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Abstract 
The signing of the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action between Iran and global powers on 14 
July 2015 was a major turning point in the emerging strategic landscape of the Middle East. 
The ‘nuclear deal’ led to the lifting by the EU and the US of nuclear-related sanctions and is 
now operational. Other sanctions remain in place, however.  
Nevertheless, unhindered by US competition, European trade delegations have entered into a 
latter-day gold rush, led by the promise of the biggest untapped market in the world. As such, 
the EU has both an opportunity and a responsibility to help Iran reintegrate properly into the 
international system. But, faced with a system of governance where the lines of command and 
control are not always clear to the outside observer, Europe stands to lose if it continues to 
pursue its uncoordinated approach towards the Islamic Republic.  
This report offers recommendations to guide the EU towards a comprehensive EU strategy for 
relations with Iran. It maintains that there is no other option but to keep universal values and 
the rule of law at the core of the emerging bilateral relationship. In fact, the protection of the 
economic rights of European traders and investors would allow the EU to push for wider 
reforms and the normalisation of relations. 
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EU-Iran Relations after the Nuclear Deal 
Steven Blockmans, Anoushiravan Ehteshami and 
Gawdat Bahgat (eds) 
May 2016 
Executive Summary 
After more than a decade of painstaking diplomatic negotiations, the Joint Comprehensive 
Plan of Action (JCPOA) between Iran and global powers was signed on 14 July 2015. The 
Iranian nuclear deal was a major turning point in the emerging strategic landscape in the 
Middle East. On 15 December 2015, the Board of Governors of the International Atomic Energy 
Agency issued a resolution ending speculation about the possible past military dimensions of 
Iran’s nuclear programme. That resolution paved the way for the implementation of the 
JCPOA on 16 January 2016, the temporary lifting by the EU and the US of nuclear-related 
sanctions, and the start for the Islamic Republic of a process of reintegrating into the global 
system. 
This report examines Iran’s internal political, societal and economic dynamics, as well as the 
country’s role in a changing region. An examination by several experts provides the basis for 
a critical analysis of the development of the European Union’s relations with Iran in three key 
areas: trade and investment, energy cooperation and human rights. It does so within the 
parameters established by the current international sanctions regime which, as the 
contributions to this report reveal, is so far the only coordinated effort in Europe’s relations 
with Iran. Other than that, there is no comprehensive approach that would synchronise and 
subordinate member state-level policies. Unhindered by competition from the US, European 
trade delegations are tripping over each other to secure segments of what is commonly 
described as the world’s last big market to open up. 
Europe’s approach to renewing ties with Iran has so far been premised on building personal, 
institutional and business relations, while avoiding a confrontation with the Iranian 
authorities in areas where differences of opinion exist: human rights and fundamental 
freedoms, the arms embargo on Syria and ballistic missile tests. The main justification offered 
by European foreign policy officials for this stance is the overriding priority to strengthen the 
pro-reform camp in Iranian politics. 
The dilemma for the EU is that it is faced with a state in which each branch of government, 
including that of the reformist President Hassan Rouhani, is under the control of a Supreme 
Leader who aims to secure both the legacy of the Islamic Revolution and the future of the 
system of government that he has helped to put in place. This means that Europe stands to 
lose by pursuing its uncoordinated approach. As in the case of Russia, which took the foreign 
policy establishment in the West by surprise when it annexed Crimea, keeping up appearances 
with Iran could lead to unexpected and unfavourable consequences. If the EU and its member 
states continue to avoid confrontation with the military business conglomerates like the 
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Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC) that support the Supreme Leader, this will not 
only play into the hands of the hardliners, it will also prolong the dangers for European 
companies of doing business in Iran. Even for smaller trade deals, enterprises are in need of 
EU-wide support in the form of due diligence and clear, simplified procedures for complying 
with EU and international law, such as anti-corruption measures and non-financial disclosure. 
All this raises the question of what elements could contribute to a more effective EU policy 
towards Iran. This report maintains that, even from a realist standpoint, there is no other 
option but to maintain universal values and the rule of law at the core of the emerging bilateral 
relationship. Put differently: the protection of the economic rights of European traders and 
investors provides the wedge to push for wider reforms and the normalisation of relations. 
The EU is vested with both an opportunity and a responsibility to help Iran to properly 
reintegrate into the international system. In this respect, the determination of the EU and Iran 
to engage in a human rights dialogue is a welcome first step. 
Complementing the agenda set out in a joint statement issued on 16 April 2016 during a visit 
to Tehran by High Representative/Vice President Federica Mogherini, and no fewer than 
seven of her fellow European Commissioners, and in an effort to inform a future 
comprehensive EU strategy for relations with Iran, this report makes the following key 
recommendations: 
 The EU should focus on well-coordinated, pre-planned policies that aim to best serve 
Europe’s collective long-term security and commercial interests, while resolutely 
promoting universal values. To that end, all public statements by European leaders should 
be coordinated with the European External Action Service. Similarly, each energy deal, 
trade agreement or investment pact should be carefully examined for EU-level consistency 
prior to its conclusion with Iran. The latter demands compliance with both the EU’s 
internal security framework and strategic relations with its neighbours. The 
Commissioners’ Group on External Action, chaired by HR/VP Federica Mogherini, will 
be instrumental in providing strategic guidance and inter-service coordination at EU 
headquarters, and indeed in promoting the development of a common commercial policy 
towards Iran (see below). 
 The methods of successfully circumventing UN, EU and US sanctions, aided and abetted 
by corporate financial institutions, demand a deeper analysis to prevent them from being 
used in the future. This analysis should be a priority for the EU and be undertaken in close 
cooperation with US authorities. Failure to closely coordinate strategies to apply sanctions 
will not only harm European banks and businesses but will also encourage hardline 
’principlists’ in Iran to oppose international agreements and obligations. Instead, a 
protection strategy for European trade entities should be developed, with a quick rollback 
if Iran reneges upon the JCPOA or if other sanctions are imposed in the wake of further 
ballistic missile tests, human rights violations or sponsored terrorist activities. 
 A transatlantic committee, comprising EU and US officials, should be established to detect 
and report energy, trade and investment deals falling under the sanctions regimes against 
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Iran, including the brokering, transit, or transfer of dual-use goods or technologies that 
could be employed to repress dissidents, sponsor international terrorist activities, or wage 
cyber attacks against EU and NATO members. By creating a monitoring and reporting 
mechanism in full coordination with the UN procurement channel, existing US 
requirements and the EU’s directive on non-financial information disclosure, it would be 
easier for European businesses to comply with their obligation to report annually on how 
they respect rules on human rights, the environment, anti-corruption, money laundering 
and counter-terrorism when operating in Iran. 
 Relations between Iran and the countries assembled in the Gulf Cooperation Council, led 
by Saudi Arabia, will be the key factor in how regional events evolve. In view of the deep 
scepticism on the Arab side of the Gulf about Iran’s intentions in the region, it is imperative 
that the emerging EU relationship with Iran is not seen to be at the expense of the Arab 
states. The EU should refute the prevailing zero-sum attitude and encourage broad 
regional cooperation. 
 The EU should try and make use of Iran’s intimate knowledge of its neighbouring 
countries while engaging Tehran as a constructive actor in the region. Bilateral security 
interests converge in finding a peaceful settlement to the civil wars in Syria and Yemen, in 
countering terrorism (e.g. Daesh) and combating narco-trafficking. 
 The EU should strengthen the value of intercultural dialogue and people-to-people 
relations initiatives. Any form of political rapprochement needs to be embedded in society. 
Only then can relations develop into functional ties between states and societies. 
 As for the long-term prospects for bilateral economic relations, and if the situation in Iran 
continues to evolve favourably, both parties should envisage a revival of negotiations for 
a Trade and Cooperation Agreement (TCA) so as to put bilateral economic relations on a 
solid footing and explore further openings for businesses on both sides. 
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CFSP Common Foreign and Security Policy of the EU 
ECO Economic Cooperation Organization 
EEAS European External Action Service 
EIKO Execution of Imam Khomeini’s Order 
EP European Parliament 
GCC Gulf Cooperation Council 
General License H Licence issued by OFAC describing the extent to which US citizens can 
be involved in Iran-related activities for non-US persons 
GSP Generalised Scheme of Preferences 
HRVP EU High Representative for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy/Vice 
President of the European Commission 
IAEA International Atomic Energy Agency 
IRGC Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps 
IRI Islamic Republic of Iran 
ISIL Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant 
JCPOA Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action 
Implementation Day The JCPOA became operational on 16 January 2016 
LNG Liquefied natural gas 
OBOR ‘One Belt, One Road’ initiative of China 
OFAC US Office of Foreign Assets Control 
QF Quds Force 
P5+1, E3+3, E3/EU+3  EU-facilitated diplomatic grouping consisting of France, Germany, the 
UK, China, Russia, and the US 
SCO Shanghai Cooperation Organization 
SDN specially designated nationals list of the US 
SNSC Supreme National Security Council 
Sykes-Picot  secret 1916 Franco-British agreement defining spheres of influence and 
control in the Middle Easy 
TCA Trade and Cooperation Agreement 
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An Introduction 
Steven Blockmans, Anoushiravan Ehteshami & Gawdat Bahgat 
The signing of the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) between Iran and global 
powers on 14 July 2015 represented a major turning point in the emerging strategic landscape 
in the Middle East. The JCPOA became operational on 16 January 2016 (‘Implementation Day’) 
and led to the temporary lifting by the EU and the US of nuclear-related sanctions and the start 
of a process of re-integrating the Islamic Republic into the global system. As such, the Iranian 
nuclear agreement is a big deal, but it does not represent the silver bullet for the normalisation 
of relations.1 
A short history of EU-Iran relations 
Since the mid-2000s the controversy over Iran’s nuclear programme has dominated relations 
between the European Union and Iran. The EU’s policy goal in this dispute has always been 
to  
“achieve a comprehensive, negotiated, long-term settlement which restores 
international confidence in the exclusively peaceful nature of the Iranian nuclear 
programme, while respecting Iran’s legitimate right to the peaceful use of nuclear 
energy under the Non Proliferation Treaty.”2  
This declared objective is no different from that of the United States. Brussels, however, had 
initially adopted a different tactic from Washington.  
Since the early days of the 1979 Revolution relations between Washington and Tehran have 
been marred by mutual hostility and mistrust. The United States has sought to isolate and 
contain Iran. For their part, the Europeans have taken a less confrontational approach and 
sought to influence Iran’s domestic and foreign policies by engaging the country in 
commercial and diplomatic relations. In other words, the Americans played the role of ‘bad 
cop’ while the Europeans played ‘good cop’. Eventually, the two roles converged at the 
beginning of this decade and Brussels followed Washington’s lead in imposing strict economic 
sanctions on Iran and suspending most forms of cooperation. Since the signing of the JCPOA 
in 2015, however, the EU institutions and member states have vigorously sought to re-engage 
Iran economically and strategically, whereas the US approach has been much more restrained. 
                                                   
1 See S. Blockmans, “The Nuclear Deal with Iran: Le moment suprême?”, CEPS Commentary, 16 July 
2015. 
2 Council of the EU, “Factsheet: The European Union and Iran”, doc. 5555/2/12 REV2, 23 March 2012. 
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The difference between the American and European policies towards Iran can be explained by 
historical, commercial and geopolitical factors.3 Since the 1979 revolution Iranian-US relations 
have been marked by mutual antagonism, while those with Europe have witnessed a series of 
up and down episodes. Generally, however, Tehran has had warmer relations with the 
European Union and some individual European countries than with the United States. The 
EU has also been Iran’s major trade partner for many years, with Iran exporting a large share 
of its oil and petroleum products to European markets in return for machinery, transport 
equipment and chemicals. 4  There is the proximity factor: Iran and the broader Persian 
Gulf/Middle East region are in the EU’s wider neighbourhood – whatever happens there has 
a deeper and more direct impact on Europe than on the United States. The recent refugee and 
migrant crisis is a case in point. These differences between Washington and Brussels (as well 
as some differences between EU member states) have provided Iran with opportunities to 
emerge from its international economic and political isolation.    
Against this background Tehran and Brussels sought to establish cooperative relations in the 
aftermath of the Iran-Iraq war (1980-88). These efforts, however, were hampered by 
disagreements over the fatwa (religious ruling) against Salman Rushdie and allegations of 
Iranian involvement in terrorist activities. Despite these obstacles and setbacks, the Iranian 
and European sides initiated the so-called ‘critical dialogue’, which later evolved into a 
comprehensive one. The EU sought to use growing trade and commercial ties as well as 
flourishing political dialogue to change Iran’s policy in four areas: human rights, the Arab-
Israeli conflict, allegations of sponsoring terrorism and the proliferation of weapons of mass 
destruction (WMD). Gradually, the nuclear issue has dominated relations between the two 
sides, particularly since revelations of previously undeclared nuclear activities in 2002. The 
latter was coupled with two other developments. First, the US invasion of Iraq in 2003 
heightened tensions in the Middle East. EU member states were deeply divided, also because 
of concerns that Washington might start another war against Iran, which would further 
destabilise the EU’s neighbourhood. Second, in an effort to close ranks, in December 2003 the 
EU articulated a broad strategy against the proliferation of WMD, signalling a growing role 
for Europe. 
All these developments laid the ground for European-Iranian nuclear negotiation. Diplomatic 
efforts were led by France, Germany and the United Kingdom (the ‘E3’) and started in 2003. 
In the following year Javier Solana, the then High Representative for the Common Foreign 
and Security Policy, joined the negotiation on behalf of the EU. In November 2004 the 
                                                   
3 The academic literature on Iran’s relations with the United States and Europe is quite extensive. For 
official perspectives, see US Department of State, Diplomacy in Action: Iran 
(www.state.gov/p/nea/ci/ir/index.htm); European Union External Action, The EU’s Relations with 
Iran (eeas.europa.eu/iran/index_en.htm); European Commission, Trade: Iran 
(ec.europa.eu/trade/policy/countries-and-regions/countries/Iran). 
4 See the statistics compiled by the European Commission’s DG TRADE 
(http://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/docs/2006/september/tradoc_113392.pdf).  
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Europeans and Iranians signed an accord known as the Paris Agreement, under which Tehran 
agreed to suspend uranium enrichment and the ‘E3/EU’ recognised that the suspension was 
a voluntary confidence-building measure and not a legal obligation.5 This agreement did not 
last long. The two sides accused each other of not living up to their commitments.  
Following the election of President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad in 2005, Tehran resumed its 
enrichment of uranium and the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) referred Iran to 
the United Nations Security Council. In 2006 and 2008 Solana presented offers for a negotiated 
solution of the nuclear dispute that included several economic and diplomatic incentives.6 
These incentives fell short of Iran’s expectations and demands, however.  
It is within this context that the United Nations Security Council issued four resolutions (1737 
of December 2006, 1747 of March 2007, 1803 of March 2008, and 1929 of June 2010). These 
resolutions imposed strict and comprehensive economic sanctions on Iran. In parallel, the EU 
took a similar stance to that of the US and adopted a raft of autonomous sanctions. The 
negotiating track was never completely abandoned, however. Between 2010 and 2014, EU 
High Representative Catherine Ashton led several rounds of negotiations with Iran in a format 
that became known as the ‘P5+1’ or ‘E3+3’ (France, Germany, the UK, China, Russia and the 
US). Her successor, Federica Mogherini and the team at the European External Action Service 
(EEAS) led by Helga Schmid, continued negotiating with Tehran and eventually, along with 
other global powers, concluded the JCPOA.7 
Several conclusions could be drawn from this brief discussion on the relations between the EU 
and Iran. First, during this long process of negotiating a nuclear deal with Iran the EU has 
successfully maintained a unified voice. Occasionally, some minor disagreements arose 
between individual European negotiators, but eventually Iran was presented with a coherent 
EU policy. Indeed, some EU analysts have hailed the outcome of the negotiations with Iran 
over its nuclear programme as a success for the EU diplomatic structures that were put in 
place after the entry into force of the Lisbon Treaty in 2009.8  
Second, the conclusion and implementation of the JCPOA suggest that a new chapter in Iran-
EU relations is about to be written. One could argue that the EU, with its proven record as a 
major economic player, is well-positioned to substantially increase investment and trade ties 
with Iran.9 During a recent visit to Tehran of High Representative/Vice-President Federica 
                                                   
5 www.iaea.org/sites/default/files/publications/documents/infcircs/2004/infcirc637.pdf 
6  See W. Posch, “Iran and the European Union”, in R. Wright (ed.), Iran Primer, USIP Press, 2015 
(http://iranprimer.usip.org). 
7 In this last phase, the EU insisted on yet another acronym to brand its role in what the rest of the world 
referred to as the P5+1: the ‘E3/EU+3’. 
8 Cf. the contribution by Fernando Garcés de los Fayos to this report. 
9 See T. Cronberg, “The Great Balancing Act: EU policy choices during the implementation of the Iran 
deal”, Non-Proliferation Papers No. 50, April 2016; and E. Geranmayeh, “Engaging with Iran: A 
European Agenda”, ECFR Policy Brief No. 139, July 2015. 
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Mogherini and no fewer than seven of her fellow European Commissioners, the EU and Iran 
mapped out a broad agenda for bilateral cooperation encompassing, inter alia, political, 
human rights, macro-economic and finance dialogues, as well as cooperation on agriculture 
and the agri-food industry, transport, the environment, science, education and culture.10 Such 
cooperation is likely to give badly needed momentum to Iran’s economic growth. Yet the level 
of expansion of such bilateral economic relations will depend on the investment climate and 
infrastructure in the Islamic Republic, and indeed Tehran’s compliance with the terms of the 
JCPOA, among other factors.11 
Third, both the EU and Iran are paying a heavy price for regional conflicts and instability in 
several Middle Eastern and South Asian states, including Afghanistan, Syria, and Iraq.12 The 
implementation of the JCPOA is likely to facilitate and enhance strategic cooperation between 
Brussels and Tehran, as seen in the Geneva talks on Syria. 
Regional security 
One of the most striking developments in the Middle East is the strong stance adopted by 
Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates and Qatar.13 The roots of this assertiveness go back to 
the 2003 US invasion of Iraq, which upset the regional balance of power to the detriment of 
the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) states. In Arab eyes, the toppling of Saddam Hussein 
provided Iran with an opportunity to expand its influence in the entire Middle East and South 
Asia region. Recent developments, including the civil wars in Syria and Yemen, have further 
intensified GCC states’ suspicions of Iran. The signing of the JCPOA has further undermined 
US credibility and raised alarm that a rapprochement with Iran might be at the expense of 
relations with Arab states. These perceptions have convinced Arab leaders to be more 
proactive in pursuing their own regional national security objectives. 
A key question to be considered in this regard is whether the approach that Saudi Arabia and 
other GCC states have taken is in fact sustainable. Factors that speak for the GCC states include 
a degree of internal legitimacy, supported by continued relative domestic stability and 
accumulated financial reserves. The significant military assets at their disposal could be used 
to provide military assistance or allow the GCC states to undertake their own interventions. 
But there are also a number of limitations that must be considered. One, the financial tools 
available to the GCC states are not necessarily open-ended. The fall of oil prices cost the region 
                                                   
10 Cf. the Joint Statement by the High Representative/Vice-President of the European Union, Federica 
Mogherini and the Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Islamic Republic of Iran, Javad Zarif, Tehran, 16 
April 2016, reproduced in the annex to this report. 
11 See the contributions by Azadeh Zamirirad, Senén Florensa, Enrico Ponzone, Jay Modrall, Arnaldo 
Abruzzini, Majid Golpour and Nima Rashedan to this report. 
12 Cf. the contribution by Roger Kangas to this report. 
13 Cf. the contribution by Christian Koch to this report. 
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$380 billion of lost revenue in 2015 alone,14  at the same time that domestic and regional 
commitments increased. Two, the GCC states’ military track record has not been encouraging, 
as the current conflict in Yemen proves. Plans announced for the creation of a joint Arab army 
have so far not advanced significantly. The facts remains that when it comes to hard security, 
the US remains the indispensable ally, despite all the misgivings of recent years. 
In the foreseeable future, relations between Iran and the GCC, led by Saudi Arabia, will be key 
to how regional events evolve. The question here will be whether the two sides will be able to 
seize the opportunity of the nuclear deal to also advance regional ties and escape the sectarian 
narratives that have become increasingly prevalent. While Iranian President Hassan Rouhani 
and his Foreign Minister Mohammed Javad Zarif have called for cooperative relations, there 
is deep scepticism on the Arab side of the Gulf about Iran’s actual intentions. Within this 
context, it is imperative that growing European relations with Iran are not seen to be at the 
expense of the Arab states. The EU should refute the prevailing zero-sum attitude and 
encourage broad regional cooperation. 
Energy cooperation 
Energy security is a major concern for the EU institutions and member states alike. As a bloc, 
the EU is heavily dependent on foreign oil and gas supplies. In 2013, i.e. prior to the 
destabilisation of Ukraine by Russia, it accounted for only 5.8% of the world’s energy 
production and 12% of its consumption. The EU imported 39% of its natural gas from Russia, 
29.5% from Norway and 12.8% from Algeria. For crude oil, 33.5% came from Russia, 11.7% 
from Norway, 8.6% from Saudi Arabia, and 8.1% from Nigeria. Overall in 2013, the EU’s 
import dependency for all energy products was at 53.2%, rising to 65.3% for natural gas 
alone.15 Within this context, importing oil and gas from Iran would reduce the EU’s over-
dependency on Russia and contribute to the diversification of energy imports.16 
Iran’s gas production has increased by over 550% since 1990, 17  according to the Energy 
Information Administration. This is due to the dramatic increase in production brought about 
by the inauguration of several phases of the South Pars field, the largest gas structure in the 
world. Gas output has further been prioritised as part of the “Iran’s 20-Year Outlook 
Document” issued in 2003, and augmented by “Iran’s Energy Outlook on the Horizon of 2025” 
and “Iran’s 20-Year Energy Grand Strategy Document”.18 Together, these policy and strategy 
documents chart the country’s energy roadmap, planning to make Iran the third-largest gas 
                                                   
14  See M. Smith, “$380 Billion in Upstream Projects Delayed as Oil Keeps Tanking” 
(www.oilprice.com/Energy/Energy-General/380-Billion-In-Upsteam-Projects-Delayed-As-Oil-Keeps-
Tanking.htm). 
15 European Commission, EU Energy in Figures Statistical Pocketbook 2015 
(http://ec.europa.eu/energy/en/news/energy-statistics-galore-new-eu-energy-pocketbook). 
16 Cf. the contribution by Anoushiravan Ehteshami to this report. 
17 Energy Information Administration, Country Brief: Iran (www.eia.gov). 
18  See M. Houshisadat, “The Role of Iran’s Future Liquid Natural Gas Supply in the EU’s Energy 
Security”, Asian Affairs, Vol. 46, No. 3, autumn 2015, pp. 458-475. 
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supplier in the world by 2025. Looking forward, Tehran has already announced various oil 
and gas industry projects worth $185 billion and has welcomed foreign (European) investment 
in many of these projects. 
The growing energy cooperation between Europe and Iran incites intense competition from 
other major oil and gas importing nations. Iran’s return to the energy market is resented in 
Moscow, but greeted with enthusiasm in Asia, particularly in China, which has announced a 
grand ‘silk road’ vision that aims to unite Eurasia around Beijing’s economic agenda. As the 
United States becomes increasingly energy self-sufficient, China has moved in the opposite 
direction. The bulk of its new supply is likely to come from the Middle East. Similarly, Japan 
has a growing interest in Iranian energy and will be keen not to fall too far behind China. India 
and South Korea are two other major Asian importers of Iranian oil and gas. Unlike Europe 
and Asia, the United States’ energy ties with Iran are likely to remain at a very low level. Still, 
Washington is likely to remain keenly interested in the export direction of Iranian oil and gas 
and the EU’s ability to mitigate the continuing risk of exposure to Russian supplies. 
Meanwhile, the EU will have to balance economic relations with Iran against relations with 
Iran’s Arab neighbours and their politico-security ties with the US. In short, the way forward 
holds both opportunities and risks.   
The way forward 
The signing of the JCPOA in 2015 established a new strategic framework for relations with 
Iran. Brussels can engage Tehran in a strategic partnership to fight Daesh and other extremist 
organisations, to find a peaceful settlement to the civil wars in Syria and Yemen, and to 
mitigate the impact of the refugee and migrant crisis. The EU has several mechanisms at its 
disposal to continue its gradual rapprochement with Iran. Within this context, ‘Brussels’ — in 
particular the European External Action Service and the European Commission – can play a 
major role in spearheading and coordinating economic and strategic cooperation with the 
Islamic Republic. 
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Iran’s New Centrism – A Tactical Retreat for Factional Re-formation 
Azadeh Zamirirad 
With the election of Hassan Rouhani in June 2013, the pragmatist faction of Iran’s political 
elites reclaimed the executive branch, for the first time in nearly 16 years. The return of 
pragmatism has been particularly evident in Iran’s foreign policy, where after more than a 
decade of unsuccessful talks, the Islamic Republic was able to reach an agreement with the 
E3/EU+3 on its nuclear programme. Solving Iran’s most challenging foreign policy crisis since 
the war with Iraq through diplomatic means was a formidable success for the new President 
and his Foreign Minister Javad Zarif. It was also a sign of Iran’s willingness and capability to 
compromise on a most sensitive political subject and to further engage with the international 
community, particularly with the European Union.   
Today, the EU and Iran are engaging in new rounds of talks on a “broad and comprehensive 
agenda for bilateral cooperation”. The conditions for enhancing relations have never looked 
so good since the ‘Comprehensive Dialogue’ took a back seat to the negotiations on Iran’s 
nuclear programme, with Germany, France and the UK assuming a decisive role in 
establishing and maintaining communication channels with the Islamic Republic to solve the 
issue diplomatically. The political environment in post-sanctions Iran appears to be more 
moderate; the nuclear deal and the recent setback to hardline principlism19 at the February 
parliamentary and Assembly of Experts elections were perceived as a logical continuation of 
a process that started with the return of pragmatism to Iran’s executive. Factional divisions 
seem to have blurred and lost their significance, noticeably in the last elections where some 
candidates’ names could be found on all electoral lists. Centrism has been on the rise in Iran, 
projecting an image of a more pragmatically oriented political elite. Given the emergence of 
this new centrism, however, the factional convergence on the political middle ground is not 
so much a product of political moderation or competing factions overcoming differences, as a 
result of the strategic choices made by those factions.  
Political margins eroding 
The current political scene is mainly the outcome of three domestic developments in Iran. The 
first was the strategic decision of the reformist faction to subordinate their own political 
agenda to other moderate forces within the political elite. Their willingness to form a new 
alliance of convenience with the pragmatists was the direct result of a marginalisation process; 
branded as “seditionists” by their conservative adversaries in the aftermath of the 2009 
presidential elections, the initial 2nd of Khordad reformist movement was systematically 
excluded from the process of political opinion-making and marginalised within the factional 
                                                   
19 ‘Principlists’ (usulgarayan) form a major political wing in Iran, claiming the necessity to recommit to 
what they consider revolutionary and religious principles. 
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sphere. Reformists responded by largely boycotting the parliamentary elections of 2012. Only 
a year later, however, they abandoned their protest-through-boycott approach and attempted 
a political comeback during the presidential elections, when their goal to remove the 
principlists from the executive branch was deemed attainable. Nominating Mohammad Reza 
Aref as their candidate, they soon withdrew their own nominee in favour of the pragmatist 
Rouhani in order to increase the chances of the moderate camp to beat principlist opponents. 
Later considered as a first step towards their political comeback, the reformists proclaimed 
“the second step” during the February 2016 elections as a slogan and title of an electoral list 
collectively assembled with the pragmatists. The close and outspoken alliance of the moderate 
factions aimed to break the dominance of the principlist camp in parliament and within the 
Assembly of Experts. For the reformists, breaking that dominance essentially meant the 
removal of one of the main obstacles to their attempt to reassume their position in the factional 
system.  
Second, the principlist camp underwent rapid fragmentation. Where the moderates succeeded 
in forming a unified and competitive bloc, the principlist camp largely failed. Initially devised 
as an attempt to counterbalance the rise of the 2nd of Khordad movement in the late 1990s, the 
principlist project to unify the political right fell apart, particularly during the second term of 
their political frontman, Mahmoud Ahmadinejad. Factional infighting over spheres of 
influence and access to resources, and differing views on the necessary means to preserve the 
political order, led to gradual disintegration and even open conflict. Irreconcilable differences 
also appeared during the nuclear negotiations, when prominent proponents of the principlist 
camp gave up their initial position on Iran’s nuclear diplomacy and advocated compromise 
on sensitive issues such as limiting enrichment activities. Other vocal principlists remained 
resistant to the idea of a comprehensive solution and were decidedly opposed to the JCPOA. 
Their categorical rejection of a diplomatic solution caused the moderate conservatives among 
the principlists to distance themselves from the outer margin of their camp, reorienting 
towards the centre of the political spectrum. While the diplomatic approach of the pragmatist 
government and the prospect of a nuclear deal with the E3/EU+3 enjoyed broad support 
among the Iranian population, the ‘Worried Movement’ and its proponents in parliament 
fundamentally objected to compromise and increasingly gave the impression of obscurity and 
agitation. Thus, many moderate conservatives considered it a necessity to keep this part of the 
principlist camp at a distance.  
Third, in the aftermath of the presidential elections of 2009, a strategic shift among Iran´s 
leadership occurred, caused by a severe domestic crisis. When people took to the streets to 
protest against the declared election results, giving rise to the ‘Green Movement’, parts of the 
political elite supported the protesters in accusing the government of electoral fraud and 
manipulation. While the demonstrations were eventually dissolved, partly by violent right-
wing interference, the domestic crisis unleashed by the unexpected events intensified during 
the second term of Ahmadinejad’s already contested presidency, when the factional infighting 
of the political right reached its peak. Developments showed that domestic challenges could 
not only stem from popular dissatisfaction but from the factional sphere itself, and were 
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capable of posing an existential threat to the political order – either by aligning with social 
unrest or by transgressing the prevalent norms of inter- and intra-factional power struggles. 
In an attempt to diminish this potential threat in a top-down fashion, the political leadership 
deemed it necessary to contain those parts of the political right that were prone to using 
violence and to lay the ground for political moderation in a less strained factional 
environment. 
Ongoing quest to reclaim lost ground 
Against this background, Iran’s new political centre is a product of convenience rather than 
conviction and not per se indicative of overall political moderation. However, the newly found 
middle course has been seen as a promising starting point by the current government, aspiring 
to set in motion a shift of power that can be sustainable. At this point, the hope for durability 
is met by challenges from both sides of the political spectrum. The reformists backed Rouhani 
in the presidential elections of 2013, expecting him to make political concessions in return. 
Their calls to strengthen civil rights and enforce the constitution have so far borne little 
political fruit, however. Backing the President and the pragmatists once more in the February 
elections contributed to a relative decline of principlist power in parliament and the Assembly 
of Experts, yet the reformist support of pragmatism has not resulted in a substantial political 
comeback. Actual reformist representation in the newly elected parliament is still 
comparatively low. Having gained little from sacrificing their distinctive political profile, their 
pressure on Rouhani will increase with the presidential elections of 2017, where once again he 
will be in need of their support. The reformists are not the only faction to have to re-evaluate 
their political agenda and approach. The principlist factions will weigh up their prospects for 
reorganising the political right to prevent pragmatists from further expanding their political 
influence far beyond the parliament and the governmental realm. Making use of their 
dominance in essential political sectors such as the judiciary, they will continue to limit 
Rouhani’s room for manoeuvre.  
These developments are nothing new. Balancing and counterbalancing dynamics have been 
an integral part of Iran’s highly contested and factionalised political sphere, which has been 
neither static nor linear in its progression. After 16 years of the executive branch being ruled 
by the outer margins of the political spectrum, the Islamic Republic has arrived at the political 
centre. A centre that is more suggestive of factional compromise and moderation but one that 
is fundamentally a tactical retreat for factional re-formation. Notwithstanding the nuclear 
deal, political engagement and the electoral success of moderate forces, Iran’s factional sphere 
remains rivalrous enough for its future to take more than one political direction.  
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Internal Transformation and Changing Mentalities: Impact on the Iranian 
Regime 
Senén Florensa 
Relations between the West and Iran have often been difficult, even painful, but the JCPOA 
concluded on 14 July 2015 in Vienna between Iran, the five permanent members of the UN 
Security Council plus Germany and the European Union opened up a path that may allow for 
evolutionary change in all of the societies involved in the deal’s implementation. After nearly 
four decades of international isolation following the 1979 Revolution and the economic 
sanctions endured by the country and its citizens, this evolution has become especially visible 
in Iran. Analysing Iran’s foreign policy in relation to the country’s internal transformation and 
the readjustment of mind-sets that has occurred in Iranian society, we can see how this has 
brought about a progressive, if limited, transformation of the regime itself. These changes have 
allowed for a convergence with global powers’ positions on the nuclear issue. 
Evolving positions 
All societies undergo a constant evolution of character and internal organisation, in slow 
processes that often go unnoticed within the social fabric. Unlike abrupt changes to the power 
structure, such as the Arab uprisings five years ago, or the Revolution of the Ayatollahs in 
1979 in Iran, or a coup d'état, there are more fundamental changes that consolidate over time 
and finally create a feeling of acceptance in the social conscience.  
The change in position adopted by Iran since it embarked on the last round of negotiations in 
2013 has been widely debated. Some experts20 consider it to be the result of the economic 
situation in the country since the economic sanctions began. One simple fact sums up the 
problems: the economic forecast of the World Bank placed Iran’s growth rate at 3.8 positive 
points for 2011, which then plummeted to 6.6 negative points for 2012. It was described as a 
“perfect economic storm”, with the price of oil at historic lows amid the regime of international 
sanctions, and without the possibility of diversifying into other sectors because of a lack of 
investment and funds. According to this thesis, the regime should have felt forced to relent 
and to some extent give up the nuclear arms race in exchange for a reduction of sanctions. This 
does not mean that there cannot be a new regression if Iran contravenes the JCPOA, although 
for now there is acceptance of the demands of the international community. Other analysts21 
defend the existence of a strategic, slow but fundamental change in Iran’s internal policy. After 
three and a half decades of international isolation Iran is now facing pressure to reform and 
                                                   
20 See Karim Sadjadpour, “Iran and the U.S.: After the Nuclear Deal”, Asia Society, New York, July 2015.  
21 See Michael Singh, “Where does the U.S. – Iran Nuclear Deal Go Now?”, Miller Center, University of 
Virginia, September 2015; and James Bowen and Karim Sadjadpour, “After the Nuclear Deal, Which 
Iran Will Flourish”, IPI Global Observatory, August 2015. 
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modernise. New reformist or moderate leaders should begin to prioritise the country’s 
national interests over the revolutionary ideology on which the regime was founded.  
In fact, we are dealing with a combination of the above-mentioned theses. The gradual internal 
change in Iranian society resulted in the election in 2013 of President Rouhani, one of the 
drivers of the nuclear negotiations. Meanwhile, the eruption of regional conflicts and the 
complex situation experienced by neighbouring Syria and Iraq have changed the rules of the 
game for Iran.22 The expansion of the terrorist organisation Daesh has put al-Assad, one of the 
few allies of the Ayatollahs’ regime, in an awkward position. Moreover, interventions by 
world powers such as Russia, the US or the EU in Iraq and Syria indicate a set of convergent, 
if conflicting interests and have resulted in a tentative rapprochement with Iran over the last 
three years.  
To analyse the change of thinking within the regime itself, let us first accept the hypothesis of 
strategic change. Not only because it is promising for Western countries insofar as it brings 
greater stability to the region, but also because there are multiple factors that indicate this 
direction.   
The foundations of the revolution and the Islamic regime  
The Islamic Revolution in Iran in 1979 surprised the world, not only because of the success of 
a popular subversive movement that put an end to a system that boasted a 2,500-year history, 
but because it was the first movement that so notably exploited the political use of (Shia) Islam. 
As is known, in reality many more ideological movements and sectors of Iranian society 
participated in the 1979 Revolution, such as the democrats, liberals or nationalists. However, 
the greatest triumph was attributed to the Shia religious leaders and to Ayatollah Khomeini, 
above all. From there a rapid erosion of the existing secularism led to a growing influence of 
Shia-inspired ‘principlism’23 in Iranian civil life and the eradication of free market liberalism 
in big business and industry, thereby inaugurating a socialising trend (mainly in favour of the 
allies of the regime) mixed with ‘bazar capitalism’ in the economic field.  
These two factors – the religious and political revolution led by the clerical class against the 
shah’s secular elite and the shift of economic power from the old capitalists to the alliance 
between the revolutionary guards (see below) and the ‘bazar’ community – are fundamental 
to understanding and setting out the interests and social struggle that developed in Iran since 
the early 1980s. These two pillars of the regime illustrate how the abrupt social changes 
brought about in Iran by the Revolution created many supporters of the new system, but many 
other opponents as well.  
                                                   
22 See the contribution by Christian Koch to this report. 
23 See the contribution by Azadeh Zamirirad to this report. 
16  PART I: A CHANGING IRAN IN A CHANGING REGION 
 
Power and the balance of interests  
After almost 40 years of the Islamic regime, is there reason to think that at the heart of Iranian 
society there is a gradual reformist transition that can give way to a more liberal system and 
improve relations with Europe and Western countries? An analysis of recent events might 
suggest that much of this is due to the presidency of Rouhani and the skills of Javad Zarif as 
Minister of Foreign Affairs. But they are only the visible face of this change; logically the 
process has not only had the consent of Ayatollah Ali Khamenei but also other fundamental 
actors in Iranian society.24 
The social stability achieved under the Ayatollahs since the Revolution has largely been 
possible thanks to their ability to manipulate religious belief and patriotism in favour of 
constructing a united and more solid regime. The Supreme Leader also has a security network 
in the Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC), an élite military corps formed by over 
150,000 soldiers with the main objective of preserving Islamic revolutionary values. In 
exchange, these ‘Guardians of the Islamic Revolution’ or ‘pasdarans’ have a privileged 
position with respect to, for example, the regular Iranian army. This position has largely 
resulted in the control and development of a conglomerate of companies with high acquisitive 
power and influence in key sectors of the economy, such as oil.  
Although the IRGC is merely an implementing body within the Iranian government system, 
they play a very important role and are still faithful to the original mandate of the Islamic 
Republic with all the consequences that this entails, including poor relations with Western 
countries. The achievement of internal political stability has also allowed them to focus their 
efforts and consolidate their position in other areas, such as the economy. Oil exports have for 
many years been crucial in relations between Iran and other (non-Western) governments. But 
problems arise when economic and political interests clash, as happened when sanctions were 
imposed in 2012. This inevitably involves the need to take a decision and prioritise. We should 
therefore ask if the Guardians of the Islamic Revolution, who are economically interested in 
strengthening the capacity of their industrial conglomerates, will always give precedence to 
the Islamic Revolution with an ossified regime or whether their own commercial and security 
interests will also play an important role. So far they have been a conservative force within the 
system in order to preserve their privileges. 
There is also the theory that political and economic liberalisation will directly affect the 
regime’s economic structure, especially if there is a massive influx of foreign capital, as recent 
events and discussions in economic fora indicate.25 This change could also be to the detriment 
of the economic power in areas controlled by the IRGC. If they cannot prevent or compete 
efficiently with the entry into the market of competitors these newcomers could threaten their 
monopoly in various industrial or commercial fields.   
                                                   
24 See the contributions by Azadeh Zamirirad and Majid Golpour to this report. 
25 But see the contributions by Enrico Ponzone, Arnaldo Abruzzini and Anoushiravan Ehteshami to this 
report. 
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Internal transformation and modernisation of mentalities 
Another more profound factor concerning the evolution of the regime in Iran is linked to the 
internal transformation experienced by civil society. Thirty-seven years after the Revolution, 
there is an inevitable generational change that translates into a gradual transformation of 
values and mentalities in the country and therefore somehow in the Islamic system. Some 
specialists and authors describe this as a ‘midlife crisis’ in relation to the theory by the historian 
Crane Brinton known as the ‘seven stages of revolution’.26 It is argued that Iran has gone 
through the first six stages of its revolutionary cycle and is currently in a period of recovery 
from the ‘revolutionary fever’ led by actors other than those who carried out the first stages. 
They are new generations with a different set of priorities from those of their predecessors, in 
which advocacy of civil Islam undoubtedly exists but moderation and the introduction of 
reforms are also deemed necessary. Approximately 60% of the population in Iran is under 30 
while most of the political instruments of power are still in the hands of the revolutionary 
leaders, most of whom are over 70. Logically, as long as such control remains with them, it 
would be absurd to expect substantial changes in the regime’s system in the short term. 
Moreover, dialogue between the extremes is complex due to the generation gap. 
But let us first characterise the new Iranian generations and later focus on their capacity to 
create reformist trends and how these have an impact, or not, on the regime. Iran’s young 
people share many of the religious values that their parents, the national education system 
and the other mechanisms of the regime endeavour to instil in them. They are Shiites, proud 
of their origin and their beliefs. Yet many factors differentiate them from their parents, such 
as easier access to academic training in schools and universities.  
There are also elements that mark out and distance most of the population from the political 
class. Iranian citizens do not speak about nuclear weapons. They are concerned with 
maintaining their families, keeping their jobs and being able to cover basic needs, and would 
tend to oppose the sanctions imposed as a result of the nuclear arms race. There are issues of 
general interest but in this respect their order of priorities is different from that of their political 
representatives and military officers. 
Over 4.5 million young Iranians currently study at university – 5% of the total population.27 
This is without taking into account primary and secondary school pupils. There are also over 
50,000 students who have chosen to study abroad and they are representative of the Iranian 
diaspora. However, youth unemployment was over 25% in 2015. Combined with the financial 
difficulties they face in accessing higher education, this provokes great unease. Consequently, 
their vision of Iran and their personal or collective interests may be decisive for the country’s 
future, especially for the design of its social and economic reform policies.  
Iran’s civil society and its young people in particular have always advocated for their rights 
and interests. Many historical episodes have shown the capacity and power of Iranian students 
                                                   
26 See C. Brinton, The Anatomy of Revolution, revised ed., New York: Vintage Books, 1965. 
27 Cf. the data presented in the contribution by Enrico Ponzone to this report. 
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once they join popular movements. The 1979 Islamic Revolution was itself partially based on 
the mobilisation of Iranian urban society and students were key to how events played out 
through the pressure exercised on Reza Pahlavi before he left the country.  
Another example was the peaceful student demonstrations in 1999 following the closing of the 
reformist newspaper Salam, which were forcefully repressed. This finally led to the confluence 
of students and unemployed youths in the main cities such as Tehran, Mashhad and Shiraz, 
with violent confrontations with the regime’s law enforcement bodies. The response from the 
‘principlists’ was to step up repression and control when faced with what they saw as attacks 
against the regime. However, a seed had been sown that would sprout just one decade later.  
The 2009 ‘Green Revolution’, although initially linked to candidate Mir Hossein Mousavi’s 
campaign to the presidential elections of 12 June that year, soon went beyond its primary 
purpose to become a reformist social movement with subversive undertones that questioned 
the results of the elections won by Ahmadinejad. Moreover, it coincided with the 
commemoration of the student protests held ten years before. This time, however, there was 
a new element that strengthened the movement: the internet and social media. The use of new 
communication technologies by the activists and participants meant an exponential increase 
in their ability to achieve their purpose. The influence that such a movement may have had on 
other Middle Eastern and North African countries just two years later is debatable, however.  
At present what interests us in the Green Revolution is not so much the question of whether 
it resulted in specific political change but rather a reflection on its very nature. Must we 
understand the Green Movement as a specific phenomenon in a particular historical moment 
or is it the result of the transformation experienced by Iranian society? This is not a trivial 
issue, because the latter thesis would mean that it is simply a matter of time before new Iranian 
generations seek to create social movements to reform the regime inspired by their 
predecessors, as happened in 1999 or 2009.  
Younger Iranian generations are highly distanced from their revolutionary grandparents. 
Access to global communication media has played a major role in the development of a two-
speed Iran. While the political and economic representation of the country has endured 
international isolation for almost 40 years, its youth has never had so much international 
contact. Surveys on the numbers of internet users in Iran vary wildly, but it seems safe to 
assume that between 30 and 40% of the population use the internet (i.e. 23 to 31 million 
people).28  Despite the restrictions and page-blocking of the top 500 most visited websites 
(Facebook, Twitter, Google, Yahoo…), in many cases these sites continue to be accessible to 
everyone experienced in computing. And this is just one example of the gradual 
rapprochement to the Western world, the modernisation of attitudes. It nevertheless shows 
the influence it has on the evolving vision and critical spirit of Iranian youth, which, together 
                                                   
28 Cf. B. Pourghadiri, “The Bewildering Maze of Internet Usage Statistics in Iran”, 24 August 2014 
(www.netbina.com/blog/2014/8/8/internet-usage-in-iran#sthash.q8twQT8P.dpuf). 
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with their involvement in social issues through political instruments, results in a push for 
necessary reforms to the regime.  
The thesis that cyclical trends within Iranian society lead to organised social movements also 
means accepting a clear reformist trend. One consequence is partly the election of President 
Rouhani, a moderate cleric who to a large extent has had the support of younger Iranians. And 
the recent nuclear agreement has resulted in a direct rise in his popularity and that of his party 
in the last round of general elections. However, there has been much attention given to the 
power of the Guardian Council over the candidates for election and the influence of the 
Ayatollah or the Expediency Discernment Council, the administrative assembly appointed by 
the Supreme Leader to revise the Constitution. Out of over 3,000 reformist candidatures 
submitted, only 30 (i.e. 1%) were approved in the first cut established by the Council. Thus, 
only insofar as the new generations can take on a more significant role in the political field will 
major reforms within Iran’s regime be possible.  
Defining a future European position 
The Islamic Republic of Iran is at a crossroads: the coming months will be fundamental to 
understanding the future of the country and its role in the region. The recent elections are just 
a first step, but the population seems to have advocated a moderate reformism that may 
introduce social, political and economic improvements within society. This will help Rouhani 
in his efforts to propose a gradual external opening and will give him and his people the 
opportunity to continue working in the same direction as led them to sign the nuclear 
agreement.  
A feasible political strategy for the EU, despite it being a risky one,29 would have to be based 
on advocating the idea of Rouhani as the legitimate political actor to engage in dialogue. 
Despite his long career in the regime and his occasional iron fist with the progressive social 
movements, the reformist leader has been Europe’s main guarantor of a nuclear agreement 
through dialogue. It is a risky agreement because the Ayatollah Ali Khamenei and the IRGC 
still have the greatest political influence.30 But recent international successes should mean an 
increase in popularity for Rouhani and ensure further steps towards a gradual transition. The 
current President has the support of the younger generations, a wide electoral base, and has 
been fearless in his talks with the Guardians of the Islamic Revolution, without presenting 
himself as an antagonist to their power.  
This offers some hope for the West but it also poses a challenge: we must be ready to extend 
our hand to Iran, with which there has been limited understanding in recent decades. We have 
the possibility to support Iran on its path to an internal and external transformation, not only 
because it is a unique opportunity that can easily be closed off but because it is the best way 
to confront the regional and global challenges that unite us more than divide us. We should 
proceed with caution.   
                                                   
29 Cf. the contributions by Azadeh Zamirirad and Nima Rashedan to this report. 
30 Cf. the contribution by Majid Golpour to this report. 
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The Opening Up of a Latter-Day Eldorado? 
Enrico Ponzone 
Much has been said about the importance of the JCPOA, which came into force on 16 January 
2016 – so-called Implementation Day. A flood of European delegations have been vying for 
the attention of the Iranian authorities ever since and many MoUs have been signed and 
promises made. When it comes to the crunch, however, these promises are yet to deliver. And 
this is a cause of great concern for the Rouhani government as it tries to fend off mounting 
criticism from opposition hardliners. 
Iran’s government is under pressure to deliver growth and jobs. Now that nuclear sanctions 
have been lifted, it can sell oil, access long-frozen assets and invite foreign investment into an 
economy in dire need of a modernising boost. There are, however, still many things it cannot 
do.31 The remaining US sanctions mean that dollar transactions through the US system are still 
forbidden and ‘U-turn transactions’ are not allowed (these are cleared through a US bank even 
though the money does not originate or stay in the United States). There is now growing 
evidence of pressure being brought to bear by US financial companies on European peers, 
strongly discouraging them to do business with Iran. 
For Iranian supporters of the JCPOA, the window of opportunity is very small. President 
Rouhani is faced with two major deadlines: the US elections this autumn could dramatically 
change relations with the US, and in June 2017 his own electorate will decide whether or not 
to re-elect him, assessing the impact of 18 months of post-sanctions benefits. 
Facts vs fiction 
For all the excitement about the potential of the Iranian market – often described as the world’s 
last big economy to open up – not much is known about its key characteristics. Little research 
has been carried out in recent years and investors are only now scrambling to conduct due 
diligence investigations into the market.  
As yet, there are no trade agreements with the EU. Iran exited the GSP (Generalised Scheme 
of Preferences) in February 2014 due to having been classified by the World Bank as an upper 
middle income country for three consecutive years. GDP per capita figures reveal that the 
country is in fact a middle income country, positioned between Mexico and Brazil. Even under 
sanctions, Iran’s GDP is comparable in size to G20 economies. Iran’s economy is also more 
diversified than other regional oil exporters.  
                                                   
31 For more details, see the contribution by Jay Modrall to this report. 
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Figure 1. Iran’s comparative GDP per capita  
 
While Iran has the world’s largest natural gas reserves and fourth largest oil reserves, only 
14% of its revenues come from oil exports. The lifting of sanctions is expected to lead to 
resumed growth in the GDP rate, of around 6% per annum over the next two years. 
Figure 2. Iran’s reserves of natural gas and crude oil 
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Iran has a young and well-educated population. At 80 million, it is the 19th largest in the 
world, and 65% of this population is under 35 years of age. The literacy rate in Iran is much 
higher than that in other emerging markets and neighbouring countries: 87% nationwide and 
99% amongst the population aged 15-24 years. A legacy of its rich and cultured history, Iran 
is 7th in the world in terms of the number of publications in pure sciences, 16th in applied 
sciences, and 3rd in terms of engineering graduates. Iran has the highest rate of scientific and 
vocational education in the world: 47% of Iranian university students are studying science, 
engineering, manufacturing or construction.  
Figure 3. Comparative uptake of higher education 
 
Apart from its wealth of natural resources, the country has a very low level of debt, as shown 
in the chart below. By dramatically reducing consumer choices, sanctions may also have 
contributed to the country’s high savings ratio, which is close to 40%, according to the IMF. 
Interest rates are of course the main explanation for this high rate – an Iranian resident with 
funds invested at a local bank can now obtain an interest rate of between 20-25% – coupled 
with the historically high level of inflation, which stands at 14% (down from 40%). 
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Figure 4 a & b. Government debt and national savings rates 
 
Years of isolation and government interference have produced a highly fragmented banking 
sector with a high level of bad debt. Most Iranian banks need to be recapitalised and the 
availability of frozen foreign assets could usefully contribute to this end. 
For such a large country with a highly diversified economy, the stock market is fairly 
representative of its economy. Other frontier markets are generally dominated by the financial 
or natural resources sectors with very minimal sector diversification. This is not the case for 
Iran, which has a highly diversified industry breakdown.  
Figure 5. Industry break-down in Iran’s stock exchange 
 
Source: Tehran Stock Exchange. 
Capitalisation stands at close to $180 billion, similar to that of Poland, with a free float of about 
18%. Capitalisation is still relatively modest, as shown by the chart below, which sets it against 
other key Middle Eastern markets such as Turkey and Saudi Arabia. As a percentage of GDP, 
Iran’s market stands at 19% compared with Turkey at 21%, Brazil at 31%, Russia at 38% and 
China 61%.  
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All the current enthusiasm for Iran may prove to be short lived if certain issues are not clearly 
understood and dealt with. Financing is one of them. After years of hardship, Iranian 
companies lack capital and desperately need to modernise. The current system favours state 
companies over private sector operators and this does not encourage foreign direct investment 
because investors need to navigate the intricacies of Iran’s domestic market. To cap it all, 
everything moves very slowly. Many MoUs are signed every time a new foreign delegation 
visits Tehran, but there are so far very few tangible contracts as a result of these memoranda.  
Iranians are expecting Europeans to transfer know-how and to create jobs. European 
companies are keen to enter the market but are reluctant to rush in. They need to understand 
this new market, to conduct accurate due diligence to avoid the remaining US sanctions, to 
find partners they are comfortable with and to get the green light from their banks, which in 
most cases are still wary about establishing links with Iran. 
Whatever the reason for caution up to now, Iran is arguably a unique proposition for investors 
today – the last great frontier/emerging market for business and investors alike. It offers a 
relatively mature economy, developed market infrastructure, a well-educated work force and 
extremely attractive macroeconomic fundamentals. Political will on all sides is all that is 
needed. 
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Regional Security: A View from the Arab Gulf States 
Christian Koch 
One of the most important geopolitical shifts to have occurred in the Middle East in the past 
few years is the activist foreign policy pursued by the Arab Gulf states, with Saudi Arabia, 
Qatar and the United Arab Emirates (UAE) taking the lead. This new foreign policy stance is 
not a sudden development but has its roots in the 2003 US invasion of Iraq, which upset the 
regional balance of power to the detriment of the GCC states and initiated a series of 
developments that weakened the region’s security. Since 2003, the Arab Gulf states feel that 
they have been pushed into a new role that would not necessarily be of their own choosing. 
Nevertheless, they are ready to take on the mantle and are not about to shy away from any 
confrontation or disagreements that such a role entails.  
The evolving role of the GCC states needs to be understood as being grounded in three factors. 
First, there is the domestic level, where both a leadership and a generational change is 
occurring within the Arab Gulf countries, namely in Qatar, the UAE, Bahrain and Saudi 
Arabia. Kuwait and Oman will experience something similar soon. There is also a transition 
underway within the wider society, in which the upper and middle echelons of state authority 
are being filled by new and better empowered nationals. Government-led efforts to build 
greater institutional capacity to underpin independent decision-making, which is quite visible 
in the UAE, can be said to be bearing fruit. 
In the context of this empowerment, there is a high degree of confidence about the ability of 
the GCC states to chart their own course; a conviction that as mature states they can be 
proactive in matters of direct concern to their security. As well as this bold sense of reserve to 
confront difficult situations, there is a clear realisation that inaction and waiting for others to 
determine regional developments is in fact dangerous. The regional element in foreign policy 
discourse is thus taking on a distinct shape in the Gulf.  
Second, over the past decade a series of developments has greatly increased the geostrategic 
threats facing the GCC states. From the perspective of GCC capitals, the main issue is the 
persistence of Iran’s hegemonic regional agenda, which questions the GCC’s legitimacy at a 
fundamental level. The assessment of recent developments is that Iran both contributes to and 
profits from the regional turmoil by supporting non-state actors (i.e. Daesh, the Kurds etc.) 
that challenge the state structures in the region. Iran is also profiting from such turmoil by 
seeing its influence spread in the wider region. As things stand, the Arab Gulf states do not 
see in the Islamic Republic a partner with whom a security arrangement for the Middle East 
can be reached. For this, Iran would need to change its policies and engage with the GCC states 
on an even footing. 
Outside of Iran, other regional challenges include the rise of militant Salafist/Takfiri 
movements such as al-Qaeda and Daesh; the emergence and persistence of militias and 
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various non-state actors in Iraq, Syria, Libya and Yemen; the subsequent fragmentation of the 
same states with diminishing options for resolution of these conflicts. There is also the populist 
street revolt stemming from the Arab Spring, which fundamentally questions the existing 
social contract in place throughout the region. On all these fronts, the GCC has put forward 
policy suggestions that have not been heeded by the wider international community. The 
failure to listen to and accommodate GCC concerns has added to a conviction within the Arab 
Gulf that independent policies are necessary.  
The third factor pushing the GCC states to pursue an activist foreign policy is the increasing 
sense of disappointment and doubt about US policies (and to a certain degree European 
policies) in the region. Here, the legacy of the 2003 Iraq invasion, despite GCC warnings, has 
opened a Pandora’s Box of unintended consequences. But these consequences have been 
exacerbated by the policies of the Obama administration and its precipitous withdrawal from 
Iraq in 2009; the failure to follow through on stated red lines in Syria; and the perception that 
the US is shifting towards Iran as a result of the JCPOA on the nuclear issue. As it stands, there 
is simply no confidence among the GCC states that the US will continue to be the status quo 
power that for decades provided for similar points of view among their Arab Gulf allies. 
President Obama’s reference32 to internal threats rather than the threat from Iran has further 
cemented this scepticism. In essence, the message being received is that ‘if you want something 
doing, you have to do it yourself’.  
Under current circumstances, the GCC states will see themselves as having little choice but to 
pursue their foreign policy activism further. This means an intense determination to push back 
on Iran’s interventionism, to solidify relations among the Arab Sunni states, and to engage 
diplomatically with countries like Russia, Turkey, China, as well as key European states. In 
exchange for its support for the JCPOA, GCC countries such as Saudi Arabia and the UAE 
expect the US to acquiesce to the new Gulf assertiveness as a quid pro quo. This includes support 
for military interventions in, for instance, Yemen.   
The way forward: strengths and weaknesses 
Yet, for all their determination, there remains a key question about the real sustainability of 
the role taken by Saudi Arabia and the other GCC states. Factors that speak for the GCC states 
include a high degree of internal legitimacy supported by continued domestic stability, 
continued financial and economic strength, the significant military assets at their disposal that 
could provide military assistance or allow the GCC states to undertake their own 
interventions, and the increasingly accepted view among states in the region that the Arab 
states need to act together.    
But a number of limitations must also be considered. For one, the financial tools available to 
the GCC states are not necessarily open-ended. The fall of the oil price has cost the region $380 
billion in lost revenue in 2015 alone, at the same time that domestic and regional commitments 
                                                   
32  See Obama’s interview with Thomas Friedman (www.nytimes.com/2015/04/06/opinion/ 
thomas-friedman-the-obama-doctrine-and-iran-interview.html). 
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have increased. Second, the GCC’s military track record has not been encouraging, as the 
current conflict in Yemen underlines. Plans announced for the creation of a joint Arab army 
have so far not advanced significantly. The fact remains that when it comes to defence matters, 
the US remains the indispensable ally, despite all the misgivings noted above.   
Other limitations for the GCC include their relatively weak institutional capacity and the 
continuing internal differences of opinion. The GCC states are not a monolithic bloc and the 
member states have been at odds with one another just as much as they have been in 
agreement on the necessity for an Arab front. Only in 2014 were there suggestions that the 
GCC was on the verge of a split due to the disagreement with Qatar over support for the 
Muslim Brotherhood. And there continue to be significant differences in opinion about how 
to promote regional security, with the Sultanate of Oman at times being isolated in its position 
from the rest of the GCC.    
As such, it is too soon to conclude that a new era of GCC/Saudi leadership is here to stay. 
While in the near term there may be some successes, such as having the Houthis join the 
Yemeni political process or seeing increased military pressure on Syrian President Assad 
through better Saudi Arabia/Qatar/Turkey coordination, the opposite may also occur, with 
the GCC finding itself increasingly bogged down in a conflict in Yemen whose outcome it 
cannot determine, or seeing the extremist groups in Syria empowered and ultimately turning 
their attention to the monarchies in the Gulf. The result for the GCC states is a mix of 
confidence and anxiety.  
One key in terms of GCC success will be how other regional relationships are managed – with 
Egypt, with Turkey, and more importantly with Iran. Iran-Saudi and Iran-GCC relations will 
be the decisive factor in how regional events develop – positively or negatively. The question 
here will be whether the two sides will be able to utilise the opportunity presented by the 
nuclear deal to also advance regional ties and escape the sectarian narratives that have become 
increasingly prevalent. While Iranian President Hassan Rouhani and his Foreign Minister 
Mohammed Javad Zarif have called for cooperative relations, there is deep scepticism on the 
Arab side of the Gulf about actual Iranian intentions. Particularly in light of the events at the 
start of 2016 when the attack on the Saudi embassy in Tehran led to the break-off of all 
diplomatic relations by the kingdom with Iran, the outlook for a near-term improvement in 
relations is not very good. Given the mind-set in the region and the decades-long enmity that 
has existed between the two sides, the situation is such that unless Iran makes a genuine effort 
to bridge the differences with their Gulf neighbours – be it on Yemen, on Syria, on Iraq or on 
issues that Saudi Arabia and the other GCC states see as really signalling Iranian intent, the 
GCC states will continue on their more confrontationist course. As it stands, the current zero-
sum mentality in the region prevails, with little indication that this will change.  
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The Impact of the Iranian Nuclear Deal on Central Asia 
Roger Kangas 
The JCPOA has been viewed variously as ‘historic’, a ‘game-changer’, a ‘way to reintegrate 
Iran into the community of nations’, or the ‘worst deal for security in the region’, depending 
upon one’s perspective. Whatever the viewpoint, the nuclear deal signalled the end of one 
process and the start of another that could build confidence among the participating states. Of 
course, other countries in the wider Middle East will feel the effects of this deal. Although not 
directly part of the negotiations, a number of them were often kept abreast of the negotiation’s 
general progress to include the points of contention. More often than not, officials and 
commentators in Turkey, Israel, Saudi Arabia, Iraq, Afghanistan, and Pakistan readily voiced 
their support for/opposition to the process. These were usually framed in terms of their own 
views on Iran as a critical neighbour. To a lesser extent, the Central Asian states were also 
made aware of the ongoing process.  
This contribution examines the implications for Central Asia of the JCPOA. Is it a positive 
step? What are the potential challenges? And what might be the unintended consequences for 
Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan? 
Pragmatism and opportunism 
Over the past 25 years, Iran has played a curious role for the countries of Central Asia. Despite 
the alarm raised by the Islamic Revolution in 1979, relations between Iran and the then Soviet 
Central Asian Republics have generally been characterised by pragmatism and opportunism. 
Only one of the five countries shares a land border with Iran, Turkmenistan, and that state has 
had limited cross-border road and rail traffic since the 1990s. In 1996, a railroad was built 
between Sarakhs, Turkmenistan, and Mashhad, Iran, with a more substantive line established 
between the two countries (including a northern route up to Kazakhstan) in December 2014. 
Rail traffic is planned to increase from 3 million to 10 million tons per annum, with the 
potential to exceed 20 million tons by 2020. Tajikistan, the country with a closer ethnic and 
linguistic affinity to Iran, has also had longstanding ties that include economic, trade, and 
political links. Iran was a viable venue for peace negotiations during the concluding years of 
the Tajik Civil War (1992-97) and has maintained a relatively strong interest in economic 
investment in that country. Transportation, aluminium mining, hydropower investment, and 
commerce are the key elements of bilateral trade that is to exceed $300 million a year by the 
end of this decade. Kazakhstan has periodically explored robust cross-Caspian energy deals 
with Iran, more in the form of oil swaps with its southern (and equally energy-rich) neighbour, 
and is part of the aforementioned transportation link involving Turkmenistan. Finally, 
Uzbekistan and Kyrgyzstan have been more distant from Iran, mainly due to a lack of real 
common interests, but also because at times these states were actively supportive of the United 
States and NATO during the Afghanistan campaign, indirectly affecting their ties with Iran. 
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One fundamental belief unites the Central Asian states on any agreement that would restrict 
the development of weaponising nuclear technology and, hence, the JPCOA: all five states are 
part of the Central Asia Nuclear Weapons Free Zone (CANWFZ). This agreement, which was 
signed on 8 September 2006 in Semey (Semipalatinsk), Kazakhstan, formalised the Tashkent 
declaration of 15 September 1997. At that event, the Foreign Ministers of the Central Asian 
states announced that they would not pursue nuclear weapons technology, or have such 
weapons located on their territories. This is particularly prescient, as four ‘neighbours’ possess 
such weapons – Russia, China, India, and Pakistan. Overall, the statements by political actors 
and media from Central Asia on any progress towards limiting nuclear technology in a 
neighbouring state are positive, so the JPCOA is seen as welcome news. Indeed, the 
government of Kazakhstan hosted two key rounds of the negotiations in July 2013 in Astana 
that were part of the sequence of events leading to the final agreement. Kazakhstan’s own 
troubled history with nuclear weapons explains the country’s keen interest in such a 
negotiation. The Oblast (region) of Semipalatinsk was the traditional Soviet test site for nuclear 
weapons. Public sources indicate that the Soviet government conducted 456 nuclear tests from 
the 1950s to the 1980s in the region, including sites near population centres. Along with Belarus 
and Ukraine, Kazakhstan has the distinction of being a country that gave up the nuclear 
arsenal on its territory after independence, with the last weapon removed in April 1995. 
It is no surprise, then, that public statements by the respective governments in the region were 
generally supportive of the steps leading up to the JPCOA. Of course, the same countries 
recognised that the larger global actors ultimately play the key roles in any negotiation with 
Iran, and that their own status and influence is limited.  
From the Central Asian perspective, several observations can be drawn from what has taken 
place since the actual signing of the JPCOA. First, it appears that many of the actors in the 
nuclear deal process have already moved ahead. Delegations of Europeans are visiting Iran in 
droves, hoping to strike lucrative agreements in the coming years. Thus, Central Asian 
businesses and governments are keen to see where they might take advantage of this new 
situation as well. Second, while American approval of such a deal remains unclear, that might 
not be as important if other key actors in the world ramp up their own engagement strategies. 
Because the threat of sanctions-derived penalties still loom, other countries will keep an eye 
on American actions, but perhaps less so than in the past. As with others, the Central Asian 
governments are monitoring this situation. Third, how Iran might want to move in the coming 
months and years is less certain and will be a key sign to the Central Asian countries as to 
what they can ultimately do in the new environment. Does Iran want to engage more fully 
east and northward, or are the security challenges to its west (such as Iraq and Syria) so critical 
that focus remains in that direction? Will the energy output from Iran help integrate Central 
Asian energy flows, or will these be in direct competition? These second- and third-order 
effects of the JPCOA and a probable integrated post-sanctions Iran fall into three general areas: 
security, economics, and politics. 
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Security 
The security implications of the Iran deal are generally viewed most positively in Central Asia. 
During the worst of the tensions between the US, Israel, and Iran, there were fears that any 
military conflict would potentially draw in the Central Asian states. This was because the US 
still had military bases in Central Asia: the Karshi-Khanabad Airbase in Uzbekistan (2001-05) 
and the Manas Transit Center in Kyrgyzstan (2002-14) were essential facilities for US and 
NATO operations in the Afghanistan campaign. With the end of the ISAF mission in 2014, and 
also because of pressure from the Kyrgyz legislature and outside powers such as Russia and 
China, the Kyrgyz government requested the closure of the Manas Transit Centre in the 
summer of 2014. While these facilities were never part of a ‘grand scheme’ to encircle Iran or 
launch attacks on that country, popular rumours and conspiracy theories suggested otherwise. 
This narrative was fuelled by rhetoric coming out of Washington towards the end of the Bush 
administration suggesting that military actions should, or would, be taken against Iran. 
During that time, Central Asian experts feared that these very same ‘Afghan-focused’ bases 
would be used to launch attacks against Iran, allowing it the opportunity to retaliate against 
them. With these concerns overcome, and with a de-escalation of tensions between the US and 
Iran, the security dynamics appear to be moving in a positive direction. 
In terms of state-on-state conflict, there is little discussion in Central Asia of a possible US-Iran 
war. The real challenges remain the very issues that have legitimately troubled the region: 
transnational terrorism and trafficking of narcotics, precious materials, and persons, to name 
a few. Statistically, these have been major problems in the region, with over 25% of opium 
trafficking from Afghanistan coming through Central Asia. A similar percentage comes 
through Iran, and onward to Turkey and Europe. Therefore, the ability for the states of Central 
Asia to cooperate more robustly with Iran on counter-narcotics efforts could create conditions 
to stem these flows. This would be especially appealing as Western-based counter-narcotics 
programmes could now be applied to this broader swathe of territory. For the first time, Iran 
could find itself part of trans-regional counter-terrorism and counter-narcotics efforts that 
include Western partners through existing UN Office on Drugs and Crime and EU 
programming. 
Economics 
Another important area for growth is trade and commerce. As noted earlier, such activity takes 
place to a limited extent, and the potential for further expansion is being explored. While 
opportunities will increase, it will ultimately be up to the individual countries as to whether 
they want to agree to trade and commerce deals with each other and with Iran. Opaque and 
difficult business environments remain in place, limiting the success of any transnational 
venture. For the foreseeable future, trade will most likely be in the areas of raw materials and 
hydrocarbons, and perhaps some level of re-exporting of commercial goods that transit 
through Central Asia onward to Iran and beyond (or, perhaps in the other direction). 
Transparency International, for example, ranks all parties involved in the region in the lower-
half of national economies in terms of “ease of doing business.” And when it comes to trade 
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volumes, the overall percentages will be modest, primarily because contracts for such goods 
are already in place going over existing routes, especially to and through Russia and China. 
Given the suggested lower transit costs through Iran, the medium and long-term trends could 
be more favourable, however. 
A possible framework for this growth could be the Economic Cooperation Organization 
(ECO), an organisation founded in 1965 by Turkey, Iran, and Pakistan, and later joined by 
Afghanistan, Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan 
in 1992. Over the quarter-century, the ECO has been moribund in terms of substantial and 
meaningful activity. One reason for this is that with Iran as a key member, the ECO was limited 
in terms of broader regional and global trade. Sanctions, as well as investment priorities of 
other ECO members in other directions prevented any true effort to invest in this collective 
structure. However, the strengthening of the Iranian economy and its gradual integration into 
global markets could indirectly help to revive the organisation. Indeed, in the past year, 
meetings have been held in Tehran and Shiraz promoting Iranian investment opportunities. 
While exact figures are not readily forthcoming, there appears to be a commitment on the part 
of ECO-sponsored events to promote cross-border trade and the transit of raw materials and 
commercial goods in coming years. 
It is important to raise two concerns amid the overall positive feelings about an Iranian 
economic ‘reintegration’. First of all, could the various ‘silk roads and belts’ go past Central 
Asia and focus on Iran itself? The ECO, for example, could also be used to promote Turkish-
Iranian-Afghan-Pakistani trade, bypassing the Central Asian states completely. With respect 
to trans-Afghanistan proposals, there is a credible logic, particularly in light of the transit hub 
capabilities of the Iranian port of Chabahar and the Afghan city of Herat. If the bureaucratic 
hurdles in the Central Asian states themselves remain difficult, international traders might 
find reason to simply decrease the number of border crossings and bilateral agreements in 
favour of a simpler routing. At present, there is no reliable data on this point, but such 
speculation will be part of the commercial discourse in the region as Iran moves away from 
the sanctions regimes in place. 
The same logic applies to the field of energy, in which one has to ask: is Iran a competitor, or 
a colleague? Iranian oil and gas would presumably enter the global energy market in the 
coming years. Even with depressed prices at this time, Iran’s relatively inexpensive oil would 
reach international markets more readily, ultimately competing with Central Asian oil. In 
terms of gas supply, Iran and Turkmenistan possess 34 and 14 trillion cubic meters of gas, 
respectively. As much of Turkmen gas is now committed to the Chinese market, the additional 
Iranian gas production would not damage those routes. However, as Turkmenistan plans to 
exploit more fields and develop such routes as the TAPI pipeline (Turkmenistan-Afghanistan-
Pakistan-India), the Iranian supply may be an impediment. With respect to TAPI, the less 
expensive and more secure IPI (Iran-Pakistan-India) route could be the preferred option to the 
South Asian consumer market. Most international gas experts suggest that the gas market 
could accommodate both suppliers, depending upon the chosen export routes. Moreover, as 
Iranian consumption is quite high, that country’s production actually has to satisfy the local 
32  PART I: A CHANGING IRAN IN A CHANGING REGION 
 
market. Turkmenistan, with a population of just over 5 million people, is dwarfed by the 
consumption needs of nearly 80 million Iranian citizens. With some skill, Turkmen gas could 
actually be used to supply northern Iranian cities, as those routes could prove to be cost 
effective. 
Politics 
Finally, the political implications of a re-integrated Iran should be positive for bilateral 
relations. The countries do not have a history of animosity or territorial disputes, except for 
the Caspian-wide disagreements over the delimitation of that body of water. However, 
because the Caspian Sea also includes Azerbaijan, Russia, and Kazakhstan, other cross-border 
disagreements overshadow any Turkmen-Iranian ones. 
Curiously, it is in the area of international organisations that change could be felt. Without 
question, if Iran is admitted as a full member of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO), 
this security architecture would shift. Admission is primarily a political decision, although it 
was declared in 2001 that countries under sanction could not become full members. Perhaps 
this earlier decision was a way to slow down any decision on Iranian admission; as sanctions 
are now being lifted, Iran’s full membership returns as a credible topic of discussion. Add to 
the fact that India and Pakistan are on track to be full members, the SCO is poised to radically 
change in terms of its focus and perhaps its very identity. Since the organisation’s inception in 
1996 as the Shanghai Five, the SCO has had a largely Eurasian character, with Kazakhstan, 
Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, and Uzbekistan wedged between Russia and China. The possible 
inclusion of India, Pakistan, and Iran would give the organisation a more Asian character, 
shifting the economic centre southward, given the potential power of the Indian economy. 
Having three of the five BRICS as well as the newly integrated Iranian economy in the SCO 
would distort the percentages of each contributing state. This expansion would weaken 
Russia’s presence in the organisation, let alone that of the four Central Asian members. Two, 
Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan would become statistically negligible, and Uzbekistan would have 
a difficult time keeping up with the new, larger entrants. Only oil-rich Kazakhstan would be 
able to hold its own in terms of relative economic power. 
Conclusion 
In sum, the JPCOA is welcome news to Central Asia and there is no question that the progress 
of its implementation will be followed closely in the region. While its impact will be positive 
for the respective Central Asian states, it is worth noting that as Iran integrates into the global 
economy, it could be a competitor and not simply a transit state for Central Asian goods. Of 
course, if the deal is scuttled – whether because Iran fails to abide by the terms or a member 
of the E3/EU+3 chooses not to support it – the status quo ante strategies would quickly return. 
Challenges could arise, as the Central Asians would once again find themselves on the ‘front 
line’ of any conflict with Iran. Ultimately, this only underscores the limited roles these five 
states can play in the larger arena of Iranian and global geopolitics. 
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In Search of an Effective EU Policy for Iran 
Fernando Garcés de los Fayos* 
The long game 
The European Union warmly welcomed the JCPOA agreed on 14 July 2015. This is no surprise 
because the EU, through its High Representative for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy/Vice 
President of the European Commission (HRVP), and the European External Action Service 
(EEAS) that she leads – had actively participated in the long and difficult negotiation process 
and facilitated its success. For its part, the European Parliament (EP) provided political 
support and impetus to the negotiations. While this may have raised questions about to the 
coherence of the Union’s external representation in this process, a unified EU voice has so far 
been successfully maintained. 
From the outset of the process in 2003, three EU member states (France, Germany and the UK, 
the so-called E3), along with three successive EU High Representatives (Javier Solana, 
Catherine Ashton and Federica Mogherini), were at the front-line of nuclear negotiations with 
Iran. For years they were a rather lonely group, however, having the additional responsibility 
of bridging with the other interested parties, including the USA. The E3+3 group was 
constituted in 2006 (the E3 group plus China, Russia and the USA), but negotiating with Iran 
under the radical conservative presidency of Mahmoud Ahmadinejad was no easy task. 
With the election of Hassan Rouhani as President in 2013 and the critical telephone call 
between him and US President Barack Obama, a robust final round of negotiations between 
the E3+3 and Iran began. This time the negotiations were relaunched under a precise 
framework (the Joint Plan of Action) and with tangible confidence-building measures adopted 
by each side. The negotiations were based on the concepts and ideas initially developed by the 
E3 and Iran, and were often tense, but when there was a real risk of rupture the EU group 
consistently maintained hope and favoured extensions to the self-imposed deadlines. 
When in April 2015 a provisional framework agreement was reached, and in July the JCPOA 
was finally agreed, the EU rushed to endorse the agreement. Thereafter, against all political 
odds, the important consecutive deadlines included in the JCPOA were respected, and on each 
occasion the EU contributed to and welcomed the new success. First, the immediate 
endorsement at the UN Security Council, and then the approval (or non-objection) of the US 
Congress and Iranian Majilis, which enabled ‘Adoption Day’ on 18 October 2015. More 
importantly, as a result of the verification by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) 
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positions of the European Parliament. 
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that Iran had fulfilled its initial JCPOA engagements, ‘Implementation Day’ was also achieved 
on 16 January 2016 – triggering the lifting of UN, EU and US nuclear-related sanctions.  
EU analysts tend to see the JCPOA as a test case for the functioning of EU diplomacy after its 
substantial reshaping in the 2009 EU Lisbon Treaty. The performance of the EEAS and the 
feasibility of flexible EU diplomatic formats were also under scrutiny. However, for the EU – 
a supporter of multilateral processes such as nuclear non-proliferation – the JCPOA is also 
important evidence that diplomatic means can be successful, even in a particularly sensitive 
area. Indeed, the JCPOA is an international reference and a good deal – strong, durable and 
verifiable.  
The EU, like the UN and the US, has fulfilled its engagements to lift nuclear-related sanctions 
as a result of reaching ‘Implementation Day’. In other words, an acceptable level of trust has 
been re-established between the EU and Iran after so many years of disagreements. As an 
expression thereof, HRVP Mogherini led a high-level delegation to Tehran on 16 April 2016 to 
explore different sectors of cooperation with Iran. The delegation included EU Commissioners 
Elżbieta Bieńkowska, in charge of Internal Market and Industry, Violeta Bulc, for Transport, 
Miguel Arias Cañete, in charge of Climate Action and Energy, Carlos Moedas, for Research, 
Science and Innovation, Tibor Navracsics, in charge of Education, Culture, Youth and Sport, 
Christos Styliandes, for Humanitarian Aid and Crisis management and Karmenu Vella, in 
charge of Environment, Maritime Affairs and Fisheries. 
Future engagement 
Although the EU is not so naïve as to forget previous disenchantments with Iran, it regards 
the JCPOA with hope, as it can open up other avenues of cooperation. In the US – deeply 
immersed in its electoral year – the JCPOA is however often used as a political weapon 
between the rival parties and their presidential candidates, reflecting the historically unusual 
phase of extreme political polarisation in the country. The other two JCPOA parties have 
different priorities in their approaches to relations with Iran. For Russia, the resolution of the 
Syrian crisis on its terms, and the urgency to see a rise in the world’s hydrocarbons prices are 
key elements. For China’s pragmatic foreign policy, chiefly inspired by economic gains, the 
crucial questions are whether or not its ambitious ‘One Belt, One Road’ (OBOR) initiative is 
still affordable after the unexpected slowdown in growth that it is experiencing and what 
precise role Iran – located between Pakistan / Central Asia and the Middle East – should 
assume in the project.   
In principle, the EU has a good chance of swiftly reinstating economic ties with Iran in this 
complex scenario, particularly increasing trade and investment flows. It would be logical to 
expect that in the medium term the volume of EU-Iran trade would go back to the relatively 
high levels of the 1970s. Nevertheless, a significant Iranian contribution to the EU’s energy 
security will probably not come as quickly as the EU would like, particularly in view of the 
large infrastructure development required in Iran.  
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Once the Iranian economy becomes more open and efficient, it should reach spectacular 
annual growth rates.33 The big challenge for the authorities would then be to ensure that the 
whole Iranian population benefits from this growth and not just those linked to the regime, 
i.e. that the economy and that the society modernise in parallel to growth. This is critical, not 
least because Iran has a very young population whose aspirations need to be addressed.34 For 
this endeavour, the EU can be a suitable partner, with a proven record of valuable 
contributions across the globe.  
The January visit of President Rouhani to Italy and France – just a few days after 
Implementation Day – was of real significance. The rush of EU member states’ ministers, 
accompanied by representatives of the private sector visiting Iran since last summer, is also 
noteworthy. All of this is logical since the EU has a comparative advantage: US companies 
worry about the uncertainty caused by the extent of their country’s non-nuclear related 
sanctions and the possibility of these being amplified – something that indirectly also affects 
EU firms.35 However, in this type of economic environment there is an obvious risk of falling 
into ‘competition traps’, with the potential of weakening the E3+3 common stand and 
jeopardising the JCPOA’s credibility. The risk even extends to the unity of action among EU 
member states. Additional risks to reinstate sound economic relations with Iran emanate from 
the country’s internal situation, with signs of worrying and opaque finances, uncertain judicial 
decisions and, above all, high levels of corruption – which increased faster during the 
international sanctions.  
Regional aspects 
The area of regional cooperation with Iran is of major importance for the EU, but it should also 
be for Iran – particularly given the present turmoil in the Middle East. The JCPOA presents 
Iran with a unique opportunity to demonstrate that it is an important and responsible actor 
on the international stage, applying restraint in its tense relations with Saudi Arabia and 
working constructively with other regional and international powers to seek peace in Syria, 
Iraq and Yemen. The continuous suffering of the Syrian population is unacceptable and all 
parties, directly or indirectly involved in this longstanding conflict, have the moral obligation 
to make mutual concessions to seek workable agreements that can be accepted by all parties. 
Iran’s participation in the Syrian talks is certainly a positive step here. ‘Frozen conflicts’ at the 
core of the Middle East can escalate globally at any moment and no-one would want such an 
outcome. The respect of international borders of all states in the Middle East is a basic 
condition, as rightly stressed by Foreign Minister Javad Zarif in his recent February visit to the 
EP; but this principle should also imply Iran’s recognition of all existing states and its support 
for the two-state solution for the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. The EU and Iran should closely 
cooperate in the stabilisation of Afghanistan, at a time when the Afghan authorities are facing 
                                                   
33 For a word of caution, see the contribution by Enrico Ponzone to this report. 
34 Cf. the contribution by Senén Florensa to this report. 
35 Cf. the contribution by Jay Modrall to this report. 
36  PART II: THE EU AND POLITICAL AND ECONOMIC REFORM IN IRAN 
 
an upsurge in insurgency. Both the EU and Iran share some of the painful consequences of the 
Afghan conflict, notably increased drug trafficking and an influx of refugees. 
The role of the European Parliament 
The EP has also played an important role in attaining the JCPOA and in promoting its 
implementation. This, however, has not been achieved without a degree of strain. On 3 April 
2014 the EP expressed its firm support for the nuclear negotiations and formulated its wishes 
about how Iranian politics could evolve to improve bilateral and regional relations. This EP 
resolution was badly received by the Iranian authorities. They complained that the 
resolution’s call “to mainstream human rights in all aspects of EU-Iran relations”, and the 
statement that Iran had a record of “continued, systematic violation of fundamental rights” 
was an unacceptable interference in Iran’s sovereign affairs. For Foreign Minister Zarif, 
accusations about human rights abuses were simply fabricated by groups close to ‘Zionists’. 
Visits of EP delegations to Iran were frozen for over a year, cutting off any dialogue between 
parliamentarians on both sides. However, the resolution also touched upon many other areas 
that were unfortunately relegated to second place by Iran as a result of its sensitivity to human 
rights criticisms. For example, the EP said that, subject to substantial progress in the nuclear 
negotiations: 
 EU-Iran relations should be extended to cover economic development, trade agreements, 
the rule of law and issues of regional concern, such as the civil war in Syria and the fight 
against all forms of terrorism and its causes; 
 the EEAS should carry out the preparatory work for opening an EU Delegation in Tehran; 
and  
 the Council of the EU should discuss a future contractual framework for bilateral relations, 
which would include the development of civil society and private sector in Iran, the fight 
against narcotic drugs (while ensuring that suspects receive a fair trial and are not 
subjected to the death penalty); environmental cooperation; technology transfer; 
infrastructure development and planning; education and culture; and child protection and 
health. 
In the same resolution, the EP: 
 expressed concern about the worsening environmental situation in Iran, in particular 
water shortages, desertification and air pollution, and invited the EU to facilitate 
cooperation between EU and Iranian research institutes, environmental organisations and 
cities; 
 called for a concerted effort to empower and develop civil society in Iran and to increase 
the number of exchanges for students, artists and other visitors, as well as cultural and 
academic exchanges, and to promote youth participation and civic engagement; and 
 called for the EU to pursue a more independent policy towards Iran, while coordinating 
with allies and partners. 
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In other words, the Iranian authorities’ extreme sensitivity about human rights criticism 
impeded any parallel talks about post-JCPOA areas of cooperation. Even now, during the 
recent visit of Zarif to the EP – in a much warmer political environment – he forewarned that 
the EP should understand that human rights issues should be discussed “in a spirit of mutual 
respect and without preaching”. 
Currently, the EP’s Foreign Affairs Committee is preparing a new resolution, calling for a 
comprehensive EU strategy for relations with Iran. The rapporteur is MEP Richard Howitt 
(S&D, UK) and the plenary may approve it before the summer break. The resolution will 
certainly look forward to improved and constructive relations with Iran, retrieving many of 
the proposals formulated in the 2004 resolution and probably adding new ones. But the Iranian 
authorities should also understand that the EP could never put aside its concerns about human 
rights violations in its proposals for relations with any third country. The protection of human 
rights is a fundamental principle of the EP – and of the EU as a whole. Furthermore, mature 
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Iran Sanctions Compliance after ‘Implementation Day’ 
Jay Modrall 
For many in the European business community, ‘Implementation Day,’ 16 January 2016, was 
welcomed for the EU-Iranian business opportunities that were expected to flow from the Joint 
Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA). The announcement was followed closely by a wave 
of European-Iranian delegations and conferences and announcements of planned transactions. 
Meanwhile, for US companies, the impression was that little or nothing had changed, and that 
they would be left out in the cold while European companies snapped up new opportunities.   
The truth is more complex, however, both for European, US and other business groups. The 
JCPOA was and remains essentially a limited sanctions agreement, not a trade promotion 
agreement. Companies wishing to do business with Iran must still take great care in any 
transaction involving Iran. Importantly, the JCPOA related only to sanctions imposed in 
relation to Iran’s nuclear programme; sanctions relating to Iran’s ballistic missile programme, 
and support for terrorism and suppression of human rights, are unaffected. Even for 
transactions in sectors where sanctions have been lifted there are still conditions and 
limitations that must be scrupulously observed. 
Indeed, doing business after Implementation Day is more complex, not less; while any 
transaction involving Iran was prohibited before Implementation Day, afterwards even 
permitted transactions required carefully designed compliance policies and procedures. 
US sanctions 
Much of this complexity derives from the way in which the US relaxed its nuclear-related 
‘secondary sanctions,’ which are directed towards non-US persons for specified conduct 
involving Iran that occurs outside US jurisdiction. Specifically, the United States lifted 
secondary sanctions on the following sectors or activities: 
1) financial and banking-related sanctions;  
2) sanctions on the provision of underwriting services, insurance, or re-insurance in 
connection with activities consistent with the JCPOA;  
3) sanctions on Iran’s energy and petrochemical sectors;  
4) sanctions on transactions with Iran’s shipping and shipbuilding sectors and port operators;  
5) sanctions on Iran’s trade in gold and other precious metals;  
6) sanctions on trade with Iran in graphite, raw or semi-finished metals such as aluminium 
and steel, coal, and software for integrating industrial processes, in connection with 
activities consistent with the JCPOA;  
7) sanctions on the sale, supply, or transfer of goods and services used in connection with 
Iran’s automotive sector; and  
8) sanctions on associated services for each of these categories.  
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Even in the sectors where sanctions were lifted, however, this relief is subject to strict 
limitations,36 including the following: 
 non-US companies cannot enter into certain significant transactions with Iranian persons 
still on the US list of so-called ‘specially designated nationals’ (the ‘SDN’ list), including 
the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corp. (IRGC) and its designated agents or affiliates 
(designated IRGC on the SDN list) and other persons designated as SDNs in connection 
with Iran’s proliferation of weapons of mass destruction or Iran’s support for international 
terrorism (designated IFSR on the SDN list). The SDN list still contains several hundred 
people and continues to be subject to change (including a number of additions on the day 
after Implementation Day); and 
 non-US companies cannot engage in transactions with Iran that involve the export or re-
export of US goods or services. Such exports or re-exports continue to require a licence 
from the US Office of Foreign Asset Control, or OFAC (subject to a few exceptions, such as 
certain aviation products). 
Meanwhile, the so-called ‘primary’ nuclear-related sanctions on activities subject to US 
jurisdiction remain in place, in addition to sanctions outside the scope of the JCPOA. In 
practice, that includes transactions involving US citizens and green card holders, transactions 
involving US companies, transactions involving persons located in the United States and 
transactions passing through the US financial system, such as wire transfers of US dollars.37  
These primary sanctions can be significant, even for non-US companies. For example, many 
European companies have US nationals on their boards, or in senior management roles, who 
could not be involved in the negotiation or approval of transactions involving Iran. Even 
European nationals working for European companies could run afoul of US primary 
sanctions, for instance if they participate in the negotiation of Iran-related transactions via a 
conference or during a trip to the United States. OFAC has adopted a general licence, known 
as General License H, describing the extent to which US citizens can be involved in Iran-related 
activities for non-US persons, in particular in assisting in developing compliance policies and 
procedures, but this licence is very limited.38 
                                                   
36 A collection of documents published by the State Department and another published by the Treasury 
Department is available at www.state.gov/p/nea/rt/jcpoa/index.htm and 
www.treasury.gov/resource-center/sanctions/Programs/pages/iran.aspx. 
37 For a detailed summary of the status of US sanctions as from Implementation Day, see the “Guidance 
Relating to the Lifting of Certain US Sanctions Pursuant to the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action on 
Implementation Day”, published by the US Department of the Treasury and the US Department of State 
on 16 January 2016, in annex to this report. 
38 See “General License H Authorizing Certain Transactions Relating to Foreign Entities Owned or 
Controlled by a United States Person”, published by the Office of Foreign Assets Control of the 
Department of the Treasury on 16 January 2016, in annex to this report. 
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EU sanctions 
The EU never imposed secondary sanctions comparable to those of the US, so the situation in 
the EU is somewhat simpler, but EU sanctions must also be considered. As of Implementation 
Day, EU amendments to Council Decision 2010/413/CFSP and Regulation (EU) No 267/2012 
(Regulation)) discontinued asset freezes on certain individuals and entities and permitted a 
wide range of trade and associated services in respect of Iran and Iranians, including: 
 oil, gas and petrochemicals: import and other transactions in relation to crude oil, 
petroleum products, petrochemical products and natural gas from Iran; supplies of 
previously restricted equipment and technology relating to the oil, gas and oil, gas and 
petrochemical sectors; investment in Iranian sectors of oil, gas, and petrochemicals; 
 shipping and shipbuilding: supplies of previously restricted naval equipment and 
technology; design, construction and repair of cargo vessels and oil tankers; the inspection, 
testing and certification of marine equipment; conduct of surveys, audits and visits and 
issuance of certificates and documents of compliance; provision of vessels for transport or 
storage of oil and petrochemical products; provision of flagging and classification services; 
 precious metals and currency: transactions relating to gold, other precious metals and 
diamonds; supplies of newly printed or unissued Iranian-denominated banknotes and 
minted coinage; 
 financial transfers and banking activities: financial transfers to and from non-listed Iranian 
entities; the establishment of relationships with Iranian banks and branches, offices or 
subsidiaries in Iran; the opening of branches, subsidiaries or representative offices of non-
listed Iranian banks in EU member states; 
 financial services: the provision of insurance and reinsurance to non-listed Iranian entities; 
the supply of specialised financial messaging services for non-listed Iranian financial 
institutions; transactions in public or public-guaranteed bonds with Iranian non-listed 
entities; and 
 cargo flights operated by Iranian carriers or originating from Iran have access to EU 
member states’ airports. 
As in the US, however, sanctions outside the scope of the JCPOA remain in place, and 
transactions involving Iranian citizens not removed from the asset freeze lists continue to be 
prohibited. 39 
 
                                                   
39 See the “Information Note on EU sanctions to be lifted under the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action 
(JCPOA)”, published by the EEAS on 23 January 2016, in annex to this report. 
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Snapback for violations 
Parties entering into agreements involving Iran will also need to give careful consideration to 
the risk of sanctions ‘snapping back’. Under the JCPOA, sanctions can be reinstated 
automatically, or snap back in the event of a breach by Iran. Both the US and the EU have said 
that in the event of a snapback they will not retroactively sanction conduct engaged in between 
Implementation Day and the date on which the snapback takes effect. However, that does not 
mean that continued performance of a contract entered into during that period will be 
permitted.   
The risk of a snapback may not be too significant in the case of one-off transactions such as a 
purchase or sale of goods. In the case of open-ended relationships like joint ventures, however, 
negotiating termination provisions that protect Western companies in the event that sanctions 
are re-imposed will likely be complex. 
Conclusion 
Implementation Day represented a major turning point in relations between Iran and the rest 
of the world. Broadly speaking, the lifting of certain EU sanctions and US secondary sanctions 
opens the door for European and other non-US companies and individuals to explore business 
opportunities that were previously foreclosed.   
However, non-US companies proposing to do business in Iran must be very careful to put in 
place appropriate policies and procedures to avoid inadvertent sanctions violations.   
In particular, before considering any potential transaction involving Iran, European 
companies will need to put in place procedures to ensure that US primary sanctions are not 
violated, for instance if US nationals are involved or European nationals are involved while 
travelling in the United States. They will also need to ensure that performance of any Iran-
related contracts will not entail prohibited exports or re-exports of US goods or services. 
For US-based corporate groups, the possibilities are even more restricted. As noted, since the 
JCPOA did not lift any primary sanctions, US companies continue to be prohibited from doing 
business in or with Iran or Iranian nationals. In principle, non-US subsidiaries of US corporate 
groups can engage in business in or with Iran to the same extent as other non-US companies. 
In US-based corporate groups, however, designing policies and procedures to ensure that the 
transaction does not involve US persons, commodities, technology, services, or the US 
financial system (except as permitted by General License H) will likely be even more 
challenging.  
From the Iranian perspective, the main purpose of the JCPOA was no doubt to reintegrate Iran 
into the global economy. From the European and (especially) US perspectives, however, the 
JCPOA was and remains a targeted and conditional agreement designed to curtail Iran’s 
nuclear ambitions more effectively than sanctions had done so far.  Any increase in trade was 
incidental. Indeed, the JCPOA provides no increased flexibility for US individuals or 
companies (as distinct from their non-US subsidiaries), except to assist in sanctions-
compliance policies and procedures. The continuing application of EU and US sanctions 
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regimes may delay the growth of Iranian-EU trade and disappoint European business people, 
as well as Iranians. Given that the EU and (especially) the US government are more interested 
in reining in Iranian nuclear ambitions than in promoting trade, however, it should come as 
no surprise that Implementation Day under the JCPOA has created a complex legal and 
business landscape.   
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Renewed EU-Iranian Economic Relations: Opportunities and Pitfalls 
Arnaldo Abruzzini 
Regaining lost ground 
Under the JCPOA agreed by the E3+3, along with the High Representative of the EU and the 
Islamic Republic of Iran in June 2015, five milestones were laid out to guide the suspension 
and termination of international sanction measures towards the Islamic Republic of Iran. 
One important milestone was reached earlier than expected, in January of this year: 
Implementation Day. Upon certification by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) 
that Iran had complied with its nuclear related commitments under the JCPOA, the lifting of 
a substantive amount of sanctions by the US and the EU was made possible.40  
This gave the green light that many European businesses had been hoping for, either to expand 
and seek new business opportunities in a thriving Iranian market, or to renew old business 
partnerships that had been interrupted by the sanctions regime.  
Enthusiasm on the part of European businesses is understandable because after years of 
isolation Iran’s vast market will re-join the global economy; a country of 80 million people 
with an economy in dire need of revival and the new cutting edge technologies that Europe 
can provide.  
Chambers of Commerce and Industry have seized upon the new opportunities by building 
bridges with the Iranian business community, be they through the bilateral Chambers of 
Commerce or the newly founded EU-Iranian Business Alliance. Chambers across the EU have 
also embarked on a series of large-scale national and regional business missions to Iran, 
accompanied by entrepreneurs from different sectors. As such, Chambers are prime movers 
within the EU business community in facilitating new opportunities in Iran, also for highly 
competitive small and medium sized enterprises (SMEs).  
European business dealings with Iran have changed greatly since the sanctions regime kicked 
in. Europe’s former position as Iran’s number-one trading partner has been challenged by its 
competitors. As a consequence of the sanctions, EU exports to Iran fell by 51% between 2006 
and 2013, from €11.3 billion to €5.4 billion. During the same period, US exports increased from 
US$ 85.9 million to US$ 312.8 million, and other mainly Asian countries have significantly 
increased their share of Iran's imports during this period. China, too, has become a key trading 
partner with Iran and is now a strong competitor for EU companies on the Iranian market. 
                                                   
40 For the EU, see Council Decision (CFSP) 2016/37 of 16 January 2016 concerning the date of application 
of Decision (CFSP) 2015/1863 amending Decision 2010/413/CFSP concerning restrictive measures 
against Iran, Official Journal L 11I, 16.1.2016, p. 1. 
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Yet, EU and European companies have an excellent reputation in Iran and have the capacity 
to respond to the task of regaining market shares.  
The opportunities 
The potential of Iran’s economy is significant. It is the biggest market in the Middle East, and 
has a vast amount of natural resources, comparable to those of Russia.41 Its population is 
highly educated, with tech-savvy consumers and 92% of its adult population having bank 
accounts. Consumer expenditure is expected to reach over $170 billion this year, with 
predictions of 6% for Iran’s GDP growth for this Iranian calendar year, which starts in March.42 
Given that the political situation in Iran is evolving favourably, the timing is right for EU 
business to make a move. After elections to the Iranian Parliament and the Assembly of 
Experts this February, President Rouhani and fellow reformists gained ground on the 
conservatives and hardliners, thus reinforcing their scope to liberalise the Iranian economy, 
increase privatisation and create attractive opportunities for foreign investment across 
different sectors.   
Of these sectors some merit highlighting, given the opportunities they present for EU business. 
One of those is – unsurprisingly − the oil and gas sector. Iran is home to the fourth-largest 
proven crude oil reserves and second-largest natural gas reserves. According to experts, the 
oil sector alone needs up to $200bn to make up for a decade of under-investment and 
companies such as ENI or TOTAL have already seized on some of those opportunities in deals 
signed during a recent visit by President Rouhani to Italy and France. Yet many more 
opportunities remain, also for SMEs to function as intermediary suppliers to big energy 
corporations when supplying the Iranian market.  
EU manufacturing companies, especially those in the automotive, aerospace, technology and 
industrial sectors are also expected to gain. The automotive sector, the biggest in the Middle 
East and Iran’s biggest non-oil employer, had been particularly affected by the sanctions, 
making the sector likely to be a substantial profiteur from the lifting of sanctions, as more 
foreign investment pours in, combined with increased possibilities for companies to import 
parts and machinery. Among those companies is Peugeot Citroen, which signed a deal worth 
over $430 million for a joint venture with Iranian carmaker Khodro to manufacture cars in Iran 
when President Rouhani visited France in January. The deal will see the production of 200,000 
cars annually, which is expected to start in late 2017. The preliminary agreement to produce 
and sell trucks in Iran by the large German manufacturer Daimler is another case in point.  
The transportation sector is the other major industry that will benefit from the lifting of 
sanctions. The aircraft industry, for instance, can expect a big boost, as it is estimated that Iran 
needs $7.5bn to renew its aviation fleet. In this regard, Iran already agreed to buy 118 Airbus 
aircraft, worth approximately $25 billion. 
                                                   
41 See the contribution by Anoushiravan Ehteshami to this report. 
42 For more details, see the contribution by Enrico Ponzone to this report. 
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As for the long-term prospects for bilateral economic relations, and if the situation in Iran 
continues to evolve favourably, both parties should envisage a revival of negotiations for a 
Trade and Cooperation Agreement (TCA) so as to put bilateral economic relations on a solid 
footing and explore further openings for businesses on both sides.   
The pitfalls 
While the opportunities in Iran are undoubtedly numerous, business ventures in the Iranian 
market are not risk-free, as certain challenges and obstacles remain, for which businesses and 
policy-makers need to find common solutions.  
Iran still ranks 119th out of 189 countries in the World Bank’s ‘ease of doing business’ index, 
and 136th out of 175 countries in Transparency International’s Corruption Perceptions Index. 
Most of the economic sectors are controlled and owned by the Iranian state, so doing business 
can be challenging. Structural problems, including high levels of bureaucracy, have also 
impacted the economy unfavourably and been exacerbated by corruption and the continued 
involvement of the Revolutionary Guards in economic activities, adding to the potential 
obstacles foreign investors and domestic private sector companies must seek to overcome 
when doing business with Iran. 
One of Iran’s major economic priorities in the short to medium term will be to tackle youth 
employment in the country. This is an all too familiar problem − also in the EU − and European 
Chambers have extensive experience to offer in terms of training, developing and deploying 
the skills of young people seeking to join the workforce. A bilateral dialogue track devoted to 
this issue between the EU and Iran would already be a welcome first step in this direction.   
The continuing fear over sanctions 
When deciding whether to invest in Iran, companies will need to take into account that 
sanctions could ‘snap back’ at any point, should Iran violate its nuclear commitments. It is 
therefore crucial for authorities to make it very clear to businesses which investments would 
be targeted, what guarantees apply and how companies can prepare for such an eventuality 
before they decide to invest. In this regard, the comprehensive set of guidelines prepared by 
the EEAS for businesses is a very good first step forward.43 However, they will need to be 
accompanied by further communication campaigns, especially targeting SMEs, which might 
not have the same know-how as big corporations.   
An additional element of risk is the uncertainty about the United States’ future Iran policy and 
the potential for US unilateral actions to undermine increased EU investments in Iran.44 While 
guarantees have been given by the current US administration that it will refrain from policies 
that might adversely affect economic relations with Iran, it is unclear how future US 
                                                   
43 See the “Information Note on EU sanctions to be lifted under the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action 
(JCPOA)”, published by the EEAS on 23 January 2016, in annex to this report. 
44 See the contribution by Jay Modrall to this report. 
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legislation, particularly under a new President, might impact EU business. It would become 
particularly problematic if any future US measures would have an extra-territorial effect, such 
as the counterterrorism laws that were enacted by Congress last December that excluded 
Europeans who travel to Iran from the US visa waiver programme. 
To minimise risks for EU business, it remains imperative for the EU and US authorities to 
coordinate their respective policies on Iran to the greatest extent possible and, where measures 
diverge, Europe must stand united to prevent US unilateral measures from undercutting EU 
benefits. Where needed, the Europeans should also make use of the majority in the Joint 
Commission set up under the JCPOA to mediate disagreements by both sides before they can 
pose significant threats to the agreement and consequently to any EU investment made in Iran 
as a consequence of the lifting of sanctions. 
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Energy Cooperation between the EU and Iran 
Anoushiravan Ehteshami 
The EU’s energy concerns 
The EU is, rightly, concerned about energy, particularly its member states’ long-term access to 
an affordable supply of hydrocarbons. Energy security has thus been on the EU’s political 
agenda since at least 2005 with the adoption of the March 2006 Green Paper proposing an 
energy security strategy. Following this, the Lisbon Treaty went on to provide a legal basis for 
EU energy policy, which eventually led to the adoption in 2010 of the EU Energy Strategy for 
2020.45  
Energy security for a vibrant market of 28 countries and a population of 509 million is critical. 
Since the EU holds less than 1.3% of proven global gas reserves and a negligible quantity of 
global oil reserves, it is dependent on external sources of hydrocarbons for 56% of its energy 
mix. The EU’s natural gas consumption is around 15.5% of world demand and this is the 
energy source earmarked for growth, alongside renewables. To put natural gas in context, its 
share in Europe’s total primary energy demand grew from 18% in 1990 to 24% in 2009 and 
could rise to 30% by 2030. What is more, the EU will be a proverbial ‘Gulliver in chains’ on the 
basis of it being the world’s largest gas importer by 2030. Indeed, the Union’s gas import 
dependency is expected to rise from 64% in 2009 to over 80% by 2030.  
Figure 7. European energy dependency 
 
Supply routes complicate matters further, with the EU importing as much as 85% of its gas 
through pipelines and LNG, mainly from Russia, Norway and Algeria, and receiving smaller 
                                                   
45 See (https://ec.europa.eu/energy/en/topics/energy-strategy/2020-energy-strategy). 
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LNG volumes from Qatar, Oman, Libya and even as far afield as Trinidad and Tobago. A 
number of well-recognised challenges face gas imports via pipeline, however, such as transit 
risks, Russia’s domination of the regional gas market, delays in the construction of new gas 
pipelines and, last but not least, the absence of a fully coherent European energy foreign 
policy.  
Nevertheless, interest in LNG has been growing steadily and in this regard a former European 
Commissioner for Energy in the European Commission has envisaged that the volume of 
imported LNG will grow by up to 24% in less than five years from now – marking a 60% 
increase compared to 2010. Consequently, a high number of new LNG import terminals have 
been proposed for the EU (which currently has 31 LNG terminals in existence, under 
construction or under consideration). Some 24 of these facilities are situated in Spain, the UK, 
France and Italy, ranking fourth, seventh, eighth and tenth respectively in the league of global 
importers. In addition, LNG ports offer greater resilience than pipelines as they can receive 
from different suppliers. Since the 2000 Green Paper “Towards a European strategy for the 
security of energy supply”,46 the diversification of LNG suppliers has been seen as essential to 
improving the Union’s security of gas supply and easing the supply risks mentioned above. It 
is also notable that in an unpublished study in preparation for the Green Paper the European 
Commission made the point that “competition with Japan, China, India, etc. over oil and gas 
from the Persian Gulf and Russia will become tougher in future”. This is where Iran comes in: 
as a supplier and also as one tempted by the open and opening markets of Asia. 
Iran as energy supplier47 
Iran is a strategic hydrocarbons state that straddles Western and Central Asia’s hydrocarbons 
reserves but is itself a major player, with 17.7% of the known global reserves and the world’s 
second biggest natural gas reserves, along with nearly 10% of the world’s oil reserves. British 
Petroleum (BP), moreover, has placed Iran’s natural gas reserves at the top of world rankings 
with an estimated 17.9% of the global deposits.48 Major natural gas fields include South Pars 
(which accounts for about 35% of Iran’s total gas production), North Pars (adjacent to South 
Pars), Kish, Forouz, Lavan, Golshan, Ferdowsi, and with sizeable generation coming from 
Kangan and Tabnak. According to BP’s data, 61% of the Middle East’s gas deposits are situated 
in the South Pars field, this being a single off-shore giant field shared between Qatar and Iran. 
Crucially, this is in fact the world’s largest non-associated natural gas field (non-associated 
fields are developed with the primary objective of producing natural gas; associated fields 
produce gas as a by-product of crude oil production). But according to energy sources, 62% of 
these deposits remain unexploited or underdeveloped; what is accessed is mostly for domestic 
use. It is noteworthy that Iran’s gas reserves are predominantly located offshore (almost 61%) 
                                                   
46 COM(2000) 769 final. 
47 For data and links, see M. Houshisadat, “The Role of Iran’s Future Liquid Natural Gas Supply in the 
EU’s Energy Security”, Asian Affairs, Vol. XLVI, No. III, 2015, pp. 458-475. 
48 See BP’s graph on ‘Hydrocarbon reserves’ reproduced in Enrico Ponzone’s contribution to this report.  
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and are non-associated, followed by onshore associated and onshore non-associated, each 
with 19%. Be that as it may, the potential for gas production in Iran is huge. 
Iran’s gas production has increased by over 550% since 1990, according to the country’s Energy 
Information Administration, which places Iran as the fourth global producer and as the 
Middle East’s largest gas producer today. This dramatic increase is due to the enlarged 
production from the sixth, seventh and eighth and also inauguration of the ninth and tenth 
phases of the above-mentioned South Pars field. Gas output has further been prioritised as 
part of the ‘Iran’s 20-Year Outlook Document’ issued in 2003, and augmented by ‘Iran’s Energy 
Outlook on the Horizon of 2025’ and ‘Iran’s 20-year Energy Grand Strategy Document’. 
Together these policy and strategy documents chart the country’s energy roadmap to make 
Iran the third largest gas supplier in the world, raising its current 1% share to 8-19% of the 
global market by 2025. Iran’s ‘Fifth Five-Year Development Plan (2010–2015)’ further 
reinforced the ‘20-Year Outlook Plan (2005–2025)’, as the country’s blueprint for long-term 
sustainable growth.  
On the basis of these plans, Iran’s current and expected growth in gas pipeline networks and 
LNG projects assumes that the Europe Union will be a major destination for Tehran’s LNG 
and the Rouhani administration has been reminding European leaders that the EU is regarded 
as a strategic partner for Iran and could become again Tehran’s largest trading partner (which 
it was prior to the sanctions imposed in 2012). Then, the EU accounted for a third of all Iranian 
exports, 90% of which were energy related. Iran stood as the EU’s sixth largest energy supplier. 
Looking forward, Iran has already announced its various oil and gas industry projects worth $185 
billion and has welcomed foreign (European) investment in many of them. French and Italian 
energy companies are already leading the European march and more opportunities will present 
themselves as Iran embarks on its transformation from an emerging market into an emerging 
economy with a major industrial base, quality manufactured exports and a sophisticated 
workforce.49 To realise its ambitions the country has to rely on hydrocarbons as the spark for this 
economic revolution, which expects to absorb over $50 billion in direct foreign investment. It is not 
surprising then that Iran has announced its plan to increase its oil output, despite soft oil prices. 
Indeed, Barclays has said that it expects Iran to produce almost 700,000 barrels per day (bpd) 
more oil in the fourth quarter of 2016 than over the same period in 2015. Tehran also aims to 
raise crude exports by 1 million bpd within six months of the sanctions being lifted, according 
to the government. To meet these targets, and more, Tehran looked closely at the old ‘buyback 
system’, which would not allow international firms to ‘book’ reserves or take any stake in 
Iranian firms and has replaced it with the much more attractive Iran Petroleum Contract (IPC). 
The IPC allows for (limited) ‘booking’ of reserves and also reduces the risk of investment by 
increasing the length of agreements to (a maximum of) 25 years, potentially raising the 
margins on investments quite substantially. Nevertheless, there is still little transparency 
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regarding contracts; it is unclear how contracts will be awarded and implemented and how 
the element of risk will be calculated.50 
Geopolitics 
Iran’s return to the energy market has also been greeted with enthusiasm in Asia, particularly 
by China, which has introduced a grand ‘silk road’ vision that aims to unite Asia around 
Beijing’s economic agenda. The key link to West Asia is, of course, hydrocarbons, as Michael 
Singh notes:  
“China’s commercial ambitions in the Middle East are expanding. As the United States 
becomes increasingly energy self-sufficient, China has moved in the opposite 
direction. It is projected to overtake the United States as the world's largest energy 
consumer by 2030, as its demand for imported oil grows from six million barrels per 
day to 13 million by 2035. The bulk of its new supply is likely to come from the Middle 
East, which China also needs for tapping new markets to produce its goods, invest its 
capital, and secure new labor. It is in this context that China has articulated its Middle 
East strategy, focusing on areas like energy cooperation and infrastructure investment. 
It has sought to integrate the region into its One Belt, One Road initiative, which Xi 
announced in 2013 and which would connect China with Eurasia”.51 
China, in this geopolitical context, is Europe’s direct competitor. But Japan is increasing its 
interest in Iranian energy and will be keen not to fall too far behind China, which continued 
to cultivate links with Tehran throughout the sanctions period. In 2010 Japan cooperated with 
Iran on several major projects, and at its height annual trade between the two states exceeded 
$11 billion. The volume of Iran-Japan trade stood at about $2.5 billion before the imposition of 
sanctions against Tehran, but fell to $240 million in later years. Japan therefore feels that it has 
a lot of catching up to do. 
Then there is Iran’s own interest in deepening its hydrocarbons presence in South Asia and 
India’s vast market. But Iran will have to compete with Saudi Arabia, among others, in these 
markets. 
On the other side of the geopolitical equation is the US, which is likely to be excluded from the 
changes in Iran’s energy landscape. Richard Mallinson makes the point here: 
“the reality is that for U.S. oil and gas firms, even after the JCPOA is implemented, it 
will be almost impossible to do any business in Iran. And this is the case for most U.S. 
firms. The reason is that the JCPOA will not lift sanctions or restrictions on U.S. banks 
from allowing dollar-based transactions with Iranian businesses and that creates 
significant limitations and problems that particularly apply to U.S. businesses but 
could also affect other Western firms considering a return to Iran. So, the JCPOA lifts 
a significant number of sanctions that are directly linked to Iran’s nuclear program but 
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what it leaves in place is a whole infrastructure of U.S. and UN sanctions that relate to 
other issues and other disputes between Iran and the international community. And 
that means that companies will still have to navigate a complex landscape in terms of 
compliance, in terms of legal restrictions and that landscape is much less appealing for 
U.S. businesses”.52 
But Washington is likely to remain keenly interested in the direction of travel of Iranian oil 
and gas and the EU’s ability to mitigate the continuing risk of exposure to Russian supplies. 
In conclusion 
Iran is poised to return as a major player in the Asian and European energy markets, and will 
exploit its comparative hydrocarbons advantage (particularly in terms of natural gas), despite 
soft prices. While this strategy will raise tensions with other producers in OPEC and also with 
its key security partner, Russia, Iran’s return to the energy markets has nonetheless been 
warmly received by the EU and the main East Asian consumers (China, Japan, South Korea) 
and India. If the Rouhani administration can continue to remove or neutralise the barriers to 
Iran’s reintegration in the global system of investment, production and exchange, then energy 
will provide the underpinning of close economic relations between the Islamic Republic and 
the European Union. Both sides have much to play for in the permissive post-JCPOA 
environment, but only as long as the EU is able to put politics after economics when it comes 
to its dealings with Iran. And in this, as in all their dealings with Iran, EU countries will have 
to balance their economic relations with Iran against relations with Iran’s Arab neighbours 
and their politico-security ties with the United States. Where there is opportunity, there is also 
a degree of risk. 
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Building a Long-Term EU-Iran Strategic Relationship… and Putting 
Fundamental Human Rights back on the Agenda 
Majid Golpour 
Ushering Iran’s reappearance onto the world stage  
The Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) permits a strictly civilian nuclear energy 
programme for the Islamic Republic of Iran (IRI). But the treaty is not intended to rubberstamp 
Iran with legitimacy in other domains. In fact, the sanctions relating to terrorism, corruption 
and human rights are still in place.53 
During the negotiations leading up to the JCPOA, it was understood that human rights would 
not be on the table as a bargaining chip. Predictably, the fact that Iran was negotiating with 
the world made no dent whatsoever in its disastrous human rights record. Sadly, 2015 was a 
bumper year for executions, among many other abuses across all demographics of Iranian 
society. As the world now jostles to do business with Iran, enabled by the progressive lifting 
of economic sanctions, the question remains: how will human rights be worked into these new 
relationships over the coming 15 years of the JCPOA implementation? 
Business delegations from EU member states are jetting in and out of Tehran, but since the 
treaty was signed there has been little sign of a common EU framework or roadmap for the 
normalisation of diplomatic and business relations with Iran, or interaction within the region, 
or indication of how the EU will actively support civil society within these processes. The 
implementation of the JCPOA presents an opportunity for the EU to demonstrate leadership 
and guide Iran to improve its business and governance processes, regional relationships and 
the fundamental human rights of its people – while affording both parties win-win business 
partnerships.  
But does Iran want these advances? If not, how then will relations with the democratised 
world progress? The IRI is faced with an important decision: whether to continue with an 
aggressive, hegemonic policy, or move towards a policy of détente.  
For its part, Europe cannot expect to conduct business successfully with Iran without regional 
support or major changes in procedure and process within the country. In the coming months, 
the various protagonists of the JCPOA will need to merge their strategic policies into solid 
operational frameworks – including human rights, which should be negotiated to find 
common positions based on shared values, and agreed through purely legal (non-theological) 
interpretation. To this end, however, a correct reading of Iran’s domestic political set-up is 
essential. 
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Understanding Iran’s inner workings 
For 37 years, based on the ideological capital of Khomeinism, Iran’s revolutionary rent-takers 
have monopolised power, propagating a messianic vision in defiance of the modern world. 
This has resulted in an Islamic Republic with four heads operating according to a 
polycephalous logic, with democracy in the pure sense of the word playing a minor role, under 
the absolute authority of the Supreme Leader: 
1) The central head: the Supreme Leader, the IRI’s key power which includes numerous 
foundations and conglomerations54 , the ministries of national security, justice and the 
Guardian Council of the Constitution.  
2) The expatriate head: the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) in charge of the 
defence of the Islamic revolution and international expansion, especially in the Middle 
East and North Africa (MENA) through the Quds special forces. Controls/owns most 
publicly traded companies (transport, energy, and telecommunications, banking…). An 
investment portfolio estimated at 22% of the Tehran Stock Exchange’s value, which partly 
funds the expatriate activities. 
3) The head of enforcement: the Basiji or ‘people’s militia’ – a flexible and engaged force of 
20 million people who lead normal lives until they are mobilised to suppress public 
meetings, expression and police the population. They also rely on an established power 
base within the clergy, operating across 72, 000 mosques and 10,500 shrines.  
4) The decorative head: the President and parliament, which are partially elected 
institutions. 
Looking at this opaque political system it becomes clear that the EU will need to establish 
strategic deals, not just with one faction – that of President Rouhani – but with the power 
factions above and around him, i.e. the actors representing the unelected ‘institutions’ which 
constitute the more hostile and rigid core of the political system. 
Arguably, the European Union is also a complex polity; one which enjoys less visibility in 
Iran’s ‘decision-making’ centres than Russia, China, and the US. To close this gap and to 
safeguard its own interests, the EU should not only envisage opening a diplomatic delegation 
in Tehran. It should also work towards the appointment of an independent, legally competent 
body with a ‘Head’ of JCPOA implementation, to support European businesses on the status 
and workings of the sanctions mechanisms and the related penalties (which are tied to 
financial governance and human rights criteria), and to analyse the legal obstacles to business 
operations, and draft the necessary policy to deal with them. 
For the EU to succeed in building secure and lasting multilateral relationships and 
counterbalance factional rhetoric, strategies must be targeted to the realities of Iran’s inner 
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workings and regional position – influencing at all levels, while visibly supporting progress 
and benefit for Iranian civil society.  
Deciphering Iran’s current political climate 
Since 2009, power has been monopolised at the regime’s summit by the groups and 
stakeholders of the inner ideological circle. The Guardian Council of the Constitution, which 
is the regulatory authority of ‘democracy’ in Iran, is composed of 12 people who decide the 
validity or not of all electoral candidates and laws. Six members of this council are elected 
directly by the Supreme Leader and six are appointed by the Minister of Justice, himself 
appointed by the Supreme Leader.  
It is no coincidence that political parties have not thrived, despite the so-called ‘reformist’ 
gains over the last two decades. Neither the most recent legislative elections of February 2016 
nor the second round of elections to the Islamic Assembly in May gave the necessary majority 
to the President, but allowed a timid return of the reformists and independents. 
The underlying issue of legitimacy has lingered on from the 2009 elections, as fundamentalist, 
conservative and moderate or reformist factions continued their battle for power. This 
bartering and positioning will continue at least until the presidential election of 2017. The 
regime is more than ever embedded in internal crisis, which reduces any real capacity to 
develop medium and long-term strategy. 
Add to this the uncertainties about the succession for the Supreme Leader and the Rouhani 
government’s desperate need for international finance to pull the country out of recession, pay 
its debts and fund renewal of its dilapidated infrastructure, strangled by corruption.  
To offset this triple crisis of legitimacy, economy and governance, the Rouhani government’s 
priority will be to get out of recession, reduce mass unemployment, and end the corruption 
and economic domination of the Revolutionary Guards over a heavily indebted country eager 
to see its frozen capital returned. The Supreme Leader’s priorities, on the other hand, will be 
to refocus all factions of the moderate conservative wing to strengthen the legitimacy for the 
appointment of the future guide.  He must anticipate any changes in the domestic and regional 
environments and commit all the resources of his immense financial and ideological empire 
into the hands of the future guide. 
At present, the institutions are repositioning themselves to refocus the conservatives at the 
expense of the ultra-conservative wing of the regime. If enough undesirable elements are 
successfully side-lined, thus shifting the balance of power, the thorny question for the 
reformists will be what economic and structural reforms they propose and how they can be 
actually kick-started within the coming months. This is where the EU can and should step in. 
A unique window of opportunity for EU leadership 
EU leadership on the Iranian question remains disjointed, hesitant and cautious. Member 
states prefer to quietly arrange bilateral business deals instead of actively promoting good 
governance and human rights. Yet, depending on the faction whose president is elected in the 
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2017 Iranian election, and on the outcome of the US presidential election, an about-face could 
occur both internally and in the geopolitical situation. The US, which effectively oversees the 
international sanctions regime against Iran, has made it clear that the JCPOA could be 
cancelled and all sanctions reinstated if Iran does not respect its engagements. What if the next 
US president takes a harder line than Mr. Obama, or if Iranian hardliners get a candidate into 
the 2017 president’s seat? 
These months in the run-up to the 2017 presidential elections present a unique and limited 
window of opportunity for the EU to leverage the differing interests, particularly those of the 
Rouhani government, to gain some ground in governance and human rights. 
Knowing that most of the power is in the hands of unelected institutions, with more than 60% 
of publicly traded Iranian companies controlled or owned by the Revolutionary Guardians 
and thus remaining under US sanction restrictions for any foreign transactions, EU companies 
need to be much more informed than is currently the case.55 They need to be able to correctly 
identify the main actors, sources and funding behind Iran’s key companies and transactions, 
and firmly secure their interests. The EEAS’ ‘Information Note’ is a first step in this direction.56 
But more is needed. 
The EU’s responsibility to encourage human rights in Iran 
National and European NGOs regularly report on the dire human rights situation and have 
condemned Iran for executing minors. However, explanations for the underlying causes or 
the structural obstacles are not provided – nor are strategic solutions proposed.  
At this unique juncture in time, it is human rights that must be put back onto the agenda and 
it is for the EU to develop and propose reasonable and targeted human rights initiatives. There 
may not come another time in the near future when Iran is this receptive to the rest of the 
world.  
The EU must therefore take this opportunity to assert its attachment to universal human rights 
values. Human rights are not a political discourse, but fundamental issues that span all 
political parties, cultures and nations. The nuclear agreement, with its complex system of 
sanctions, can facilitate a strategic dialogue with the one faction of the regime that is working 
more in the national interest and for a successful JCPOA implementation. 
Many of Iran’s human rights abuse mechanisms are neither written into the constitution nor 
the law, but are upheld by illegal mass repression by the Basiji militia and other pressure 
groups that do not answer to the national judiciary. These issues could be investigated by the 
dedicated JCPOA implementation team’s legal experts (including at least one expert in Iranian 
human rights), in order to help launch targeted human rights initiatives. They would analyse 
and report on human rights in Iran, and propose policy and practical initiatives to be 
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negotiated with Iran during the JCPOA implementation, while helping to deconstruct the 
rhetoric and unfounded arguments of fundamentalists.  
The insights and initiatives of this group of experts could be coordinated with the EU’s Special 
Representative for Human Rights Stavros Lambridinis, the European Commission’s Special 
Envoy for the promotion of freedom of religion or belief outside the EU Jan Figel, and Ahmed 
Shaheed, the UN Special Rapporteur on the situation of human rights in the Islamic Republic 
of Iran.  
The EU, above and beyond its member states, can and should speak confidently on ‘national 
and mutual interests,’ the fundamental rights of all humans, particularly for women and 
children, and freedom for all organisations and foundations of social legitimacy. Similarly, the 
EU could legitimately apply pressure regarding the house arrest, without charge, of bona fide 
opposition leaders since 2009, such as Mr. Karabhi and Mr. Moussavi, or negotiate the release 
of imprisoned human rights lawyers such as Mr. Soltani and Ms. Soutedeh. 
Take the example of Switzerland, which agreed a ‘road map’ for further talks on the 
ratification of a trade accord with Iran. Both parties announced that “it had been agreed to 
launch a dialogue on human rights as part of planned political consultations.” This 
demonstrates how President Rouhani and Minister Zarif can act as conduits of reasoned 
foreign pressure back into the Iranian security services and judiciary – opening doors that have 
been closed for decades. 
The coming year brings historic opportunities for Europe to take positive leadership with Iran, 
and help bring economic and humanitarian well-being to Iranians. This is a chance the EU 
cannot afford to miss. 
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Towards an EU Strategy for Iran 
Nima Rashedan57 
A critical examination of public statements by EU officials, and indeed a reading of the 
preceding contributions to this report, is testament to the lack of strategic imperative in EU-
Iran negotiations during the post-JCPOA period. Furthermore, they do not reveal any 
coordinated effort in the European Union’s relations with Iran, or a planned approach that 
would synchronise and subordinate member state-level policies. This lack of a pan-European 
strategy, in spite of the coordinating instruments at the EU’s headquarters, 58  should be 
analysed in conjunction with the idea of establishing a transatlantic committee, comprising EU 
and US officials, to focus on the role of the Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC) and 
combat corruption, money laundering and the sponsorship of terrorism. 
The abuse of European public diplomacy for Iranian consumption 
The Islamic Republic of Iran maintains full control over television and radio stations in the 
country and print media is subjected to heavy censorship. Any critical debate among Iranian 
intellectuals or the wider public on issues such as the IRGC’s involvement in Syria and Yemen 
is successfully muzzled by the state. Therefore, despite a significant growth of internet users 
and the penetration of British and American-based satellite channels, it is very difficult to come 
across independent debates by Iranians who feel safe and assured of the necessary levels of 
freedom of speech to provide useful commentary in those dialogues.59  
Iran’s military apparatus, in particular, is based on a purely ideological and solid command 
structure that was established over time by the Supreme Leader and developed into 
interdependent and parallel configurations within different Iranian military organisations. 
Taking into consideration the nature, modus operandi, hardware and historical record of the 
IRGC and its activities, this organisation is unlikely to act constructively on regional stability. 
These facts should not be denied or politicised, for risk of sudden, uncertain and counter-
productive outcomes on both sides. 
When comparing Europe’s benevolent perception of its changing relationship with Iran with 
the one between the EU and Russia, which was characterised during the 2000s by partnership 
and cooperation but changed abruptly with the annexation of Crimea by Russia, there are 
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signals that, once again, illusions entertained by European policy-makers are clouding their 
judgement about measurable realities and outcomes.60  
Statements emanating from the EU (issued either by the High Representative, the EEAS or 
(Members of) the European Parliament)61 about regional security cooperation with Iran are a 
case in point. It is unclear whether security professionals were consulted prior to issuing these 
statements and, if so, how their evaluation of the state of the Iranian military has been 
considered. But when tracking reports in Farsi about statements by EU officials and Members 
of the European Parliament, a pattern emerges of European statements being systematically 
used by the Iranian state as propaganda to portray a marked shift in the EU’s strategy towards 
Iran. As such, the impression has been created that the EU has broken with traditional allies 
and Sunni states in the region, in favour of an IRGC, pro-Shia presence in Syria and Iraq. 
Examples of the EU’s alleged shift in strategy include an increase in statements that are critical 
of Turkey and Saudi Arabia, in particular by MEPs, against a backdrop of conspicuous silence 
about systemic human rights abuses in Iran, accompanied by decisions such as delisting Quds 
Force Commander Qasim Suleimani. All these actions are being presented by IRGC media 
outlets as the EU siding with the victorious Shia party in a full-scale Shia-Sunni conflict – 
effectively a triumph for the hardliners and a strategic victory for the IRGC’s firm resistance 
against the West. 
European public diplomacy should be able to resist or counter such propaganda. But when 
various European diplomats use widely diverging terms to describe the state and 
consequences of the large influx of Syrian refugees, who themselves regard al-Assad, Iran’s 
IRGC and Hezbollah as responsible for ongoing atrocities and potential war crimes against 
the Syrian population, it is unlikely to convince observers that the EU has any coordinated 
strategy for de-escalation in the Middle East at all. Unfortunately, this view is held by the 
Sunni majority of European Muslims and will most certainly shape a strong anti-Iran Sunni 
alliance throughout Europe. This trend is likely to intensify if Iran continues to act on behalf 
of radical Shia forces outside of its national borders.  
The EU has fundamental geopolitical interests in relation to more than 200 million Sunnis, 
nationals of countries in the southern European neighbourhood stretching from Morocco to 
Turkey, in addition to the Sunnis living in EU enlargement countries in the Western Balkans.  
It is therefore in the Union’s own interest to redress its image and clearly define for Iranian 
policy-makers the geopolitical dimensions of its Common Foreign and Security Policy and the 
importance of countries on its southern periphery, particularly Turkey and Egypt, to the EU’s 
strategic and vital security interests. GCC countries are also important for the EU’s trade and 
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investment policy, and these countries are increasingly troubled by Iran’s IRGC presence in 
different direct or proxy wars across the region.62 
Sanctions regime: monitoring and reporting 
Iran’s Supreme Leader Ayatollah Khamenei has absolute control over each branch of the 
state. 63  He consistently exerts his right to veto, from micromanagement issues such as 
changing a car brand name or the interior design of Tehran’s international book fair, to all 
issues concerning foreign and defence policy.  
According to public statements by Khamenei, as well as several texts written by high-ranking 
Iranian officials, including President Rouhani’s detailed description of the official approach 
taken when he was head of the nuclear negotiating team from 2003 to 2005 (included in his 
2011 memoir),64  Iran has adhered to a long-term, pre-defined strategy of sowing division 
among the permanent members of the United Nations Security Council. Further attempts 
include creating a transatlantic divide followed by divisions between EU member states. This 
approach is similar to Russia’s strategy towards the EU over the past 20 years, in which it has 
aimed to divide member states on contentious issues such as energy security. This strategy 
was further observed during the Supreme Leader Ayatollah Khamenei’s meeting with Italian 
Prime Minister Matteo Renzi in April 2016, when he divided the EU into blocs of American 
‘poodle’ and terror-sponsoring states, and some relatively independent ones.  
A look at Iran’s post-2012 sanctions circumvention strategies shows that Iran depends on the 
EU being divided on its policy stance.65 The adoption of sanctions regimes is often hailed by 
European policy-makers as one of the few truly effective instruments of EU foreign policy. 
Yet, Iran’s methods of successfully circumventing sanctions in the EU, aided and abetted by 
European financial institutions,66 demand a deeper analysis since those same methods are 
currently being used to circumvent EU and international sanctions by other actors, such as 
Hezbollah. This analysis should be a priority for the EU and be undertaken in close 
cooperation with US authorities. Failure to closely coordinate strategies to apply sanctions will 
not only harm European financial and trade entities but will also encourage hardliners in Iran 
to oppose international agreements and obligations instead of complying with them.  
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It helps that European companies now have a mandatory reporting requirement under the 
EU’s directive on non-financial information disclosure. 67  It obliges large undertakings to 
report annually on how they respect human rights, environmental, anti-corruption and 
bribery rules in the countries in which they operate. This will be particularly pertinent for 
businesses dealing with Iranian entities. But the EU should go further and consider forming a 
task force to create a monitoring and reporting mechanism in full coordination with existing 
US monitoring and reporting mechanisms and the UN procurement channel. This task force 
would enable the EU to detect trade and investment deals falling under the sanctions regimes, 
including the brokering, transit or transfer of dual-use goods or technologies that are 
employed in the repression of dissidents in Iran and Syria, the sponsorship of international 
terrorist activities, and cyber attacks against EU and NATO members.  
Rule of law and human rights as the core principle of EU-Iran relations  
Europe’s current approach to renewing ties with Iran seems to focus on building personal, 
institutional and business relations while refraining from criticising the current regime for 
continued human rights violations. More importantly, the EU’s position ignores the frequent 
violations by Iran of EU and international law, such as the arms embargo on Syria, UN-
sanctioned ballistic missile tests and, critically, cyber attacks. The main justification offered by 
European foreign policy officials for this approach is the priority to strengthen the pro-reform 
camp in Iranian politics. As in the case of Russia, this uncalculated, simplistic approach, which 
does not attempt to determine the measurable strategic outcomes, can lead to unexpected and 
unfavourable consequences. This would result in heightened security risks for each and every 
member state and the EU as a whole. 
The following example illustrates how a simplified pro-reform approach can create adverse 
outcomes. The latest legislative elections in February and April 2016 and the figures from 
Rouhani’s presidential election portray a far more fragile, reformist majority. 68  In both 
elections, the participation rate and pro-reform vote were far below those achieved by 
President Khatami in 1997 and 2001. Also, in Iran’s sixth parliamentary election in February 
2000, the reformists won 222 seats out of 290 – an absolute majority. Suppression of President 
Khatami and his-pro reform Parliament in 2000s showed that repressive action by the Supreme 
Leader, IRGC hardliners and the judicial branch were capable of successfully ousting a very 
popular reform movement, even though it held executive and legislative branches of power 
in Iran. In a focused campaign, Ayatollah Khamenei’s actions ranged from suppressing the 
6th parliamentary reformist majority to banning dozens of reformist newspapers. And yet the 
authorities faced little or no internal or international repercussions. By comparison, the pro-
Khatami political organisations ‘Jebhe Mosharekat’ and ‘Sazman Mojahedin’ consisted of 
well-organised national and provincial structures, while Rouhani has little if any systematic 
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support from Iranian political parties; his campaigns are largely based on public relations. 
Furthermore, in comparison to post-Khatami 2005 and the 2009-10 Green Movement, Rouhani 
can more easily be ousted from power with minimal political costs by the Supreme Leader or 
the IRGC once the key condition of their respective business interests is in a state that 
Khamenei describes as being “... resistant to foreign pressure”.  
In other words, if Europe continues to avoid a confrontation with the IRGC and Iranian hard-
liners, this is likely to result in the crushing of the pro-Rouhani camp.  
Even from a realist standpoint, there is simply no alternative other than to maintain universal 
values and the rule of law at the core of EU-Iran relations.69 Any other policy option would be 
counter to EU and international law. As seen in recent US lawsuits against BNP Paribas and 
HSBC, bypassing these safeguards would pose considerable risk to EU trade and financial 
entities.  
Protection of economic rights: opening the door to wider reforms 
Currently, some of Iran’s largest business entities are either related to or owned by the IRGC, 
the Execution of Imam Khomeini’s Order (EIKO), Bonyad MFJ and the Ministry of Defence. 
European actors have few legal and risk-assessed options for undertaking business activities 
in Iran.70 Most of those organisations are subject to multiple UN, US and EU sanctions and 
divestment policies as a result of Iran’s involvement in Syrian atrocities; infringement of UN 
sanctioned ballistic missile testing, internal repression and human rights violations on a 
massive scale.71 Even if some European leaders decide to cooperate with those actors, despite 
the clear legal conflict, there is evidence that those military entities are frequently misusing 
their power against their economic competitors. There are many examples of the military 
abusing its power, such as the IRGC’s deployment in 2004 of an MIG fighter jet at Tehran’s 
IKA airport, preventing planes from landing at the site where an Austrian Turkish contractor 
recently completed building work because the regime thought non-Iranians were involved in 
the running of the airport; takeovers against competitors in the ICT sector; intimidation 
campaigns and summary arrests. All of these activities were supported by the Supreme 
Leader.  
In recent years, in every major corruption scandal that went public in Iran the aforementioned 
military/economic conglomerations were involved, along with several European entities.72  
                                                   
69 See also the contribution by Majid Golpour to this report. 
70 See also the contribution by Arnaldo Abruzzini to this report. 
71 See also the contribution by Jay Modrall to this report. 
72 As reported by Reuters (see, e.g., www.reuters.com/article/us-iran-oil-scandal-
idUSKCN0R41I920150904; www.reuters.com/article/us-iran-turkey-special-report-
idUSBREA3S07120140429; www.reuters.com/article/us-usa-iran-zarrab-idUSKCN0WN295). 
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The involvement of the IRGC, the Ministry of Defence, EIKO-related organisations in Syrian 
atrocities, human rights violations in Iran, and the vast abuse of power, corruption and 
environmental damages mean that any investment or trade would be in conflict with existing 
EU law and with US federal and state sanctions and divestment policy.  
In the past couple of years, there has been a flood of legal cases by victims of Iran’s actions, 
and they are increasingly successful in gaining compensation. The April 2016 US Supreme 
Court ruling against the Iranian Central Bank shows that a new era of compensation for past 
actions has begun. 73  Unlike rulings lower down the system, political pressure cannot be 
brought to bear on those of the Supreme Court. Therefore, any European investment in 
organisations that are either involved in sponsoring terrorism or in violating human rights 
expose those investor companies to litigation from thousands of EU citizens who have been 
victims of Iran’s human rights violations over the last 37 years. Public and private financial 
institutions could face legal action if they were to invest in IRGC, EIKO, or Bonyad MFJ-related 
entities, as some of the assets owned by those organisations are highly likely to have been 
confiscated from Iranian Jews, Baha’is, other minorities or political dissidents. In many cases, 
these individuals were tortured and their family members executed. Many of the victims are 
now European citizens capable of taking legal action against the European entities that invest 
in confiscated assets.  
Apart from the risk of European and American litigation, there is a possibility that Syrian 
refugees in Europe would take legal action against the IRGC, as it is the only demonstrably 
visible and present foreign military ground force active in Syria, operating without any 
international legal mandate and in explicit violation of the aforementioned international 
embargo.  
These considerations make the Iranian economic landscape rather problematic for investment 
by European entities in the longer term. Every possible reform scenario would return to the 
question of the rule of law, an independent judiciary and the involvement of the IRGC and 
EIKO in Iran’s economy. Even for smaller trade deals, member states are in need of the EU-
wide support in the form of due diligence and clear and simplified procedures for complying 
with EU and international law such as anti-corruption measures and non-financial disclosure. 
Monitoring and reporting, as a transatlantic effort, therefore remains crucial to resolving these 
issues in a coordinated fashion with the US authorities.  
Conclusion and recommendations  
Based on the analysis above, oversimplified and uncalculated views of future relations with 
Iran may lead to adverse consequences. 
The EU should instead focus on well-coordinated, pre-planned strategies that aim to best serve 
Europe’s collective long-term security and trade interests while resolutely promoting 
universal values. 
                                                   
73 Case No. 14–770, Bank Markazi, aka Central Bank of Iran v. Peterson et al., 26 April 2016. 
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To that end, all public statements and each trade or investment pact with Iran should be 
carefully pre-examined and evaluated, based on the following four criteria: 
 consistency with the EU’s internal security framework, its strategic relationship with 
countries in the southern neighbourhood, the EU enlargement agenda and relations with 
Turkey, in particular; 
 encouragement of a closer post-JCPOA transatlantic coordination and prevention of the 
EU from becoming a ‘sanction-circumvention’ territory; 
 inclusion of a carefully calculated protection strategy for European trade entities, with a 
quick rollback trigger in case of a JCPOA snapback clause or further ballistic missile tests, 
human rights violations or terrorism sponsorship-related sanctions; 
 maintaining respect for the rule of law and human rights as the core principle of EU-Iran 
relations, in accordance with a monitoring and reporting mechanism that prevents EU 
trade entities from investing in IRGC, EIKO and other entities involved in repression in 
Iran and Syria or other illicit activities.     
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1.1. Background and outline  
This Information Note
1
 is published in accordance with the voluntary commitment contained 
in the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) between the E3/EU+3 and the Islamic 
Republic of Iran to issue relevant guidelines on the details of sanctions or restrictive measures 
which are to be lifted under the JCPOA.
2
 
The purpose of this Information Note is to provide practical information to all interested 
parties on the commitments contained in the JCPOA concerning the lifting of the sanctions, 
the measures adopted at the EU level to meet those commitments and the various practical 
stages in this process. 
The information provided for in this Information Note is based on the assumption that the 
commitments under the JCPOA will be complied with by all the Parties. 
The United States (hereinafter: U.S.) have also issued equivalent U.S. Guidelines with respect 
to the lifting of U.S. sanctions under the JCPOA. 
This Information Note is organised as follows: 
 Section 1 introduces the structure of the JCPOA. 
 Section 2 describes the timelines for the implementation of the sanctions-related 
commitments under the JCPOA (Implementation plan). 
 Section 3 presents a detailed description of the sanctions lifted under the JCPOA on 
Implementation Day. 
 Section 4 contains an overview of the relevant EU legislative framework. 
 Section 5 details the EU sanctions or restrictive measures that remain in place after 
Implementation Day. This section also includes an outline of the procurement channel. 
                                                          
1 It is noted that this Information Note is not legally binding and produced for illustrative purposes only. 
2 In the EU legal acts the term restrictive measures is used instead of sanctions. For the purpose of the present Information 




 Section 6 presents EU non-nuclear related sanctions that remain in place as they are 
not concerned by the JCPOA. 
 Section 7 is to address practical issues with regard to the JCPOA through questions 
and answers. Input for this section was provided by EU Member States, business 
community and other interested parties.  
 Section 8 lists the main reference documents and provides relevant links. 
1.2. Introduction to the JCPOA 
On 14 July 2015, the E3/EU+3 (China, France, Germany, the Russian Federation, the United 
Kingdom and the United States, with the High Representative of the European Union for 
Foreign Affairs and Security Policy) and the Islamic Republic of Iran reached an agreement 
on a Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA). The full implementation of this JCPOA 
will ensure the exclusively peaceful nature of Iran's nuclear programme. 
The JCPOA will produce a comprehensive lifting of all UN Security Council sanctions as 
well as multilateral
3
 and national sanctions related to Iran's nuclear programme. The JCPOA 
reflects a step-by-step approach and includes the reciprocal commitments as laid down in the 
agreement and is endorsed by the UN Security Council.
4
  
UN Security Council resolution 2231 (2015) endorses the JCPOA, and urges its full 
implementation on the timetable established in the JCPOA. It calls upon all Members States, 
regional organisations and international organisations to take such actions as may be 
appropriate to support the implementation of the JCPOA, including by taking actions 
commensurate with the implementation plan set out in the JCPOA and the resolution and by 
refraining from actions that undermine implementation of commitments under the JCPOA. 
1.3. Structure of the JCPOA 
The JCPOA contains a general section addressing the main content of the agreement: 
preamble and general provisions, nuclear, sanctions, implementation plan and dispute 
                                                          
3
 For the purposes of the JCPOA and this Information Note, the term 'multilateral sanctions' is meant to cover EU restrictive measures. 




resolution mechanism and is supplemented with five Annexes.
5
 For this Information Note 
Annex II (Sanctions) and Annex V (Implementation Plan) are essential: Annex II stipulates 
exactly which sanctions will be lifted and Annex V describes the timing of the 
implementation of the JCPOA and points out on which event/moment in time the lifting of 
sanctions will occur. 
Annex IV is devoted to the role of the Joint Commission established to monitor the 
implementation of the JCPOA and to carry out the functions as provided for in the JCPOA. 
The Joint Commission will also address issues arising from the implementation of the 
JCPOA. On the basis of Annex IV a Procurement Working Group and a Working Group on 
the Implementation of Sanctions Lifting were established. The High Representative acts as the 
coordinator of the Joint Commission and of both working groups. 
The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) has an essential and independent role and is 
requested to monitor and verify the implementation of the voluntary nuclear-related measures 
as detailed in the JCPOA. The IAEA will provide regular updates to the Board of Governors 
and the UN Security Council. 
 
                                                          
5 Annex I: Nuclear-related measures, Annex II: Sanctions-related commitments, Annex III: Civil Nuclear Cooperation, 





Annex V of the JCPOA contains the Implementation plan describing the sequence and the 
steps to be carried out under the provisions of the JCPOA. There are five main events to 
distinguish in this process: Finalisation Day, Adoption Day, Implementation Day, Transition 
Day and UN Security Council resolution Termination Day. 
2.1. Finalisation Day 
This event took place on 14 July 2015 when the negotiations on the JCPOA were successfully 
concluded and endorsed by E3/EU+3 and Iran. Following this event the UN Security Council 
adopted Resolution 2231(2015) on 20 July 2015. The Council of the European Union 
expressed its full support for UN Security Council resolution 2231(2015) on the same day 
with the adoption of Conclusions.
6
 
2.2. Adoption Day  
On Adoption Day, which occurred on 18 October 2015, the JCPOA came into effect. Iran 
started the implementation of its nuclear-related commitments. The European Union and the 
United States began to make the necessary preparations for the lifting of nuclear-related 
sanctions as laid down in the JCPOA. 
The European Union adopted the necessary legal acts to lift all EU economic and financial 
sanctions taken in connection with the Iranian nuclear programme
7
 as laid down in the 
JCPOA.
8
 The EU legislative package adopted on 18 October 2015 only came into effect on 
Implementation Day (16 January 2016).
9
 
                                                          
6 http://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/press/press-releases/2015/07/20-fac-iran/ 
7
 More information on EU legal acts is to be found in Section 4 on the legislative framework. 
8 As specified in section 16.1 of Annex V of the JCPOA. 




2.3. Implementation Day 
Implementation Day occurred on 16 January 2016, the day on which the IAEA verified the 
implementation by Iran of the nuclear-related measures
10
 and simultaneously, the E3/EU+3 
took the actions
11
 to which they have committed under the JCPOA.  
On Implementation Day, the Director-General of the IAEA presented a report to the IAEA 
Board of Governors and to the United Nations Security Council which confirmed that Iran 
had taken the measures specified in paragraphs 15.1 to 15.11 of Annex V to the JCPOA, EU 
economic and financial sanctions taken in connection with the Iranian nuclear programme
12
 
were lifted. On that same day, the European Union published in the Official Journal of the 
European Union a legal act and related notice intended exclusively to confirm that the 
legislation adopted on Adoption Day should apply.
13
 The details of the sanctions lifted are 
described in section 4 of this Information Note.  
On Implementation Day, the limited sanctions relief provided to Iran under the 2013-interim 
agreement (JPOA)
14
 was superseded by the lifting of all economic and financial sanctions 
taken in connection with the Iranian nuclear programme in accordance with the JCPOA. 
2.4. Transition Day 
Transition Day is in 8 years after Adoption Day (18 October 2023) or at an earlier moment 
based upon a report from the Director General of the IAEA to the IAEA Board of Governors 
and in parallel to the UN Security Council stating that the IAEA has concluded that all 
nuclear material in Iran remains in peaceful activities (Broader Conclusion). On this day, the 
EU will lift proliferation–related sanctions15, including arms and missile technology sanctions 
                                                          
10 As specified in paragraph 15 of Annex V of the JCPOA. 
11 As specified in paragraph 16 and 17 of Annex V of the JCPOA.  
12 As specified in Sections 16.1 -16.4 of Annex V of the JCPOA. 
13 Official Journal of the European Union L 274, 18.10.2015, p.1, see Article 2 of Decision (EU) 1863/2015. 
14
 As part of the Joint Plan of Action the EU suspended on 20 January 2014 sanctions on petrochemicals, gold and precious 
metals, the prohibitions on the provision of insurance and transport in relation to Iranian crude oil sales as well as vessels. 
The thresholds for authorising financial transfers to and from Iran were increased. 




and related designations. All provisions in Council Decision 2010/413/CFSP suspended on 
Implementation Day will be terminated on Transition Day. 
2.5. UN Security Council resolution Termination Day 
UN Security Council resolution Termination Day will occur 10 years from Adoption Day. On 
Termination Day all the provisions of UN Security Council resolution 2231(2015) will 
terminate and the UN Security Council will conclude consideration of the Iranian nuclear 
issue; the EU will lift all remaining nuclear-related restrictions and terminate the legal acts.
 16
 
2.6. Dispute Resolution Mechanism 
The JCPOA provides for a consultation process if one of the participants in the JCPOA 
believes that the agreed commitments have not been met. The participants in the JCPOA will 
try to resolve the issue according to the procedures set out in the JCPOA.
17
 If at the end of the 
process the issue still has not been resolved to the satisfaction of the complaining participant 
and that participant deems the issue to constitute significant non-performance of the 
obligations under the JCPOA, it can notify the UN Security Council thereof. 
The UN Security Council will – in accordance with its procedures – vote on a resolution to 
continue the sanctions lifting. If this resolution is not adopted within 30 days of the 
notification, then the provisions of the relevant UN Security Council resolutions
18
 will be re-
imposed ("snapback"), unless the UN Security Council decides otherwise. 
In the event of a reintroduction of measures, paragraph 37 of the JCPOA and paragraph 14 of 
UN Security Council resolution 2231 (2015) stipulates that the application of UN Security 
Council provisions will "not apply with retroactive effect to contracts signed between any 
party and Iran or Iranian individuals and entities prior to the date of the application, provided 
that the activities contemplated under and execution of such contracts are consistent with the 
JCPOA and the previous and current UN Security Council resolutions." 
                                                          
16 These restrictions include the procurement channel as described in section 5.2 of this Note. 
17 As specified in paragraph 36 and 37 of the JCPOA. 





Referring to the provisions of the JCPOA
19
, it should be noted that all parties to the JCPOA 
are determined to avoid any behaviour which could be qualified as non-performance and to 
avoid a re-imposition of sanctions by engaging in the Dispute Resolution Mechanism. 
 Reintroduction of EU sanctions ("EU snapback") 
In the event of a significant non-performance by Iran of its commitments under the JCPOA 
and after having exhausted all recourse possibilities under the Dispute Resolution Mechanism, 
the European Union will reintroduce the lifted EU sanctions ("EU snapback"). An "EU 
snapback" will take the form of a decision by the Council of the European Union, based on a 
recommendation by the High Representative of the European Union for Foreign Affairs and 
Security Policy, France, Germany and the United Kingdom. Such a decision will reintroduce 
all the EU sanctions taken in connection with the Iranian nuclear programme that have been 
suspended and/or terminated consistent with Council declaration of 18 October 2015
20
 and in 
accordance with regular EU procedures for the adoption of restrictive measures. 
Sanctions will not apply with retroactive effect. In the event of the reintroduction of EU 
sanctions, the execution of contracts concluded in accordance with the JCPOA while 
sanctions relief was in force will be permitted consistent with previous provisions when 
sanctions were originally imposed, in order to allow companies to wind down their 
activities.
21
 Details about the period of time allowed for the execution of prior contracts will 
be specified in the legal acts providing for the reintroduction of EU sanctions. 
For example, the reintroduction of sanctions on investment activities would not retroactively 
penalise investment made before the date of snapback, and the execution of investment 
contracts concluded before the reintroduction of sanctions will be permitted consistent with 
previous provisions when sanctions were originally imposed. 
Contracts that were permitted when the sanctions regime was still in place will not be targeted 
by the reintroduction of sanctions. 
                                                          
19
 See paragraph 28 of the JCPOA. 
20
 Official Journal of the European Union C 345/01, Pb C 345, 18.10.2015, p 1. 




3. Description of sanctions lifted on Implementation Day 
3.1. Sanctions lifted by the European Union on Implementation Day 
On Implementation Day (16 January 2016), the EU lifted all its economic and financial 
sanctions
22
 taken in connection with the Iranian nuclear programme. As a consequence of the 
lifting of these sanctions, the following activities, including associated services, are allowed 
as of Implementation Day.
23
 
 Financial, banking and insurance measures  
The prohibition of financial transfers to and from Iran (including the notification and 
authorisation regimes) is lifted. Consequently, transfers of funds between EU persons, entities 
or bodies, including EU financial and credit institutions, and non-listed Iranian persons, 
entities or bodies, including Iranian financial and credit institutions
24
, are permitted as of 
Implementation Day and the requirements for authorisation or notification of transfers of 
funds are no longer applicable. 
Banking activities, such as the establishment of new correspondent banking relationships and 
the opening of branches, subsidiaries or representative offices of non-listed Iranian banks in 
Member States are permitted. Non-listed Iranian financial and credit institutions are also 
allowed to acquire or extend participation, or to acquire any other ownership interest in EU 
financial and credit institutions. EU financial and credit institutions are allowed to open 
representative offices or to establish branch or subsidiaries in Iran; to establish joint ventures 
and open bank accounts with Iranian financial or credit institutions. 
The supply of specialised financial messaging services, including SWIFT, is allowed for 
Iranian natural or legal persons, entities or bodies, including Iranian financial institutions and 
                                                          
22 As specified in Sections 16.1 -16.4 of Annex V of the JCPOA. 
23 For the exact details of the permitted activities reference is made to Annex II of the JCPOA. This section describes 
permitted activities following the lifting of sanctions on Implementation Day (16 January 2016). It does not cover other 
activities that were permissible while the sanctions regime was in place and thus continue to be permitted after 
Implementation Day.  
24 With the exception of Iranian natural or legal persons, entities of bodies, including financial and credit institutions still 








The provision of financial support for trade with Iran such as export credit, guarantees or 
insurance is permitted as of Implementation Day. The same applies for commitments for 
grants, financial assistance and concessional loans to the Government of Iran. Other allowed 
activities in this context are provision of insurance and reinsurance to Iran and transactions in 
public or public-guaranteed bonds with Iran. 
 Oil, gas and petrochemical sectors 
Import, purchase, swap and transport of crude oil and petroleum products, gas and 
petrochemical products from Iran is allowed as of Implementation Day. EU persons are able 
to export equipment or technology, and provide technical assistance, including training, used 
in the sectors of the oil, gas and petrochemical industries in Iran covering exploration, 
production and refining of oil and natural gas, including liquefaction of natural gas, to any 
Iranian person, in or outside Iran, or for use in Iran. Investing in the Iranian oil, gas and 
petrochemical sectors, by the granting of any financial loan or credit to, the acquisition or 
extension of a participation in, and the creation of any joint venture with, any Iranian person 
that is engaged in the oil, gas and petrochemical sectors in Iran or outside Iran is permitted as 
of Implementation Day. 
 Shipping, shipbuilding and transport sectors 
Sanctions related to shipping and shipbuilding sectors and certain sanctions related to the 
transport sector, including the provision of associated services to these sectors, are lifted on 
Implementation Day.  
Consequently, the following activities are allowed: sale, supply, transfer or export of naval 
equipment and technology for ship building, maintenance or refit, to Iran or to any Iranian 
persons engaged in this sector; the design, construction or the participation in the design or 
construction of cargo vessels and oil tankers for Iran or for Iranian persons; the provision of 
vessels designed or used for the transport or storage of oil and petrochemical products to 
Iranian persons, entities or bodies; and the provision of flagging and classification services, 
                                                          




including those pertaining to technical specification, registration and identification numbers of 
any kind, to Iranian oil tankers and cargo vessels. 
All cargo flights operated by Iranian carriers or originating from Iran have access to the 
airports under the jurisdiction of EU Member States. 
Inspection, seizure and disposal by EU Member States of cargoes to and from Iran in their 
territories no longer apply with regard to items which are no longer prohibited. 
Provision of bunkering or ship supply services, or any other servicing of vessels, to Iranian-
owned or Iranian-contracted vessels not carrying prohibited items is allowed; and the 
provision of fuel, engineering and maintenance services to Iranian cargo aircraft not carrying 
prohibited items is permitted. 
 Gold, other precious metals, banknotes and coinage 
Sale, supply, purchase, export, transfer or transport of gold and precious metals as well as 
diamonds, and provision of related brokering, financing and security services, to, from or for 
the Government of Iran, its public bodies, corporations and agencies, or the Central Bank of 
Iran is allowed. 
Delivery of newly printed or minted banknotes and coinage for the Central Bank of Iran is 
permitted. 
 Metals  
Sale, supply, transfer or export of certain graphite and raw or semi-finished metals to any 
Iranian person, entity or body or for use in Iran is no longer prohibited but subject to an 




Sale, supply, transfer or export of Enterprise Resource Planning software, including updates, 
to any Iranian person, entity or body, or for use in Iran, in connection with activities 
consistent with the JCPOA is no longer prohibited but subject to an authorisation regime as of 
                                                          
26 For details on the authorisation regime and the list of goods subject to it, see section 5.2 on the sanctions that remain in 








 De-listing of persons, entities and bodies 
As of Implementation Day, certain persons, entities and bodies are delisted and consequently 
no longer subject to the asset freeze, prohibition to make funds available and visa ban. This 
covers UN listings and EU autonomous listings. For more information on the persons and 
entities that are delisted it is advised to consult Council Implementing Regulation (EU) 
2015/1862 of 18 October 2015 and Council Implementing Regulation (EU) 2016/74 of 22 




3.2. U.S. Sanctions 
For the details and consequences of the lifting of sanctions in the U.S. it is recommended to 
consult the U.S. Guidelines with Respect to the Lifting of Sanctions on Implementation Day 
under the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) between the E3/EU+3 and the 
Islamic Republic of Iran and the FAQs.
29
 
                                                          
27 For details on the authorisation regime, see section 5.2 on the sanctions that remain in place after Implementation Day. 





4. Legal framework 
This section contains an overview of the relevant legal framework implementing the lifting
30
 
of sanctions as specified in the JCPOA. 
4.1. UN Security Council resolution 2231(2015) 
UN Security Council resolution 2231(2015) was adopted on 20 July 2015. It endorsed the 
JCPOA, urged its full implementation on the timetable established in the JCPOA
31
, and 
defined the schedule and commitments to be undertaken by all parties to lead to the 
termination of UN sanctions against Iran. 
 On Implementation Day (16 January 2016), all provisions of previous UN Security 
Council resolutions
32
 on the Iranian nuclear issue were terminated, subject to re-
imposition in the event of significant non-performance by Iran of JCPOA 
commitments, and specific restrictions, including restrictions regarding the transfer of 
proliferation sensitive goods, apply. 
 On UN Security Council resolution Termination Day, all the provisions of UN 
Security Council resolution 2231(2015) will terminate and the UN Security Council 
will conclude its consideration of the Iranian nuclear issue and the item will be 
removed from the list of matters of which the Council is seized. 
4.2. EU legislative framework 
It is through the adoption of legal acts providing the legislative framework for the lifting of 
EU sanctions that the European Union implements UN Security Council resolution 
2231(2015) in accordance with the JCPOA. Although the lifting of the abovementioned 
sanctions took effect on Implementation Day (16 January 2016), the EU committed under the 
JCPOA to prepare and adopt the necessary legislation on Adoption Day (18 October 2015), 
but with delayed application. 
                                                          
30 In the present Information Note the "lifting" of restrictive measures refers equally to the suspension and implementation of 
those measures, as appropriate. 
31 Annex V of the JCPOA. 





The restrictive measures lifted in accordance with the JCPOA are those that have been 
imposed by the European Union in relation to Iran nuclear-related activities as set out in 
Council Decision 2010/413/CFSP
33
 and Council Regulation (EU) No 267/2012
34
. The 
implementation of UN Security Council resolution 2231(2015) in accordance with the JCPOA 
is mainly
35
 accomplished through the following EU legal acts: 
 Council Decision (CFSP) 2015/1863 of 18 October 2015 amending Council Decision 
2010/413/CFSP concerning restrictive measures against Iran
36
 
This Decision provides for the suspension of the articles of Council Decision 2010/413/CFSP 
concerning all EU economic and financial sanctions as specified in the JCPOA 
simultaneously with the implementation by Iran, and verified by the IAEA, of the agreed 
nuclear measures. The Decision also suspends the application of asset freeze (including the 
prohibition to make funds and economic resources available) and visa ban measures for 
persons and entities as specified in the JCPOA. Furthermore, this Decision also introduces an 
authorisation regime for reviewing and deciding on certain nuclear-related transfers and 
transfers of certain metals and software. The Decision is implemented by two Regulations 
(see below), which are directly applicable in all Member States. 
 Council Regulation (EU) 2015/1861 of 18 October 2015 amending Regulation (EU) 
No 267/2012 concerning restrictive measures against Iran
37
 
This Regulation provides for the deletion of the corresponding articles of Council Regulation 
(EU) No 267/2012 concerning all EU economic and financial sanctions as specified in the 
JCPOA, simultaneously with the implementation by Iran, of the agreed nuclear measures and 
verified by the IAEA (16 January 2016). Furthermore, this Regulation also implements the 
prior authorisation regime for reviewing and deciding on certain nuclear-related transfers and 
                                                          
33 Official Journal of the European Union L 195, 27.07.2010, p.39 (http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-
content/EN/TXT/?uri=uriserv:OJ.L_.2010.195.01.0039.01.ENG) 
34 Official Journal of the European Union L 88, 24.03.2012, p.1. 
35 Referring to the sanctions to be lifted on Implementation Day (16 January 2016). The lifting of remaining sanctions on 
Transition Day will require separate EU legal acts, see paragraph 2.4. 
36 Official Journal of the European Union L 274, 18.10.2015, p.174. 




transfers of certain metals and software. Council Regulation (EU) 2015/1861 also implements 
provisions on the proliferation-related prohibitions, like missile technology sanctions, that 
remain in force. 




 Council Implementing Regulation (EU) 2015/1862 of 18 October 2015 implementing 
Regulation (EU) No 267/2012 concerning restrictive measures against Iran
39
 
This Regulation implements Council Decision (CFSP) 2015/1863 in so far as it lifts the 
restrictive measures applying to individuals and entities set out in Annexes V (UN listings) 
and VI (autonomous listings) to Decision 2010/413/CFSP simultaneously with the IAEA-
verified implementation by Iran of agreed nuclear-related measures. These individuals and 
entities are removed from the list of persons and entities subject to restrictive measures, set 
out in Annexes VIII (UN listings) and IX (autonomous listings) to Regulation (EU) No 
267/2012 simultaneously with the IAEA-verified implementation by Iran of agreed nuclear-
related measures (16 January 2016). 
 Council Decision (CFSP) 2016/37 of 16 January 2016 concerning the date of 
application of Decision (CFSP) 2015/1863 amending Decision 2010/413/CFSP 
concerning restrictive measures against Iran
40
  
 Notice: Information concerning the date of application of Council Regulation (EU) 
2015/1861 of 18 October 2015 amending Regulation (EU) No 267/2012 concerning 
restrictive measures against Iran and Council Implementing Regulation (EU) 
2015/1862 of 18 October 2015 implementing Regulation (EU) No 267/2012 
concerning restrictive measures against Iran
41
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 See Article 2 of Regulation (EU) 2015/1861. Declaration No 17 attached to the EU Treaties provides that: "in accordance 
with well-settled case law of the Court of Justice of the EU, the treaties and the law adopted by the Union on the basis of the 
Treaties have primacy over the law of the Member States (...)".  
39 Official Journal of the European Union L 274, 18.10.2015, p.161. 
40
 Official Journal of the European Union L 11I, 16.01.2016, p.1. 
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When the Council of the EU noted that the Director-General of the IAEA had presented a 
report to the IAEA Board of Governors and to the United Nations Security Council which 
confirmed that Iran had taken the measures specified in JCPOA, the Council Decision, 
Regulation and Implementing Regulation lifting all EU economic and financial sanctions 
came into effect on the same day. A legal act and related notice intended exclusively to 
confirm that the legislation adopted on Adoption Day
42
 shall apply were published in the 
Official Journal of the European Union
43
. 
Finally, the Council of the EU issued a Statement
44
 noting that the commitment to lift all EU 
nuclear-related sanctions is without prejudice to the dispute resolution mechanism specified in 
the JCPOA and to the reintroduction of EU sanctions in the case of significant non-
performance by Iran of its commitments under the JCPOA. However, all parties involved in 
the JCPOA process will engage in ensuring that the JCPOA is successfully implemented and 
sustained. 
 Council Implementing Decision (CFSP) 2016/78 of 22 January 2016 implementing 
Decision 2010/413/CFSP concerning restrictive measures against Iran
45
 
This Decision suspended the application of the asset freeze (including the prohibition to make 
funds and economic resources available) for two entities which had been delisted by the UN 
Security Council on 17 January 2016. 
 Council Implementing Regulation (EU) 2016/74 of 22 January 2016 implementing 
Regulation (EU) No 267/2012 concerning restrictive measures against Iran
46
 
This Regulation implements Council Implementing Decision (CFSP) 2016/78 by lifting the 
asset freeze measures applying to two entities following a decision by the UN Security 
Council to delist them on 17 January 2016.  
                                                          
42 Official Journal of the European Union L 274, 18.10.2015, p.1. 
43 See Article 2 of Council Decision (CFSP) 2015/1863 of 18 October 2015.  
44 Official Journal of the European Union C 345, 18.10.2015, p 1. 
45
 Official Journal of the European Union L 16, 23.1.2016, p.25. 




5. Proliferation-related sanctions and restrictions remaining in place after 
Implementation Day 
This section describes the proliferation-related sanctions and restrictions that remain in place 
after Implementation Day (16 January 2016). These concern the arms embargo, sanctions 
related to missile technology, restrictions on certain nuclear-related transfers and activities, 
provisions concerning certain metals and software which are subject to an authorisation 
regime, as well as related listings which remain in force after Implementation Day. 
Measures concerning inspection of cargoes to and from Iran and those related to the provision 
of bunkering or ship supply services continue to apply after Implementation Day in relation to 
items which continue to be prohibited. 
5.1. Proliferation-related sanctions 
 Arms embargo 
A prohibition to sell, supply, or transfer, directly or indirectly, or procure arms and related 
materiel of all types, including weapons and ammunition, military vehicles and equipment, 
paramilitary equipment and spare parts for such arms and related materiel; and the provision 
of associated services continues to apply after Implementation Day. The EU arms embargo 
covers all goods included in the EU common military list.
47
 
The EU arms embargo stays in place until Transition Day.
48
 
 Missile technology sanctions  
A prohibition to sell, supply, transfer, export or procure, directly or indirectly, the goods and 
technology listed in Annex III to Council Regulation (EU) No 267/2012 concerning 
restrictive measures against Iran, as modified by Council Regulation No 2015/1861
49
 
(hereafter: Council Regulation 267/2012 (as amended)), and any other item that the Member 
State determines that could contribute to the development of nuclear weapon delivery 
systems, and the provision of associated services continues to apply. Annex III lists all goods 
                                                          
47 Link to the UE CML. 
48 As specified in Annex V, paragraph 20.1, of the JCPOA. 




and technology contained in the Missile Technology Control Regime list. For more 
information on the Missile Technology Control Regime list, it is recommended to consult the 
Guidelines of the Missile Technology Control Regime.
50
 
It is to be noted that in case an item whose specific technical characteristics or specifications 
fall within the categories covered by both Annex I and Annex III to Council Regulation 
267/2012 (as amended), the item is considered to fall within Annex III, meaning that a 
prohibition always applies in this situation.
51
 
EU missile technology sanctions stay in place until Transition Day.
52
 
 Remaining individuals and entities subject to restrictive measures 
Certain persons and entities (UN and EU listings) remain subject to an asset freeze, visa ban 




5.2. Proliferation-related restrictions (authorisation regimes including the Procurement 
Channel) 
 Nuclear transfers and activities 
As of Implementation Day, proliferation-sensitive transfers and activities concerning certain 
goods and technology, including associated services, such as technical and financial 
assistance and related investments are subject to prior authorisation to be granted on a case-
by-case basis by the competent authorities of the Member State.
54
 
The lists of goods and technology subject to prior authorisation are to be found in Annexes I 
and II to Council Regulation 267/2012 (as amended). 
                                                          
50 http://www.mtcr.info/english/guidelines.html 
51 According to the introductory note in Annex I to Council Regulation 267/2012 (as amended). 
52 As specified in Annex V, paragraph 20.1, of the JCPOA. 
53 Persons and entities as set out in Annexes VIII (UN listings) and IX (autonomous listings) to Regulation (EU) No 
267/2012. 
54 Competent authorities of each Member Sate are identified in Annex X to Council Regulation 267/2012 concerning 




Annex I contains the goods and technology listed in the Nuclear Suppliers Group lists. For 
more information on the Nuclear Suppliers Group list, it is recommended to consult the 
Guidelines for Nuclear Transfers of the Nuclear Supplier Group.
55
 
In the case of goods and technology listed in Annex I, any transfer or related activity falls 
within the procurement channel as described in the JCPOA
56
 and UN Security Council 
resolution 2231(2015)
57
. Consequently, the national competent authority will have to submit a 
request for authorisation to the UN Security Council. The Procurement Working Group of the 
Joint Commission will make a recommendation to the UN Security Council on every request 
for authorisation. Each E3+3 State and Iran participate in the Procurement Working Group 
and the High Representative serves as the Coordinator. 
For more information on the functioning of the Procurement Working Group, it is 
recommended to consult the Procurement Working Group guidelines.
58
 
Another group of goods and technology subject to prior authorisation on a case-by-case basis 
by the competent authorities of Member States is listed in Annex II to Council Regulation 
267/2012 (as amended). Annex II contains other dual-use goods and technology that could 
contribute to reprocessing, enrichment-related, heavy water-related or other activities 
inconsistent with the JCPOA. In this case the authorisation is granted by the national 
competent authority only in accordance with the EU legal framework. 
 Metals and Software 
The sale, supply transfer or export of Enterprise Resource Planning software, designed 
specifically for use in nuclear and military industries, as described in Annex VIIA to Council 
Regulation 267/2012 (as amended), and the provision of associated services is subject to prior 
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56 Annex IV of the JCPOA. 
57 Exceptions may apply in relation to certain goods for light-water reactors or in respect of transactions necessary to 
implement Iran's nuclear-related commitments specified in the JCPOA or required for the preparation for the implementation 
of the JCPOA. For further details, consult Council Regulation 267/2012 (as amended). 








The sale, supply, transfer or export of certain graphite and raw or semi-finished metals and the 
provision of associated services is subject to prior authorisation to be granted on a case-by-
case basis by the competent authorities of the Member State.
60
 The list of goods covered by 
this restriction can be found in Annex VIIB to Council Regulation 267/2012 (as amended). 
                                                          
59 Competent authorities of each Member Sate are identified in Annex X to Council Regulation 267/2012 concerning 
restrictive measures against Iran. 
60 Competent authorities of each Member Sate are identified in Annex X to Council Regulation 267/2012 concerning 





6. Non-nuclear proliferation-related sanctions and restrictive measures  
Sanctions imposed by the EU in view of the human rights situation in Iran, support for 
terrorism and other grounds are not part of the JCPOA, and remain in place. 
Measures adopted by the EU in relation to concerns on human rights violations include an 
asset freeze and visa ban on 84 persons and one entity responsible for grave human rights 
violations, as well as a ban on exports to Iran of equipment which might be used for internal 
repression and of equipment for monitoring telecommunications.
61
 
Iranian persons who are also listed under EU terrorism and Syria sanctions regimes (or any 
other EU sanctions regime)
62
 continue to be subject to restrictive measures under these 
regimes which are outside the scope of the JCPOA. 
                                                          
61 Please consult Annexes III and IV to Council Regulation (EU) No 359/2011 of 12 April 2011 concerning restrictive 
measures directed against certain persons, entities and bodies in view of the situation in Iran (http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-
content/EN/ALL/?uri=CELEX:32011R0359&qid=1452107764652). 
62 EU measures to combat terrorism: Common Position 2001/931 and Council Regulation (EC) No 2580/2001. 





7. Questions and Answers 
This section contains a description of practical issues raised by EU Member States or third 
States and the business community. The aim of this section is to serve as a practical tool on 
the implementation of the JCPOA and the uniform application of the aforementioned legal 
acts within the EU. Therefore, this section could be updated in light of experience on the 
implementation of the JCPOA and relevant legal acts. The questions are divided by main 
categories. 
General questions 
1. When is Implementation Day scheduled to occur according to the JCPOA?  
Implementation Day occurred on 16 January 2016 when the IAEA verified the 
implementation by Iran of the nuclear-related measures as described in the 
relevant paragraphs of the JCPOA, and simultaneously the E3/EU+3 lifted 
sanctions as described in the relevant paragraphs of the JCPOA. 
2. What sanctions were lifted on Implementation Day and is there a list of the 
sanctions that were lifted? 
On Implementation Day (16 January 2016), the EU lifted all its economic and 
financial sanctions taken in connection with the Iranian nuclear programme. 
Details on sanctions which were lifted on Implementation Day are to be found in 
section 3 of this Information Note. 
3. What sanctions remain in place on Implementation Day? 
Proliferation-related sanctions which remain in place are described in section 5 
of this Information Note. Restrictive measures not related to nuclear issues or 
proliferation, such as those related to human rights and support for terrorism, as 
described in section 6 of this Information Note, remain in place as they are not 




4. What exports to Iran are permitted? 
As of Implementation Day (16 January 2016), all exports to Iran are permitted, 
with the following exceptions:  
- Prior authorisation to be granted on a case-by-case basis by the 
competent authority of the relevant Member State is needed for the export 
of goods and technology in Annexes I, II, VIIA and VIIB to Council 
Regulation 267/2012, as modified by Council Regulation No 2015/1861; 
- A prohibition is maintained on the export of arms as detailed in the EU 
Common Military List and missiles-related goods and technology as 
detailed in Annex III (Missile Technology Control Regime list) to Council 
Regulation 267/2012 concerning restrictive measures against Iran, as 
modified by Council Regulation No 2015/1861; 
- In addition, it remains prohibited under the Iran human rights sanctions 
regime to export equipment which might be used for internal repression 
and equipment for monitoring telecommunications since this is outside the 
scope of the JCPOA; 
- Finally, any export to or for the benefit of any person or entity listed under 
any EU sanctions regime shall remain prohibited (prohibition to make 
economic resources available to listed persons or entities) 
5. Are there any export control rules that apply to exports to third countries?  
Any export control rules that apply independently from the sanctions taken in 
connection with the Iranian nuclear programme continue to apply. Any such 
controls apply to exports to any country outside the EU. In addition, goods and 
technology in Annexes I, II, VIIA and VIIB to Council Regulation 267/2012, as 
modified by Council Regulation No 2015/1861 are subject to specific 





6. What does the term "associated services" mean when used in Annex II of the 
JCPOA? 
For the purposes of Annex II of the JCPOA the term "associated services" means 
any service – including technical assistance, training, insurance, re-insurance, 
brokering, transportation or financial service – necessary and ordinarily incident 
to the underlying activity for which sanctions have been lifted pursuant to the 
JCPOA.
63
 It is noted that the EU legal acts provide further clarity regarding the 
scope of lifting of sanctions on associated services for each measure. 
7. Does the lifting of sanctions also include the lifting of restrictions currently in 
place on Iranian students? 
As of Implementation Day (16 January 2016), Member States are no longer under 
a UN or EU imposed obligation to prevent specialised teaching or training of 
Iranian nationals of disciplines which would contribute to Iran's proliferation-
sensitive nuclear activities and development of nuclear weapon delivery systems.
64
 
However, other international obligations and commitments including UN Security 
Council resolution 1540 and commitments of Member States under the 
international export control regimes concerning intangible transfer of controlled 
technology related to Weapons of Mass Destruction proliferation as well as non-
assistance obligations under the Chemical Weapons Convention and Biological 
Weapons Convention continue to apply. Member States may also have additional 
national approval schemes that remain in place. 
8. What will happen if Iran does not comply with the provisions of the JCPOA? 
If Iran or the E3/EU+3 believes that the commitments under the JCPOA are not 
met, the issue could be referred to the Joint Commission. The Joint Commission 
would try to solve the issue through the dispute resolution mechanism described 
in the JCPOA. If at the end of the process the complaining participant believes the 
issue still has not been resolved to its satisfaction, and if the complaining 
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participant deems the issue to constitute significant non-performance, it can notify 
the UN Security Council that it believes the issue constitutes significant non-
performance of the obligations under the JCPOA. The UN Security Council will 
vote on a resolution to continue the sanctions lifting and if this resolution has not 
been adopted within 30 days of the notification, then the provisions of the old UN 
Security Council resolutions
65
 will be re-imposed, unless the UN Security Council 
decides otherwise. 
In such an event, the European Union, following the necessary Council decision, 
will reintroduce ("snapback") EU sanctions taken in connection with the Iranian 
nuclear programme that have been suspended and/or terminated. 
9. Is it possible that new sanctions on Iran will be introduced by the UN/EU/U.S.? 
The EU and the U.S. will refrain from re-introducing or re-imposing sanctions 
that have been lifted under the JCPOA or from imposing new nuclear-related 
sanctions, without prejudice to the dispute resolution process provided for under 
the JCPOA. There will be no new nuclear-related UN Security Council sanctions, 
without prejudice to the dispute resolution process provided for under the 
JCPOA. 
10. What kind of support is established for evaluating and determining if an activity is 
consistent with the JCPOA? 
The Joint Commission consisting of the E3/EU+3 and Iran is established to 
monitor the implementation of the JCPOA and carries out the functions specified 
in Annex IV of the JCPOA.
66
  
For the review and recommendations on proposals for nuclear-related transfers 
to or activities with Iran the Joint Commission is assisted by the Procurement 
Working Group. As regards the lifting of sanctions the Joint Commission is 
assisted by a Working Group on Implementation of Sanctions Lifting. The High 
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Representative serves as the coordinator of the Joint Commission and both 
working groups. 
Financial, banking and insurance measures 
11. Is it permissible to access financial and banking services in Iran? 
The restrictions on accessing financial and banking services in Iran (as contained 
in EU Council Decision 2010/413/CFSP and Council Regulation 267/2012) are 
lifted as of Implementation Day (16 January 2016). 
12. Does the lifting of measures on banking allow the reopening of correspondent 
banking accounts?  
As of Implementation Day (16 January 2016), banking activities including the 
establishment of new correspondent banking relationships with Iranian banks are 
allowed, provided that the Iranian financial institution is not a listed entity. 
13. Can an EU person or entity use any Iranian bank for its business and engage in 
banking transactions? Or are there still Iranian banks listed? 
Certain Iranian banks remain listed (Ansar Bank, Bank Saderat Iran and Bank 
Saderat plc, and Mehr Bank). Hence, due diligence should be performed to ensure 
that the Iranian bank is not listed as activities and transactions with these banks 
remain prohibited. Banking transactions or relationships with non-listed Iranian 
banks are permissible. 
14. Is there any limitation to opening a new bank account or entering into a 
correspondent banking relationship with non-listed financial institutions 
domiciled in Iran or their branches or subsidiaries? 
All restrictive measures concerning financial, banking and insurance measures 
are lifted and, as of Implementation Day (16 January 2016), it is permissible to 
open a new bank account or to enter into correspondent banking relationships 
with credit or financial institutions domiciled in Iran (or their branches or 




15. Is there any limitation to opening branches, subsidiaries or representative offices 
of Iranian banks in EU Member States or of European banks in Iran? 
As of Implementation Day (16 January 2016), non-listed Iranian banks are 
allowed to open branches, subsidiaries or representative offices in EU Member 
States. EU financial institutions are then permitted to open branches, subsidiaries 
or representative offices in Iran. 
16. What sanctions on the Central Bank of Iran (CBI) and other listed Iranian 
financial institutions will remain?  
The CBI and certain other listed Iranian financial institutions were delisted and 
therefore sanctions related to these entities are no longer applicable. 
17. Is there any limitation for the Central Bank of Iran (CBI) to access its funds and 
economic resources? 
The CBI was delisted on Implementation Day (16 January 2016), hence sanctions 
related to this entity are no longer applicable as of that day and any funds or 
economic resources that have been frozen pursuant to its listing were released. 
18. Is there any limitation for financial institutions supplying financial messaging 
services for the Central Bank of Iran (CBI) and other non-listed financial 
institutions? 
The prohibition for financial institutions to supply specialised financial messaging 
services used to exchange financial data applies in relation to listed entities. The 
CBI and certain other listed Iranian financial institutions were delisted. 
Therefore, financial institutions can supply financial messaging services for the 




19. Will financial institutions be exposed to U.S. sanctions for transacting with 
Iranian financial institutions if those Iranian financial institutions have banking 
relationships with Iranian persons on the SDN list? 
This question addresses the U.S. sanction regime and for an accurate response 
reference is made to the U.S. Guidelines and FAQs on the OFAC website.
67
 
20. Are Iranian banks allowed to reconnect to SWIFT? 
As of Implementation Day (16 January 2016), Iranian banks which are no longer 
included in the list of persons and entities subject to EU restrictive measures are 
allowed to reconnect to SWIFT
68
. Persons and entities delisted on Implementation 
Day are included in the Annex to Council Implementing Regulation (EU) 
2015/1862 of 18 October 2015, implementing Regulation (EU) No 267/2012 
concerning restrictive measures against Iran. Additional entities delisted on 22 
January 2016 are included in the Annex to Council Implementing Regulation 
(EU) 2016/74 of 22 January 2016, implementing Regulation (EU) No 267/2012 
concerning restrictive measures against Iran 
Against this background reference is made to a statement published by SWIFT
69
, 
that banks delisted by the Implementing Regulation will automatically be able to 
reconnect to SWIFT on Implementation Day, following the completion of SWIFT's 
normal connection process (i.e. administrative and systems checks, connectivity 
and technical arrangements). 
21. Is it permissible for EU financial institutions to clear transactions involving non-
listed Iranian persons or entities after Implementation Day? 
Yes, EU financial institutions are permitted to clear transactions with non-listed 
Iranian persons or entities. EU financial institutions will have to ensure, however, 
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that they do not clear transactions through other financial systems, or with other 
entities, where such activity is not allowed. 
70
  
22. Is it permissible to transfer funds to and from Iran? 
As of Implementation Day (16 January 2016), the prohibition to transfer funds 
with non-listed Iranian banks is lifted. Consequently, all limitations to transfer 
funds to or from Iran applicable to non-listed Iranian banks, financial institutions 
and bureaux de change, as well as any subsidiary or branch, cease to apply. 
23. Is it still necessary to file notifications and requests for authorisations relating to 
the transfer of funds pursuant to Articles 30, 30a of Council Regulation 267/2012 
as currently applicable? Is there any limitation in relation to the amount of funds 
that can be transferred? 
As of Implementation Day (16 January 2016), there is no requirement to file 
notifications and requests for authorisations relating to the transfer of funds to 
and from Iran as these articles are removed from Council Regulation 267/2012
71
. 
Equally, restrictions linked to the amount of funds to be transferred no longer 
apply in accordance with the JCPOA. 
24. Is it permissible to transfer funds to and from Iran for foodstuffs, healthcare, 
medical equipment, or for agricultural or humanitarian purposes? 
According to the restrictions on transfer of funds to and from Iran in place before 
Implementation Day the transfer of funds regarding foodstuffs, healthcare, 
medical equipment, or for agricultural or humanitarian purposes were permitted 
under certain conditions. However, as of Implementation Day, the provisions 
regarding transfer of funds to and from Iran are lifted and the limitations to 
transfer funds cease to apply with the exception of transfer of funds or economic 
resources to listed persons or entities. 
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25. Is it permissible for listed person and entities to use frozen funds for extraordinary 
expenses? 
Those persons and entities that are removed from the list have immediate access 
to their funds on that same day. The persons and entities remaining listed do not 
have access to their funds. However, exemptions to take account of in particular 
basic needs of targeted persons, legal fees, and extraordinary expenses remain in 
force and listed persons can request an authorisation from the competent 
authorities of Member States in order to use their funds where a valid derogation 
applies. 
26. Is there any limitation for Iranian banks and financial institutions, bodies and 
entities to access their funds and economic resources? 
Non-listed Iranian banks and financial institutions are not subject to any asset 
freeze measures by the European Union. Therefore, their funds in the EU are not 
frozen. On Implementation Day (16 January 2016), a number of listed Iranian 
banks and financial institutions were delisted followed by additional Iranian 
banks on 23 January 2016. Consequently, delisted Iranian banks and financial 
institutions had access to their frozen funds in the EU. However, a limited number 
of Iranian banks and financial institutions remain listed (Ansar Bank, Bank 
Saderat Iran and Bank Saderat plc, and Mehr Bank) and not able to access their 
funds in the EU, unless specifically provided for in Council Regulation 267/2012. 
27. How does the lifting of sanctions provided under the EU legal acts in accordance 
with the JCPOA affect the provision of insurance and reinsurance for transactions 
involving Iran? 
As of Implementation Day (16 January 2016), it is permitted to provide insurance 
and reinsurance to Iran or the Government of Iran or any non-listed Iranian 
person, entity or body acting on their behalf or at their direction.
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28. Is the purchase or sale of Iranian issued sovereign debt allowed? 
The sale or purchase of public or public-guaranteed bonds issued by, for example, 
the Government of Iran or the Central Bank of Iran, or Iranian banks and credit 
or financial institutions, and providing related services thereto, is permitted as of 
Implementation Day (16 January 2016). The same applies to any natural or legal 
person entity or body acting on behalf or owned and controlled by them. 
29. Are there any limitations on the provision of financial support for trade with Iran, 
including export credits, guarantees or insurance? 
As of Implementation Day (16 January 2016), EU Member States are no longer 
prohibited from entering into new commitments to provide financial support for 
trade with Iran, including the granting of export credits, guarantees or insurance, 
to EU nationals or entities. 
30. Is there any limitation for persons to enter into new commitments for grants or 
concessional loans to the Government of Iran? 
As of Implementation Day (16 January 2016), EU Member States are no longer 
prohibited from entering into new commitments for grants, financial assistance 
and concessional loans to the Government of Iran, including through their 
participation in international financial institutions. 
31. Is there any limitation to financial institutions opening a new representative office 
or establishing a new branch or subsidiary in Iran? 
As of Implementation Day (16 January 2016), EU financial institutions are able 
to open representative offices, subsidiaries or banking accounts in Iran. It is also 
permissible to establish new joint ventures with Iranian financial institutions. 
However, EU financial institutions cannot engage in banking activities with those 




Oil, gas and petrochemical sectors 
32. Are petrochemicals covered by the lifting of sanctions? 
Yes, activities related to Iranian petrochemicals are covered by the lifting of 
sanctions on Implementation Day (16 January 2016).
73
 
33. Is it permissible to purchase, acquire, sell or market petroleum products, 
petrochemical products and natural gas to or from Iran? 
Yes, as of Implementation Day (16 January 2016), it is permissible to purchase, 
acquire, sell or market petroleum products, petrochemical products and natural 
gas to or from Iran and to provide associated services.
74
 
34. Does the lifting of sanctions on Iranian crude oil, petroleum products, 
petrochemical products and liquefied natural gas also cover the provision of 
transport? 
The transport of Iranian oil and petrochemical products, and the provision of 
insurance and re-insurance, including protection and indemnity (P&I) insurance, 
are permissible. As of Implementation Day (16 January 2016), the transport of 
Iranian petroleum products and liquefied natural gas, and the provision of 
insurance and re-insurance, including protection and indemnity (P&I) insurance, 
are also permissible. As of Implementation Day, other activities and transactions 




35. Are sanctions on entities such as the National Iranian Oil Company lifted? 
All entities removed from the list are no longer subject to restrictive measures. As 
of Implementation Day (16 January 2016), the National Iranian Oil Company, as 
well as its listed subsidiaries and affiliated companies, are removed from the list 
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of listed entities and as a consequence the sanctions on these entities are lifted 
and transactions are allowed. 
36. Is it permissible to invest in Iran's oil, gas and petrochemical sectors? 
Yes, as of Implementation Day (16 January 2016), it is permissible to invest in 
Iran's oil, gas and petrochemical sectors.
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37. The JCPOA provides that on Implementation Day the application of efforts to 
reduce Iran's crude oil sales are ceased, including limitations on: the quantities of 
Iran crude oil sold; the countries that can purchase Iranian crude oil and the use of 
Iranian oil revenues. What will this entail?  
This question addresses the U.S. sanction regime and for an accurate response 
reference is made to the U.S. Guidelines and FAQ’s on the OFAC website.77 
38. Is it prohibited for an EU person to conduct business with an Iranian entity in 
which a natural person or entity listed by the EU retains a minority or non-
controlling interest? 
EU persons are prohibited from making available funds or economic resources to 
listed persons or entities directly or indirectly. The criteria to establish control or 
ownership and whether funds or economic resources are made indirectly 
available to designated persons and entities are to be found in the 'Guidelines on 
implementation and evaluation of restrictive measures (sanctions) in the 
framework of the EU Common Foreign and Security Policy'.
78
 
                                                          
76 Annex II, paragraph 1.2.4, of the JCPOA. 
77 https://www.treasury.gov/resource-center/sanctions/Programs/Pages/iran.aspx 
78
 See link to ´New elements on the notions of ownership and control and the making available of funds or economic 




Shipping, shipbuilding and transport sectors  
39. Is it permissible to provide vessels designed for the transport of Iranian oil and 
petrochemical products? 
Yes, it is permissible to supply vessels designed for the transport or storage of oil 
and petrochemical products to non-listed Iranian persons or entities as well as to 
any person or entity for the transport of Iranian oil or petrochemical products.
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40. Is it permissible to export naval equipment and technology for shipbuilding to 
Iran? 
Yes, as of Implementation Day (16 January 2016), it is permissible to export 
naval equipment and technology for shipbuilding, maintenance or refit, to Iran or 
to non–listed Iranian or Iranian-owned enterprises engaged in this sector.80 
41. Is it permissible to construct and repair Iranian vessels? 
Yes, as of Implementation Day (16 January 2016), it is allowed to sell, supply, 
transfer or export naval equipment and technology for ship building, maintenance 
or refit, to Iran or to any Iranian persons engaged in this sector such as NITC and 
IRISL. The participation in the design, construction and repair of cargo vessels 
and oil tankers for Iran or for non-listed Iranian persons or Iranian-owned 




42. Is it permissible to provide flagging and classification services to vessels owned 
or controlled by Iranian persons? 
Yes, as of Implementation Day (16 January 2016), the provision of flagging and 
classification services, including those pertaining to technical specification, 
registration and identification numbers of any kind, to Iranian oil tankers and 
cargo vessels owned or controlled by non–listed Iranian or Iranian-owned 
                                                          
79 Annex II, paragraphs 1.3.1 and 1.3.2, of the JCPOA. 
80 Annex II, paragraph 3.4.1 of the JCPOA 
81




enterprises engaged in the shipping and shipbuilding sectors such as NITC and 
IRISL is allowed. 
43. Is it permissible to provide bunkering or ship supply services to Iranian owned or 
Iranian contracted vessels? 
Yes, as of Implementation Day (16 January 2016), it is permitted to provide 
bunkering or ship supply services to Iranian-owned or Iranian-contracted vessels, 
including chartered vessels, not carrying prohibited items.
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Gold, other precious metals, banknotes and coinage 
44. Is it permissible to mint coins for Iran or deliver newly printed or unissued Iranian 
denominated banknotes to the Central Bank of Iran? 
As of Implementation Day (16 January 2016), the delivery of newly minted 
coinage and newly printed or unissued Iranian denominated banknotes to or for 
the benefit of Central Bank of Iran is allowed.
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45. Is it permissible to export diamonds to Iran? 
As of Implementation Day (16 January 2016), the sale, purchase, transportation 
or brokering of diamonds to Iran is allowed.
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46. Is it permissible to supply, sell, purchase, transfer, export or import gold and other 
precious metals to and from Iran, the Government of Iran, its public bodies, 
corporations and agencies, any person, entity or body owned or controlled by 
them? 
Yes, it is permissible to sell, supply, purchase, export, or transfer gold and 
precious metals, to provide related brokering, financing and security services to, 
or from or for the Government of Iran, its public bodies, corporations and 
agencies or the Central Bank of Iran its public bodies, corporations and agencies, 
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any person, entity or body acting on their behalf or at their direction, or any 
entity or body owned or controlled by them. 
Metals / Software 
47. Are all restrictions on the export of software lifted? 
As of Implementation Day (16 January 2016), the export of software to Iran is 
permitted, with the following exceptions:  
- Prior authorisation to be granted on a case-by-case basis by the 
competent authority of the relevant Member State is needed for the sale, 
supply, transfer or export of Enterprise Resource Planning software, 
designed specifically for use in nuclear and military industries as set out 
in Annex VIIA to Council Regulation 267/2012, as modified by Council 
Regulation No 2015/1861, and the provision of associated services; 
- Prior authorisation to be granted on a case-by-case basis by the 
competent authority of the relevant Member State is needed for the sale, 
supply, transfer or export of software related to nuclear equipment and 
technologies as set out in Annexes I and II to Council Regulation 
267/2012, as modified by Council Regulation No 2015/1861; 
- On the contrary, the sale, supply, transfer or export of software related to 
ballistic missiles as set out in Annex III to Council Regulation 267/2012, 
as modified by Council Regulation No 2015/1861, is still subject to a 
prohibition. 
48. What metals are still subject to restriction on the sale, supply or export to Iran? 
As of Implementation Day (16 January 2016), the export of metals to Iran is 
permitted with the following exception: 
- Prior authorisation to be granted on a case-by-case basis by the 
competent authorities of the Member State is needed for the sale, supply, 
transfer or export of graphite and raw or semi-finished metals and the 
provision of technical assistance or training, financing or financial 




Annex VIIB to Council Regulation 267/2012, as modified by Council 
Regulation No 2015/1861. 
49. Is an entity allowed to invest in the production or in a production facility in Iran 
for the production of metals covered by an export authorisation regime? 
Yes, the JCPOA does not preclude investment in Iran in sectors related to goods 
the sale, supply, transfer or export, of which remain subject to an authorisation 
regime. 
50. Is the sale or export of aluminium oxide (alumina) to Iran subject to prior EU 
authorisation? 
The list of graphite and raw or semi-finished metals subject to prior authorisation 
to be granted on a case-by-case basis by the competent authority of the relevant 
Member State
85
 can be found in Annex VIIB to Council Regulation 267/2012, as 
modified by Council Regulation No 2015/1861. 
51. Is it permissible to sell, supply, transfer, export or to provide technical and 
financial assistance related to software to an Iranian person body or entity? 
Sale, supply, transfer or export of Enterprise Resource Planning software
86
, 
including updates and provision of associated services, to any Iranian person, 
entity or body, or for use in Iran is no longer prohibited as of Implementation Day 
(16 January 2016) but is subject to prior authorisation to be granted on a case-
by-case basis by the competent authorities of the Member States. 
Nuclear proliferation-related measures 
52. Where can the list of dual-use goods which can be exported to Iran be found? 
The lists of dual-use goods which can be exported to Iran – subject to prior 
authorisation – are to be found in Annexes I (Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG) list, 
Parts I and II) and II (EU autonomous list) of Council Regulation 267/2012, as 
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modified by Council Regulation No 2015/1861. In addition to this, export licenses 
for other dual-use goods listed in Annex I of Regulation (EC) No 428/2009 can be 
applied for in line with the provisions of that regulation. 
53. Is it permissible to apply for a license to export dual-use goods to Iran? 
Yes, licenses to export dual-use goods should be requested from the competent 
authority in the relevant Member State. A list of the national competent 
authorities is to be found in Annex X of Council Regulation 267/2012, as modified 
by Council Regulation No 2015/1861. 
54. Is an authorisation for the export of dual-use goods granted by an EU Member 
State valid in other EU Member States? 
Yes, authorisations for the export of dual-use goods granted by the competent 
authorities of the Member State where the exporter is established shall be valid 
throughout the Union. 
55. How much time will it take to obtain a licence? 
This is a matter for the relevant competent authority responsible for issuing 
licenses. 
56. Article 2d(3)(b) Council Regulation 267/2012, as modified by Council Regulation 
No 2015/1861, states that Member States shall notify the IAEA of supplied 
products included in the NSG list: Is a reference to both lists (NSG Part I and II) 
intended? 
Notification obligation concerns both lists – Part I and II - of the Nuclear 
Suppliers Group (NSG) and is to be found in Annex I to Council Regulation 
267/2012, as modified by Council Regulation No 2015/1861.  
Arms & ballistic missiles  
57. Are arms exports also subject to prior authorisation in the procurement channel? 
The EU arms embargo was not lifted on Implementation Day (16 January 2016). 
Sanctions related to arms, including the provision of associated services, remain 




Listing of persons, entities and bodies (asset freeze and visa ban) 
58. Is it permissible to do business with anybody in Iran? Or are there still persons 
and entities listed? 
Yes, in general terms, as of Implementation Day (16 January 2016), it is 
permissible to do business with Iranian persons or entities, with the exception of 
those that remain listed until Transition Day or are listed under a different 
sanctions regime and thus remain subject to the asset freeze measures, including 
the prohibition to make funds or economic resources available. It is advised to 
consult these lists before engaging in a business relationship. A central register of 
persons and entities that are subject to EU sanctions is available online.
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59. How to verify if an entity or individual is on the sanctions list? 
It is the responsibility of every person or entity within the European Union, and 
EU nationals anywhere in the world to conduct due diligence checks to ensure 
that they are not making funds or economic resources available to a listed person. 




60. Does the JCPOA allow new sanctions to be imposed against Iranian persons or 
entities for providing support to the Government of Iran after Implementation 
Day? 
In accordance with the JCPOA, the EU will refrain from imposing new sanctions 
against Iranian persons or entities exclusively on the grounds of providing 
support, such as material, logistical or financial support, to the Government of 
Iran. 






Reintroduction of sanctions 
61. What would trigger the reintroduction of EU economic and financial sanctions? 
In the event of a significant non-performance by Iran of its commitments under 
the JCPOA and having exhausted all the steps under the dispute resolution 
mechanism, the European Union shall reintroduce EU sanctions ("snapback") 
that have been lifted. It should be noted that all parties to the JCPOA are 
determined to avoid any behaviour which could be qualified as non-performance 
and to avoid a re-imposition of sanctions by engaging in the Dispute Resolution 
Mechanism. 
62. How will EU sanctions be reintroduced in case of snapback? 
A decision by the Council of the European Union, based on a recommendation by 
the High Representative of the European Union for Foreign Affairs and Security 
Policy, France, Germany and the United Kingdom, will reintroduce all EU 
sanctions taken in connection with the Iranian nuclear programme that have been 
suspended and/or terminated. Reintroduction of EU sanctions in case of 
significant non-performance by Iran of its commitments under the JCPOA will be 
done consistent with previous provisions when sanctions were originally imposed. 
63. What happens with existing contracts in the event of the reintroduction of EU 
sanctions? 
In the event of the reintroduction of EU sanctions, sanctions will not apply with 
retroactive effect. The execution of contracts concluded while the JCPOA 
sanctions relief was in force and in accordance with the EU legal framework will 
be permitted consistent with previous provisions when sanctions were originally 
imposed, in order to allow companies to wind down their activities. Details about 
the period of time allowed for the execution of prior contracts will be specified in 
the legal acts providing for the reintroduction of EU sanctions. For example, the 
reintroduction of sanctions on investment activities would not retroactively 
penalise investment made before the date of snapback, and the execution of 
investment contracts concluded before the reintroduction of sanctions will be 




imposed. Contracts that were permitted when the sanctions regime was still in 
place will not be targeted by the reintroduction of sanctions.  
64. Is the moment of a snapback publicly announced? 
The reintroduction of EU sanctions will imply the adoption of legal acts 
terminating the suspension of articles in Council Decision 2010/413CFSP, as 
amended by Council Decision 2015/1863, and reintroducing the corresponding 
articles in Council Regulation 267/2012, as modified by Council Regulation 
2015/1861. These legal acts will be published in the Official Journal of the 




65. How does the procurement channel function? 
The UN Security Council will respond to requests by States to export certain 
goods to and perform certain activities in Iran (NSG list/Annex I to Council 
Regulation 267/2012, as modified by Council Regulation 2015/1861) after the 
recommendation of the Procurement Working Group/Joint Commission. 
66. What is the role of the Procurement Working Group? 
The role of the Procurement Working Group is to review and make 
recommendations on behalf of the Joint Commission on proposals for nuclear-




67. Who is the “Coordinator” in point 6.4.1 of JCPOA Annex IV? 
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68. How is confidentiality of information when sending an authorisation application 
ensured? For example, on sensitive business-related information. 
The operation of the Procurement Working Group is subject to the confidentiality 
rules of the UN.
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69. How will the Procurement Working Group communicate its authorisation 
decisions to domestic authorities? 
The Procurement Working Group will review applications and make a 
recommendation to the UN Security Council, which will then communicate its 
decision to national competent authorities.  
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DEPARTMENT OF THE TREASURY 
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20220 
OFFICE OF FOREIGN ASSETS CONTROL 
Iranian Transactions and Sanctions Regulations 
31 C.F.R. Part 560 
GENERAL LICENSE H 
Authorizing Certain Transactions Relating to 
Foreign Entities Owned or Controlled by a United States Person 
(a) Except as provided in paragraph (c), an entity owned or controlled by a United States 
person and established or maintained outside the United States (a "U.S.-owned or -controlled 
foreign entity") is authorized to engage in transactions, directly or indirectly, with the 
Government of Iran or any person subject to the jurisdiction of the Government of Iran that 
would otherwise be prohibited by 31 C.F.R. § 560.215. 
Note 1 to paragraph (a): This general license does not authorize the reexportation from 
a third country of any goods, technology, or services prohibited by 31 C.F.R. § 560.205. 
Note 2 to paragraph (a): For purposes of this general license, an entity is "owned or 
controlled" by a United States person if the United States person: (1) holds a 50 percent or 
greater equity interest by vote or value in the entity; (2) holds a majority of seats on the board of 
directors of the entity; or (3) otherwise controls the actions, policies, or personnel decisions of 
the entity. See 31 C.F.R. § 560.314 for a definition ofthe term United States person, which 
includes foreign branches of an entity organized under the laws of the United States or any 
jurisdiction within the United States. 
(b) A United States person is authorized to engage in the following activities that would 
otherwise be prohibited by 31 C.F.R. part 560: 
(1) activities related to the establishment or alteration of operating policies and 
procedures of a United States entity or a U.S.-owned or -controlled foreign entity, to the extent 
necessary to allow a U.S.-owned or -controlled foreign entity to engage in transactions 
authorized in paragraph (a); and 
(2) activities to make available to those foreign entities that the U.S. person owns or 
controls any automated and globally integrated computer, accounting, email, 
telecommunications, or other business support system, platform, database, application, or server 
necessary to store, collect, transmit, generate, or otherwise process documents or information 
related to transactions authorized in paragraph (a). 
Note 1 to paragraph (b)(2): For purposes of this subsection, the term "automated" refers 
to a computer, accounting, email, telecommunications, or other business support system, 
platform, database, application, or server that operates passively and without human intervention 
to facilitate the flow of data between and among the United States person and its owned or 
controlled foreign entities. 
Note 2 to paragraph (b)(2): For purposes of this subsection, the term "globally 
integrated" refers to a computer, accounting, email, telecommunications, or other business 
support system, platform, database, application, or server that is available to, and in general use 
by, the United States person's global organization, including the United States person and its 
owned or controlled foreign entities. 
Note 3 to paragraph (b )(2): Paragraph (b )(2) does not authorize the use of any 
automated computer, accounting, email, telecommunications, or other business support system, 
platform, database, application, or server in connection with any transfer of funds to, from, or 
through a United States depository institution or a United States-registered broker or dealer in 
securities. 
Note to paragraph (b): See 31 C.F.R. § 560.208 for prohibitions on facilitation by 
United States persons, which remain in effect, with the exception of activities authorized in 
paragraph (b). 
(c) Paragraph (a) of this general license does not authorize transactions involving: 
(1) The exportation, reexportation, sale, or supply, directly or indirectly, from the United 
States of any goods, technology, or services prohibited by 31 C.F.R. § 560.204, without separate 
authorization from the Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC); 
(2) Any transfer of funds to, from, or through a United States depository institution or a 
United States-registered broker or dealer in securities; 
(3) Any person on OFAC's list of Specially Designated Nationals and Blocked Persons 
(SDN List), or any activity that would be prohibited by any part of chapter V of 31 C.F.R. other 
than part 560 if engaged in by a United States person or in the United States; 
(4) Any person identified on the List of Foreign Sanctions Evaders pursuant to Executive 
Order 13608; 
(5) Any activity involving any item (including information) subject to the Export 
Administration Regulations, 15 C.F.R. parts 730-774 (EAR), that is prohibited by, or otherwise 
requires a license under, part 744 of the EAR; or participation in any transaction involving a 
person whose export privileges have been denied pursuant to part 764 or 766 of the EAR, 
without authorization from the Department of Commerce; 
(6) Any military, paramilitary, intelligence, or law enforcement entity of the Government 
of Iran, or any official, agent, or affiliate thereof; 
(7) Any activity that is sanctionable under Executive Order 12938 or 13382 (relating to 
Iran' s proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and their means of delivery, including 
ballistic missiles); Executive Order 13224 (relating to international terrorism); Executive Order 
13572 or 13582 (relating to Syria); Executive Order 13611 (relating to Yemen); or Executive 
2 
Order 13553 or 13606, or section 2 or 3 of Executive Order 13628 (relating to Iran's commission 
of human rights abuses against its citizens); or 
(8) Any nuclear activity involving Iran that is subject to the procurement channel 
established pursuant to paragraph 16 of the United Nations Security Council Resolution 2231 
(2015) and Section 6 of Annex IV to the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action of July 14, 2015 
and that has not been approved through that procurement channel process. 
(d) This general license does not authorize any transaction by a United States person 
prohibited by any part of chapter V of 31 C.F.R. other than part 560. 
Dated: January 16, 2016 
3 
Jo E. Smith 
Acting Director 
Office ofF oreign Assets Control 
25/05/16 11:49European Union - EEAS (European External Action Service) | Joint state…ister of Foreign Affairs of the Islamic Republic of Iran, Javad Zarif




Joint statement by the High Representative/Vice-President of the
European Union, Federica Mogherini and the Minister of Foreign
Affairs of the Islamic Republic of Iran, Javad Zarif
On 16 April 2016, the EU High Representative and Vice-President of the European Commission (HRVP)
Federica Mogherini met Iranian Foreign Minister Mohammad Javad Zarif in Tehran. European Commission
representatives present included EU Commissioners Elzbieta Bienkowska (Internal Market, Industry,
Entrepreneurship and SMEs), Arias Cañete (Climate Action and Energy), Christos Stylianides (Humanitarian
Aid and Crisis Management), Violeta Bulc (Transport), Carlos Moedas (Research, Science and Innovation),
Karmenu Vella (Environment, Maritime Affairs and Fisheries) and Tibor Navracsics (Education, Culture,
Youth and Sport). They met with their Iranian counterparts.
 
The two sides taking stock of their long standing relations, based upon mutual respect and interests,
reiterated their intention to develop a broad and comprehensive agenda for bilateral cooperation. 
 
They welcomed the implementation day of the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) on 16 January
2016 that contributed to opening a new chapter in EU-Iran relations. The EU and Iran are fully committed to
the JCPOA and its implementation in all its aspects. It was reconfirmed that the continued and full
implementation of the JCPOA remains of utmost importance. 
 
It was stated that the following shared and overarching objectives are vital for the promotion of EU-Iran
relations:
 
• Ensuring and supporting the full implementation of the JCPOA in order to further improve and deepen
bilateral cooperation;
• Developing cooperative relations in areas of mutual interest to benefit the economic development, human
rights, prosperity and well-being of the people of Iran and the EU; 
• Promoting regional peace, security and stability as well as peaceful settlement of regional conflicts
through dialogue and engagement.
To facilitate the programme of cooperation as set out below and with a view to preparing the future opening
of an EU Delegation in Tehran, in accordance with rules and regulations of the Islamic Republic of Iran, an
EU liaison team will be sent to Tehran. This will contribute to strengthening the relations and implement
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future cooperation initiatives. 
 
The EU and Iran intend to cooperate in the following areas:
 
Political Consultations
The two sides intend to enhance their political dialogue through consultations at the level of the HRVP and
the Iranian Foreign Minister, annually. This advances the existing agreement to meet regularly for a High
Level Dialogue at Deputy Minister/ Political Director level. Senior officials and experts will meet as required




The two sides expressed their determination to enhance and promote human rights. In this context, they




The two sides encourage the expansion of economic relations between EU and Iran, recognizing the
importance of macro-economic issues, trade, finance and investment in achieving sustainable growth and
development. They intend to engage in a macro-economic and finance dialogue including on the following
initiatives:
 
• Improve and enable financial as well as encouraging banking cooperation between the EU and Iran. The
EU can assist if required in addressing Anti Money Laundering and Countering Financing of Terrorism
(AML/CFT) issues;
• Explore the prospect of extending  the third country lending mandate of the European Investment Bank
(EIB) to Iran, to enhance the availability of finance for investment in Iran and possible blending (of loans
with grants);
• Cooperation in a variety of sectors with a focus in particular on encouraging regulatory and industrial
policy dialogues and creating mutual opportunities, including textiles, tourism, raw materials, construction
and any other areas to be mutually determined; 
• Building on EU expertise in the field of SMEs support to foster business and in particular SMEs favourable
environment in Iran and share information on the "Enterprise Europe Network”;
• Exchange of Iran and EU business missions in the second half of the year;
• Consider development cooperation on strengthening the private sector and SMEs in Iran;
• Facilitate and encourage EU-Iran business sector presence in each others’ markets through a variety of
measures .
 
Trade and investment Cooperation
The two sides strive to strengthen their bilateral cooperation on trade and investment matters. With a view
to renewing a  dialogue to strengthen trade and investment relations between Iran and EU, they agreed to
exchange visits of expert delegations at an appropriate level in the coming months.  EU will support and
assist Iran to become a member of the World Trade Organization (WTO).
 
Agriculture
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The two sides intend to promote cooperation on agriculture and the agri-food industry with a view to
exploring production and technological methods and to assisting Iranian products to meet regulatory and
phytosanitary standards of the European markets. 
 
Transport
The two sides express their commitment to a safe and sustainable development of all modes of
transportation in order to support the resumption of trade, investment and citizens´ links. Specifically with
respect to the safety of transport, in line with consultations already held, they intend to: 
• Perform technical assessments to remove and review restrictions on the aircraft fleet of Iran Air with
regard to the EU Air Safety List, and to issue "Third Country Operator Authorization" to the Iranian air
carriers that applied, provided the necessary safety requirements have been met; 
• Embark on technical cooperation in support of aviation safety in Iran;
• Exchange views on the possibility of a horizontal agreement;
• Exchange views and experience on rail safety and interoperability, as well as facilitation of international
rail transport, including rail corridors;
• Explore cooperation in other sectors, such as maritime, rail, road and urban transport.
 
Energy and climate change
Recognizing the significant potential in establishing a comprehensive cooperation in the field of energy, the
two sides intend to:
• Foster improved conditions for investments and technology exchange in the production and generation of
energy, and energy efficiency; and exchange information, where needed, on legal and regulatory
frameworks ;
• Engage in initiatives which aim at strengthening the security of energy supply and demand in the region
and beyond ; 
• Cooperate in multilateral fora with a view to enhancing the transparency and the functioning of the global
energy market ;
• Promote investments and encourage technological and technical exchanges to mitigate GHGs emission as
well as adaptation measures through promoting energy efficiency in different sectors of the Iranian
economy as well as enhancing use of renewable energies;
• Facilitate investments in upstream and downstream projects in the energy sector of Iran. 
 
For this purpose it is intended to launch a dedicated EU-Iran Dialogue on Energy. The objectives and
modalities of such cooperation are further detailed in the Joint Statement on Energy. 
 
Civil nuclear cooperation
With a view to contributing to the implementation of measures listed in Annex III of the JCPOA, the two
sides are launching a first cooperation project in the field of nuclear safety aimed at assisting the Atomic
Energy Organisation of the Islamic Republic of Iran and the Iranian Nuclear Regulatory Authority through EU
development assistance. In addition, the EU will share with Iran its experience acquired from stress tests
carried out within the EU and in third countries. Additional options for co-operation in the civil nuclear field
include joint fission and fusion research activities, as well as a possible regional nuclear safety conference
and a nuclear business forum. 
 
Environment
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In recognition of the importance of protecting and conserving the environment and the role of resource
efficiency in achieving green growth, and in acknowledgment of Iran's pressing environmental challenges,
the two sides intend to:
• Establish bilateral co-operation to address  air, soil and water pollution, water resources management,
conservation and sustainable use of nature,  biodiversity, desertification, and waste disposal management
issues; 
• Exchange experiences with a view to identifying appropriate policy responses, including projects to tackle
cross-border pollution; 




In support of better prevention, detection and response to disasters, including at the regional level, the two
sides intend to share experiences and best practices.
 
Science, Research and Innovation
The two sides will foster further the science, research and innovation cooperation between the EU and Iran,
including through stepping up Iran´s participation in the EU Research and Innovation Programme Horizon
2020 and its complementary Euratom Programme. They will encourage setting up partnerships with EU
counterparts, knowledge-sharing, mobility of researchers, participation in collaborative research activities in
various areas. They will share experience in the areas of technology and innovation. For this a separate joint
statement on science, technology, research and innovation was agreed between Commissioner Carlos
Moedas and his counterpart, Dr. Mohammad Farhadithe Iranian Minister for Science, Research and




Acknowledging the importance of developing the human dimension of EU-Iran relations, the two sides
intend to further deepen their cooperation in the field of higher education. To this effect, it is recalled that
the EU has earmarked an additional budget of EUR 3 million for Erasmus+ actions, to be used for
cooperation with Iran in 2016 and 2017. The two sides will expand the possibilities for Iranian higher
education institutions to participate in the Jean Monnet action for European integration studies. They also
intend to organize relevant academic events and fairs, in Tehran towards the end of 2016 to foster
cooperation between our universities and promote the participation of Iranian students and researchers and
academic staff in EU programmes, particularly Erasmus+ and the Marie Sklodowska Curie action. The EU
will also explore ways to allow for Iranian students to participate in Erasmus+ "credit mobility" action, which
consists of short-term mobility to European and Iranian universities. 
 
Culture
Both Iran and the EU have remarkably rich cultures and cultural heritage which makes them significant for
global tourism industry. Both sides therefore will promote tourism and ecotourism plans and programs.
Moreover, the two sides would share expertise in the area of conservation and restoration of archaeological
and historical works of art and monuments in order to contribute to the preservation of cultural heritage and
the promotion of cultural tourism. To this effect, the EU can share its expertise in the field, including
through developing specific training modules. The two sides also intend to further develop cultural
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cooperation between EU, its Member States and Iran, including through exchanges of professionals and
organisation of events aimed at making their respective cultures better known to the people in the EU and
Iran. To this effect the two sides will consider ways to improve Iran-EU cultural and art exchanges in Tehran
and the European capitals. In addition, Iran and the EU consider that developing their cooperation in the
field of sport constitutes a component of their engagement.
 
Drugs
Both sides recognized and agreed to meet the challenges for Iran resulting from opium production in the
region, as well as its multiple negative side effects in the areas of drug trafficking, human trafficking, border
management, law enforcement and health related aspects. Drug abuse inflicts huge damage on the
societies and individuals in Europe and Iran, thus both sides have a common interest in addressing the
drugs problem, both on the supply and demand side, as well as transit issues. The two sides intend to
engage in consultations, exchange of experience,and expertise, including on effective and proportional
criminal justice, as well as explore measures to address root causes of the problem, including poverty
alleviation and reconstruction in Afghanistan, support for political stability to foster required environment for
sustainable development in that country, both at multilateral and bilateral levels. Both sides share the view




The two sides agreed to launch a comprehensive migration dialogue and acknowledged the need to
exchange information on migration management and flows as well as on policy and legislative approaches
and priorities in relation to regular and irregular migration, asylum seekers and refugees, both at national
and regional levels. 
 
Regional issues
The two sides acknowledged the seriousness and urgency of addressing the volatile situation in the region.
Terrorism, extremism and violence have endangered regional stability and inflicted loss of human life and
resources on an unprecedented scale and have become global issues. In this context, both sides will look at
ways to implement the UNGA Resolution on World Against Violence and Extremism (A/RES/128/67). They
therefore consider that it is crucial to translate the positive benefits of the JCPOA into improved prospects
for regional peace and stability. To this end, the two sides will engage, in a constructive and equitable
manner, on regional issues with a view to building channels of dialogue, mutual trust and understanding,
and in particular to fostering approaches aimed at resolving regional crises. 
 
The two sides consider that solutions to such crises must be inclusive, peaceful and comprehensive, and
above all sustainable. They stress the need for all actors to adopt constructive approaches that reinforce the
principles of non-interference and the territorial integrity of states, as well as respecting the primacy of
international law, including human rights.
 
Humanitarian Cooperation
The two sides share deep concerns on the dire humanitarian situation in the region due to the multiple
conflicts. Violence and insecurity have led to the displacement of millions of people and the EU and Iran
advocate all parties to the conflict to ensure the protection of vulnerable population as well as humanitarian
access to the people in need. The two sides intend to enhance humanitarian coordination and humanitarian
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assistance delivery in respect of International Humanitarian Law in the crises affecting Syria, Iraq, Yemen
and Afghanistan. The EU expresses its appreciation to Iran’s decision to include all registered Afghan
refugees in the national health insurance scheme on the same basis as its own citizens and to allow all
foreign children irrespective of their legal status to be enrolled in the national education system. The EU will
continue to provide humanitarian and development assistance in support of health care, shelter, food
security and protection for the most vulnerable. In order to meet the needs of a growing number of Afghans
in Iran, the EU will make immediately available EUR 6.5 million for additional humanitarian support. Within
this amount EUR 1.5 million is allocated to assist with the integration of 10,000 out of school Afghan
children into the Iranian education system. Both the EU and Iran recognize the importance of working
closely with the Government of Afghanistan on a common and mutually reinforcing strategy towards durable
solutions. Cooperation on civil society building and strengthening of the local authorities is continuing and
the two sides intend to increase this cooperation in the future.
 
- Link to EU Iran Joint Statement on energy cooperation 
- Link to EU Iran Joint Statement on cooperation in nuclear energy 
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